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ABSTRACT
THE ECONOMIC TRINITY: COMMUNION WITH THE TRIUNE GOD
IN A MARKET ECONOMY
D. Glenn Butner, Jr.
Marquette University, 2016
Many theological approaches to economics claim that the market economy can
help develop an economic agent in virtue, while others argue that market economies
undermine virtue, impede authentic spirituality, or result in injustice. Similarly,
experimental and behavioral economists have identified market constructions that
influence economic agents in terms of their motivations, perceptions, actions, and selfunderstanding in positive or negative ways. This dissertation theologically analyzes these
two bodies of literature under the conviction that any redemptively significant
development that an economic agent undergoes in the economy must be attributed to
God’s grace.
This project develops a Reformed and trinitarian theology of divine action by
drawing on a non-contrastive account of transcendence as the basis for developing an
account of human actions as concurrent with divine acts. A theology of common grace
allows social actions within the marketplace to be identified as grace even when the
economic agents who contribute to and participate in these social interactions may not be
believers. An account of appropriations allows aspects of common grace to be
distinctively attributed to the work of the Father, Son, or Holy Spirit without jeopardizing
the divine oneness. The claim that all divine actions supervene upon created realities calls
for the identification of immanent terms for the distinctive works of the Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit. Drawing on the theology of Kevin Hector as developed in dialogue with
Charles Taylor, Cornelius Castoriadis, and Edward Rommen, this project describes the
Father working through social imaginaries, the Son through identity, and the Holy Spirit
through norms.
The dissertation subsequently explores how various market constructions may
impede or enhance redemptively significant transformation by addressing the way these
constructions influence social imaginaries, identity, or norms. Models are the key
economic focal point because models are the means by which markets are constructed.
As mathematical language, they are most prone to shape social imaginaries. Deficiencies
in many models and their consequences are explored, with constructive solutions offered.
When models undermine redemptively significant transformation, the project explains
how the immanent term relates to the work of redemption in revelation, justification, and
sanctification to illuminate the problem.
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INTRODUCTION
In a fascinating study, economists found participants from fifteen small-scale
societies for a series of experimental economic games designed to test fairness,
cooperation, and altruism. The study was a first of its kind because most cross-cultural
economic experiments use university students who largely come from industrialized
large-scale societies with similar economies. In contrast, participants in this experiment
came from societies with a range of economic development. Some participants came
from foraging societies that rarely traded with anyone outside of the family, while others
participated in a significant degree of regional exchange as part of growing agricultural
societies. Each game was designed to allow a participant to distribute money using
various mechanisms to the various players of the game. What is striking about the set of
experiments is that researchers found that in some societies participants distributed the
money almost equally, while in others participants were much more likely to keep a
significantly larger portion of the money for themselves. These differences were found to
correlate with the economic and social interactions participants faced in daily life. In
societies where interaction with others through a market is frequent and culturally
reinforced by standards of fairness, distribution was likely to be fair. In cultures where
there is limited economic exchange and/or few cultural norms enforcing fairness in such
exchanges, distribution was far less equitable. The economists conclude: “economic
choices… are shaped by the economic and social interactions of everyday life.” Simply
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put, some economies and societies mold individuals to be more just, and others
apparently do not.1
How can we make sense of these differences theologically? Throughout history,
Christians have lived in a wide range of societies, influenced by a wide range of cultural
values, and exchanging within a wide variety of economies. Presumably, Christians in
different economies would be more or less likely to develop fair patterns of exchange and
altruistic behaviors, at least if the findings of this study can extend across time. What is
most puzzling is the question of how these differences in economy relate to the work of
God. After all, theologically we must speak of any growth in holiness, indeed any
redemptively significant2 growth at all, as the gracious work of God.3 How do changes in
the economy with redemptively significant results relate to the work of the Father, Son,
and Spirit?
Perhaps the matter can be put another way if we start with a theological question:
What does it mean for a person to daily be transformed and sanctified toward the end of
participating in the communion of the Father, Son, and Spirit in a world where that
person’s daily life primarily consists of participation in a market economy? Such gracious
participation in the divine life is, after all, part of what is made available through the
redemption made possible by Jesus Christ. In him, we are becoming “partakers of the

1

Joseph Henrich et al., “In Search of Homo Economicus: Behavioral Experiments in
Fifteen Small Scale Societies,” American Economic Review, 91.2 (May 2001), 73-8.
2
I will define this term in chapters 1 and 2.
3
This has been recognized at least since the debates between Pelagius and Augustine,
where the latter concluded “Wherever and whenever [Christians] realize perfection… it cannot be
realized except by ‘the grace of God, by Jesus Christ our Lord.’” Augustine of Hippo, On Nature
and Grace, in Saint Augustine: Four Anti-Pelagian Writings, trans. John A. Mourant and William
J. Collinge (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1992), §68.
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divine nature” (2 Pet. 1:4)4 such that we “share in his holiness” (Heb. 12:2) and may
become one in love as the Father, Son, and Spirit are one in their love of one another
(John 17:20-23). Our current participation in the life of God is itself an anticipation of
that last day, when not only will we “see him [Christ] as he is” (1 John 3:2), but we also
will see the Father face to face (Rev. 22:3-4), something the Scriptures repeatedly affirm
is impossible in this current life (Ex. 33:20, 1 Tim. 6:16).
While Christians share the hope of a participation in the divine nature, holiness,
and love, it is often unclear how to be a participant in these realities today while also
participating in a market economy. What do such theological statements have to do with
our labor or our choice of occupation, with our financial investments, savings accounts,
or credit card debt, with the way that we manage and evaluate our employees, or even
with our purchasing decisions at the mall or at the nearest Wal-Mart? Many recognize
that each of these human endeavors is laden with certain moral obligations prohibiting
laziness and dishonesty in the workplace, fraudulent financial practices, or exploitative
management techniques. Most Christians could easily list a number of moral strictures to
be observed in the marketplace, but one must wonder whether such moral parameters are
the best way that Christian faith relates to what is for the average citizen in the
“developed nations” the primary space within which we dedicate our time: the market.
Do our daily interactions in the market as consumers and producers, investors and debtors
have any direct bearing on our participation in God’s redeeming work in drawing us into
ever increasing participation in the divine life?

4

Version.

Unless otherwise noted, all scripture citations are taken from the English Standard
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A number of verses clearly suggest that God does work through the market to
facilitate increasing participation in the divine life. At present I will only focus on
Romans 8:28, which reads, “and we know that for those who love God all things work
together for good, for those who are called according to his purpose.” Extant manuscripts
of the verse provide some textual variation so that “God” is sometimes included as the
one who acts – “God works all things for the good.”5 “In all things” (panta) can therefore
be taken as the direct object of the verb, which would render the verse to mean that God
causes all things to work toward the benefit of those who believe, or as an accusative of
respect indicating the sphere in which God is active.6 The second option is preferable
given that “works together” (sunergei) does not typically take a direct object and given
the possibility of an echo to Genesis 50:20’s “you meant evil against me, but God meant
it for God,”7 though there are lingering objections.8 Taking the dative for “those called”
(tois klētois) to be an instrumental dative, the verse could be loosely translated as follows:
“And we know that for those who love God, God works in all spheres for good with those
who are called according to his purpose.” The verse suggests that God works through all
spheres, which would include the market, partly by using economic agents themselves.

5

With or without this addition, God is the more likely candidate for the subject of the
verb than the Holy Spirit. Moo points out that the subject of the verbs in 8:29-30 is clearly “God”
and not “the Spirit” as in 8:26-7, suggesting that Paul has moved on from his prior
pneumatological focus. Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids, MI: William
B. Eerdmans, 1996), 528.
6
Ibid., 528.
7
Colin G. Kruse, Paul’s Letter to the Romans. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans,
2012), 354.
8
Cranfield suggests that MSS including God as the subject are likely later interpolations,
which points in the direction of “all things” being the subject of the verb rather than an accusative
of respect, which would leave an ambiguous subject. C.E.B. Cranfield, Romans: A Shorter
Commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1985), 204.
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It is somewhat unusual for Paul to refer to Christians as “those who love God,”9
but in this instance his choice of words may be intentional, echoing his teaching in
Romans 5:5 that our love derives from the fact that “God’s love has been poured in our
hearts through the Holy Spirit.”10 There is a “divine-human synergism,” to use the words
of Robert Jewett, between God and those who love him in all spheres (I will eventually
need to develop more precise language here).11 Those who love God are the beneficiaries
of a providential care active in all areas of life to bring about the good, which ultimately
refers to the final communion of God and humanity. The particular activity of this grace
is somehow connected with the saving grace wrought in the hearts of those who love God
through the outpouring of the Spirit. In this way, it seems that God is actively at work in
all things – society, history, and economy included – to bring about redemption (and
other goods), though precisely how this is brought about is not fully clear.
If we grant that God is at work through human society, through history, and
through economic exchanges, we immediately face a number of additional questions. Is
God acting in all societies and all economies equally? If not, in which societies and
economies is God more active? And, furthermore, if God is not equally active in all
societies and economies, on what grounds do we posit that God is more active in one
place rather than in another? The risks of such a line of questioning are quite clear to
those with any knowledge of recent history. When a particular society proclaims itself the
chosen object of a special divine favor, assuming for itself the supercessionist pretension

9

C.K. Barrett, The Epistle to the Romans (London: A&C Black, 1951), 159. Such an
interpretation is often ruled out as resulting in an unlikely optimism of a natural tendency of all
things to lead to moral progress apart from the agency of God. cf. Robert Jewett, Romans
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2007), 526.
10
Jewett, Romans, 526; Kruse, Romans, 355.
11
Ibid., 527.
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of supplanting Israel as the elect nation of God or of supplanting the Church as the
primary venue through which God is currently at work to redeem the world, the resulting
political and economic conceptions are far more likely to legitimize genocide, war,
terrorism, exploitation, slavery, or any number of other blatant examples of disregard for
the divine commandments to love God and neighbor than they are to result in any
legitimate identification of such divine favor. Our course will not be toward any such
attempt at identifying divine favor with a particular nation or any particular system of
political economy.
Nevertheless, if God is said to be active indiscriminately through all economic
exchanges or through all formations of social-historical reality, one immediately wonders
how, on the one hand, such uniform divine action could be anything other than an
interesting piece of trivia, while on the other hand how it might be possible to identify
any sort of political, economic, or social sin. If God works through all economic
exchanges equally, that is equally through chattel slavery, cottage industry, capitalist
multi-national corporations, and communist nation-states, such equivalent divine agency
would be irrelevant as a guide to our human efforts in building a society or in better
serving God within any society. God could be said to be at work identically through any
social-historical formation such that the economic and political particulars of our
societies would be inconsequential to the ultimate divine purposes for creation. Similarly,
if we were to suppose that God worked uniformly through economic exploitation and
through just economic interactions, we would presumably have no grounds for
condemning the former or preferring the latter. Insofar as we identified divine action and
goodness, both would simply be in full accordance with our conception of the good,
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whether we articulated this in terms of the divine commands or in respect to divine
efforts at building virtue. No, there must be some means of suggesting that particular
social-historical developments participate more fully in the life of God, and that
participating in any and all forms of economy is not coterminous with participating in the
life of God.
This is where a second scriptural insight can raise a second line of enquiry to
balance our first series of considerations. In 1 Thessalonians 5:19, Paul writes that the
church in Thessalonica should “not quench the Spirit.” In its brevity, the phrase seems
innocuous enough. Given the context of the warning to not despise prophecies in 5:20,
the passage is often taken to prohibit the silencing of the charism of prophecy.12 Under
such readings, quenching the Spirit occurs when a prophet refuses to share a prophecy, or
when a community silences a prophet’s message.13 However, Paul might actually have in
mind the fruits of the Spirit in general14 or all of the “extraordinary manifestations of the
Spirit,” including not only prophecy but tongues and other miraculous gifts.15 The
possibility of extending Paul’s exhortation to all such cases makes Paul’s brief paraenetic
phrase all the more fascinating. As Ben Witherington summarizes, “Paul’s exhortation
presupposes that it is possible to stifle the utterances of the Spirit.”16 When we think of

12

See, for example, Gordon D. Fee, The First and Second Letters to the Thessalonians
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2009), 219.
13
See F.F. Bruce, 1 & 2 Thessalonians (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1982), 125; PaulGerhard Müller, Der Erste und Zweite Brief an die Thessalonicher (Regensberg: Verlag Friedrich
Pustet, 2001), 209.
14
Earl J. Richard, First and Second Thessalonians (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical
Press, 1995), 279.
15
Friedrich Lang, σβεννυµι, in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, Vol. VII,
ed. Gerhard Friedrich, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans,
1971), 168.
16
Ben Witherington, III, 1 and 2 Thessalonians: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary (Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2006), 168.
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this presupposition in terms of prophecy alone, it is easy enough to acknowledge that
prophets have been silenced throughout history and to move on, but when we consider
the possibility that Paul might presuppose a human capacity to in some way quench the
fruits of the Spirit or the miraculous spiritual gifts, perhaps even to resist the Spirit’s role
in sanctification, the significance of the assumption that the Spirit can be resisted are
much more obvious. This is true even if we decide on exegetical grounds that Paul is
indeed only speaking of prophecy. The exegetical question causes the reader to pause
long enough to recognize that it is a significant thing indeed to suggest that human beings
have the ability to silence prophets, the mouthpieces of the omnipotent God.
There is a possible temptation here to redirect the matter of a human capacity to
quench the Spirit to the domain of soteriology in such a way that discussion degenerates
into a dispute over the Reformed doctrine of irresistible grace. That will not be the
approach of this book. Even the measured analysis of John Calvin himself suggests that
there is something more to the idea of a human capacity to resist the Spirit than
soteriological questions, as important as they may be. Calvin understands the phrase
“quenching the Spirit” to indicate more than simply rejecting prophecy. There is rather a
relationship of general to particular. “Those also quench the Spirit whose laziness renders
void the gift of God, when they should fan more vigorously the sparks which God has
kindled in them by daily progress.” He immediately rules out any suggestion that this
places the onus of salvation on human effort, for “God works efficaciously in His elect,”
but he affirms that humans can “brush aside so precious a gift of God, or close their eyes
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and allow themselves to be dragged into the vainglory of the world” in a way that is still
compatible with the claim that God is the author of faith, regeneration, and salvation.17
While such a brief Scriptural citation alone is insufficient to develop any fullfledged theory of how human beings might resist the divine will, it is enough to establish
a second line of enquiry that will occupy the rest of this study. I will suggest that, while
God is active in all things, including the economy, to fulfill His purposes, human beings
have the ability to resist such divine activity in the world through particular aspects of
society and economy. This ability makes it possible to identify particular aspects of the
economy which might impede our cooperation with God’s action without requiring that
we endorse any particular political or economic system, any nation-state or nationality, or
any theory of political economy as the beneficiary of a special divine favor through
which God is working to bring about salvation. This is to say that sidestepping the
legitimizing risks discussed above requires sidestepping questions of macroeconomic
theory, that is, questions of the nature of economic systems as whole. Though I will at
times gesture toward how our contemporary capitalist economy may fit within the
theological account I am developing, this should not be taken to mean that other
economic systems cannot be constructed such that they are either more or less in line
with divine intentions. The possibility of resisting the divine action must instead be
considered in the context of microeconomic theory, which is to say in the context of the
economic actions of single economic agents (consumers, firms, investors, etc.). This is
not to rule out the possibility of a nation as a whole “quenching the Spirit’s fire,” but
merely a move that recognizes the human capacity to resist divine action can be manifest
17

John Calvin, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Romans and to the Thessalonians,
trans. Ross MacKensie, eds. David W. Torrance and Thomas F. Torrance (Grand Rapids, MI:
William B. Eerdmans, 1960), 376.
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in individual actions in any given society. Such resistance is what allows an observer to
find some economic actions better than others. It also renders the claim that God acts
through the economy meaningful insofar as different formulations of the economy can
open themselves to this divine action in varying degrees.
Given the possibility that God works in all things for the good of those who love
Him, including in the economy, but that humans may also resist this divine action by
participating in economic interactions that quench the Spirit’s fire – for it indeed remains
only an unsubstantiated possibility after such brief and limited exegesis – the scope of
research for this study comes into focus. I will begin by surveying existing theological
analysis of economics to discern whether there is any reason to suspect either that God is
at work through the economy toward the fulfillment of the divine plan or that human
beings are able to resist this divine activity through particular aspects of the economy.
Chapter 1 will therefore establish that there is indeed good reason to suspect that God
works through the economy and that human beings can resist God in the economic
domain. I will show that theologians have accused various aspects of the economy of
distorting human nature in a wide variety of ways. I will also argue that recent
developments in philosophy of economics and economic methodology warrant such
theological consideration precisely because there can be no pure economic fact entirely
divorced from values, metaphysical commitments, and even theological implications.
Simply put, economics cannot be a pure positive science, so from a Christian standpoint
there must be a theology of economics. There is therefore a need to try to make sense of
the various theological approaches to the economy, and to apply insights from the various
approaches to economic models.
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Once we have some sense of the various influences of the economy on the human
formation that are analyzed by theologians, chapter 2 will proceed to develop the
metaphysical and theological framework within which these influences can be analyzed.
Metaphysically, the basic question of the God-world relation must be developed in such a
way that it is possible, first, to see a purportedly secular or natural space such as the
economy as properly and necessarily oriented toward communion with God, and second,
so that it is intelligible to speak about God acting within the market toward the
fulfillment of this God-ward orientation. This will require developing a theory of the
God-world relation that allows for both divine and human agency. Here I will begin
consciously embedding my project in Reformed theology, something I consider an
important methodological decision. Attempting to remain within a given tradition will
reduce the risk that my economic or philosophical tendencies may distort my theology.
Therefore I will endeavor at every stage of the argument to highlight where my claims fit
within the Reformed tradition and conform to scriptural teachings.
In chapter 2, this means that I will develop a non-contrastive account of
transcendence in dialogue with Kathryn Tanner and drawing on important historical
Reformed sources to argue that God’s transcendence of the created order does not entail
that God is not simultaneously radically immanent to that order, including to human
actions within creation. This leads to adoption of the doctrine of concurrence and the
notion that divine action is supervenient upon created reality. Because the Christian God
is triune, we must also explain precisely how God as Trinity relates to the world as
market, or at least to the part of the world that is the market. In other words, those aspects
of the economy immanent to the world will need to be connected to actions of the
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transcendent persons of the Trinity whose work ad extra has traditionally been held to be
indivisible but still distinguishable so as to terminate in one person in a certain manner
(certo modo). In short, we can speak of all human action as in some sense concurrent
with a divine action properly appropriated to Father, Son, or Spirit and oriented toward
communion with God.
Chapter 3 builds upon the insight that all divine action in the world is
supervenient upon created reality to identify three immanent terms of God’s action in the
economy that can be appropriated to the Father, Son, and Spirit. I will build upon Kevin
Hector’s pneumatology that identifies reciprocal-recognition and norms as the work of
the Holy Spirit, arguing that such norms are only intelligible within a particular social
imaginary and only sustainable through the exercise of a particular identity. A fully
trinitarian account of the immanent terms of divine action in the economy must ascribe
norms to the Spirit, social imaginaries to the Father, and identity to the Son. I will argue
that these three created realities are the means by which three dimensions of transformed
life are realized: orthopathy, orthodoxy, and orthopraxis. At the end of this discussion,
the necessary theological and metaphysical foundations of the work will be complete.
Chapters 4 through 6 serve to connect the theology already developed to concrete
economic concerns, further unpacking the role of the Father in the social imaginary, of
the Son in identity, and of the Spirit in norms along the way. Throughout these chapters I
will pay particular attention to specific economic models and to the findings of
experimental and behavioral economics. This focus is rooted in the belief that models are
a primary means by which economics shapes the social world, and in the conviction that
behavioral and experimental economics are disciplines particularly helpful in
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illuminating how subjects in our contemporary social world are influenced by such
models and institutions that rest upon them. Chapters 4 through 6 will also explain how
the divine work supervienient upon created realities within the economy corresponds
with the divine work in the ordo salutis as articulated in Reformed theology, in order to
better explain how creation is oriented toward redemption.
Chapter 4 explores how the market is a socially constructed reality that depends
upon and reinforces a particular social imaginary. Because of the constructed and
linguistic nature of the market, it is particularly susceptible to transmitting and modifying
a social imaginary through the economic models that are the basis for market design and
much market activity. I will explain here how many contemporary economic models
depersonalize and objectify human beings, undermining the Father’s work of general
revelation in the economy and resisting the common grace that forms human beings into
subjects capable of having communion with the divine Persons through the created order.
In short, much contemporary economic theory undermines orthopathy.
Chapter 5 explores the concept of identity, arguing that identity is the means
whereby an individual develops certain Background capacities within a social imaginary
that allows that individual to occupy a certain role within an imaginary and to therefore
perform specific actions within that imaginary. For the Christian, living into the identity
received in Christ through justification is the basis for transformation through
sanctification. Unfortunately many economic models contribute to the construction of an
economy that eliminates personal identity through instrumental logic and prioritization of
preferences over identity. A market economy built using economic models that could
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attend to identity would be better suited to allow Christians to live into the identity
received in justification as a means of growing in sanctification through economy.
Chapter 6 concludes the economic analysis by considering the role of norms in
economics. Three main features will be highlighted. First, when self-interested behavior
is treated as normative, economic agents tend to be more self-interested, and much of
economic theory does in fact treat self-interested behavior as normative rational
economic behavior. Second, when incentives are used to direct behavior, internal
motivations tend to wither, which may impede virtuous actions. Third and finally,
because most economic models reduce human actions to the pursuit of preferences,
economic models cannot contribute to the construction of a market that fosters the pursuit
of virtue through commitment to a telos ordained by God. Each of these problems
impedes the development of orthopraxis whereby a believer progresses in sanctification
through the work of the Holy Spirit toward the end of communion with the triune God.
The concluding chapters are not intended to offer an exhaustive analysis of how
the marketplace can be a sphere through which God works to bring about redemption, nor
a complete survey of possible ways in which our economic interactions can refuse such
divine efforts. Rather, I hope to show how one might approach economic questions with a
well-rounded eye to orthodoxy, orthopathy, and orthopraxis in the context of specific
questions without distorting the theological basis for such analysis. The end result is the
hopeful claim that markets can be designed in such a way as to not distort human
participation in the divine life and human communion with the Triune God, coupled with
a realistic acknowledgement that there is much to be done before current economic
theory is capable of addressing the questions that might concern the theologian intent on
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warning Christians where they may be “kicking against the goads” in their economic
interactions.
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CHAPTER 1 – PERSPECTIVES ON THEOLOGY AND ECONOMY
Does capitalism work? is the wrong question to put to capitalism. It is the wrong question
because it is rather obvious that capitalism works… Instead of asking, Does capitalism work?
we ought to ask, What work does it do?
- Daniel M. Bell, Jr.1

Theology would crown itself the queen of the sciences, but many researchers,
teachers, and practitioners of economics appear to be content with regicide. To these
economists, it is not clear that theology has anything to say to the fundamental tasks of
developing economic theory and models, collecting data, and making predictions. While
there are certainly exceptions, by and large a particular version of the fact/value
distinction articulated in terms of a difference between positive and normative economics
reduces theology to a secondary role at best, and marginalizes theology entirely at worst.
If such a distinction holds, then the question of how God works through the economy is
doomed to go nowhere, especially if the focus in large part will be on what many
economists consider economic facts. For this reason, I must first explain why a strong
version of the positive/normative distinction in economics is not logically tenable before I
can move to discuss how God works through the economy.
Once the aspects of economic theory that appear to provide prima facie reason to
reject an enquiry into divine action in the marketplace are eliminated, a second difficulty
pertaining to theology also must be addressed. Despite a proliferation of theological
approaches to economic questions in recent theological scholarship, it is not always clear,
first, how to relate the disparate approaches to one another and, second, how these
approaches may relate to divine agency. While it would certainly be possible to proceed
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World (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2012); 84.
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as if existing theological texts had not been written, it would be quite foolish to ignore the
fruit of such extensive labor, especially given the fact that a wide range of theological
perspectives has uncovered significant information pertinent to this study. Therefore, a
second prerequisite for this study is to survey the existing theological approaches to
economics with an eye to uncovering how these studies have either intentionally or
inadvertently uncovered evidence of divine action through the economy or of human
resistance to this action. This survey will also begin the task of sorting theologians into
relevant groupings that can be further utilized as this work unfolds, though a full basis for
correlating various authors will not be completed until the beginning of chapter 3.
In certain respects, this chapter serves to cut away the brush currently blocking
the path forward. Ultimately, the true goals of this study are to uncover evidence of
divine action through the economy or human resistance to such action, to provide a
theological and economic framework within which such actions can be discussed
intelligibly, and to propose courses that contemporary economic theory can pursue in
response to concerns by theologians. The remainder of this work will focus primarily on
pursuing these research questions. However, before we can embark down this path, the
two above obstacles must be addressed, clearing the trailhead to make the journey
possible.
The Positive/Normative Distinction in Economic Theory
In its most simple form, the distinction between positive and normative
economics is put forward as a distinction between “the actual” or positive behavior of
markets and “the desired” or normative behavior of markets.2 The distinction is
2

Gary S. Becker, Economic Theory (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), 3.
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understood to be one between scientific and ethical analysis. The idea of the
positive/normative distinction historically developed in two forms. The first builds upon
what is often called “Hume’s guillotine” and uses notions derived from logical positivism
in the early twentieth century. Hume distinguished between statements of fact describing
what “is,” and statements of obligation that describe what “ought to be.”3 Hume suggests
that there is no way to move from “is” to “ought,” and that there is therefore an
insurmountable division between statements of fact and statements of value. Such a
division assumed, of course, that there are no factual value statements. Logical
positivists, drawing in part on Hume’s ideas, strengthened the claim by appealing to a
verification principle for ascertaining the meaningfulness of statements.4 This principle of
verification went through numerous forms, but was perhaps most well known as
presented by A.J. Ayer, who claimed that there are only two meaningful types of
sentences: those analytic statements that are analytically true by definition, such as “all
bachelors are unmarried men,” or statements that are either directly or indirectly
verifiable.5 All other statements, suggests Ayer, are not literally meaningful.6 It is widely

3

David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1978).
4
John B. Davis, “Economists’ Odd Stand on the Positive-Normative Distinction: A
Behavioral Economics View,” in Oxford University Press Handbook on Professional Economic
Ethics: Views from the Economics Profession and Beyond, ed. G. DeMartino and D. McCloskey
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
5
To be directly verifiable a statement must be an observation-statement or it must with
other observation-statements entail an observation-statement that would not be deducible from
these other premises alone. Something is indirectly verifiable if it is not an observation-statement,
but if, with other verifiable or analytic non-observation statements, it entails an observationstatement that would not be deducible from these other premises alone.
6
Alfred Jules Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London: Victor Gollancz, 1949), 13.
Later revisions of the verification principle would often grant that these statements may have
“grammatical meaning” but not “intelligibility” or “assertory meaning” or any number of
comparable terms. The intention, though, is to suggest that these statements are not factual and do
not even appear to have any propositional content. This appears to be in line with Ayer’s
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argued that Lionel Robbins follows the positivist approach,7 bequeathing that strain of the
positive/normative distinction to subsequent generations of economists when he claims
that, “Economics deals with ascertainable facts; ethics with valuations and obligations.”
According to Robbins, this distinction is based on a “logical gulf” between the two that
cannot be overcome.8 Economics benefits from “verifiability by introspection and
observation,” while ethics is merely a matter of “thy blood or mine.”9 Paul Samuelson
equally adopts the positivist approach in the first edition of his textbook when he
distinguishes verifiable “meaningful theorems” in economics from those theories that rely
on psychology, philosophy, and ethics.10 If the logical positivist understanding of the
positive/normative distinction is correct, the current project should be abandoned as
meaningless and fruitless.
A second historical development of the positive/normative distinction draws on
early work of Richard Whateley, an economist turned Anglican archbishop who wanted
to preserve a religious voice in matters of ultimate concern in the public sphere against
“radicals” who wanted the utilitarian-influenced conclusions of political economy to
guide all public policy.11 Whately believed that political economy is concerned with

emphasis on “literal” meaningfulness. Ayer would suggest that value statements are simply
emotional in nature.
7
Some do object to this interpretation, though Robbins’ ultimate position is not
particularly important given that other economists (I will note Paul Samuelson below) certainly
did follow a more positivist bent. For one recent different interpretation of Robbins, see David
Colander and Huei-Chun Su, “Making Sense of Economists’ Positive-Normative Distinction,”
Journal of Economic Methodology, 22.2 (June 2015), 167-9.
8
Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature & Significance of Economic Science (London:
Macmillan & Co., 1932), 132. This gulf is expressed as the difference between “is” and “ought.”
Ibid., 133.
9
Ibid., 132, 134.
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Paul Anthony Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis (Cambridge: Harvard
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A.M.C. Waterman, “Whately, Senior, and the Methodology of Classical Economics,”
in Economics and Religion: Are They Distinct? ed. H. Geoffrey Brennan and A.M.C. Waterman
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means, but theology is concerned with ends.12 Political economy would, according to this
logic, provide various policy options along with the raw data to assess the effectiveness
of these policies, but theology would determine which policy paths were morally
permissible and which would result in the theologically desirable economic ends.
Whately’s approach is distinct from the logical positivist understanding of the
positive/normative distinction because it does allow for the possibility of genuine and
meaningful theological knowledge playing a role in economics. In fact, some recent
theologians still accept a version of Whately’s positive/normative distinction. John
Atherton suggests it is “one of the great misfortunes of Christian history” that theologians
and church leaders have not recognized “the relative autonomy of economic and political
thought” maintained through the positive/normative distinction.13 Chad Brand and Tom
Pratt argue that economics is a science that provides economic “laws” which “moral
imperatives” cannot logically compel us to question. To challenge such laws would be
akin to claiming it a moral imperative to believe that “two-plus-two is five.”14
Theologians like Philip Wogaman claim that theology’s role is only to provide values and
a valuation of values (i.e. a ranking of which values are most important) to determine
which economic paths are ethically viable.15 Despite such endorsements, even this
interpretation would be disastrous for the current project insofar as it bars religion from
having anything to say about the economic “facts.” Ultimately, Whately’s version of the

(Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic, 1994), 41-60; John Atherton, Christianity and the Market:
Christian Social Thought for Our Times (London: SPCK, 1992), 104-6.
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positive/normative distinction points toward a realm of autonomous facts independent
from God and an understanding of religious statements as value statements, but certainly
not as the human accounts of God’s factual redemptive acts in the world. If theology is at
all concerned about a God who works in the real world, then theology cannot remain
silent on the facts about this world, even if the facts are of an economic nature. Though
theology cannot replace economics as a discipline, it must be able to have input at all
stages of economic analysis instead of only providing ethical parameters for policies
derived from already developed economic models and theories.
As it turns out, there are strong reasons for doubting that a distinction between
positive and normative approaches can perfectly correspond to a distinction between facts
and values. Consider a basic neoclassical economic “fact” such as “increases in a price of
a good A results in a decrease in demand for that good, ceteris paribus.”16 Like any
theoretical foundation for any economic description, this claim depends on, to quote
Pemberton and Finn, certain “basic assumptions that are value-laden and not value-free.
In addition, since these assumptions are starting points, they are unproved and, at least
within the science of economics, unprovable.”17 In this case, there is a certain theory of
the rationality of various economic agents behind the claim that increases in price reduce
demand. Rational agents are those who maximize utility. An increase in price of A will
16

Such a statement would not apply to a good for which there is fixed demand or a price
elasticity of demand equal to zero.
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Prentiss L. Pemberton and Daniel Rush Finn. Toward a Christian Economic Ethic:
Stewardship and Social Power (Minneapolis, MN: Winston Press, 1985), 123. In fact, there is
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allow a consumer on a fixed budget to buy less of other goods if that consumer continues
consuming the same amount of the current good A. This reduces utility. The rationality of
utility maximization indicates that certain consumers will shift to a new bundle of goods
away from their current bundle along what economists call an indifference curve in order
to buy a different bundle of goods with a lower quantity of A that provides a higher
utility than that which would be received by continuing to consume the same quantity of
good A. The problem with this assumption is that such rationality theory does not
describe the “fact” of how economic agents operate18 and it is unclear how an economist
could even prove that agents were making choices based on utility.19 Lionel Robbins
himself objected to the unverifiability of such utility analysis,20 but subsequent efforts at
theories of “revealed preference” and other alternatives face equal challenges concerning
verifiability.21 In fact, it turns out that such rationality theories are neither purely factual
18

Aggregate data is not helpful in demonstrating the facticity of rationality theories
because microeconomic theories of rationality treat variables like prices, inflation, or
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accounts of economic agency nor purely ethical value statements about how an agent is
morally obligated to act. Instead, such theories offer a sort of normative analysis
describing how economic agents should act if they desire to be rational.22 This example
illustrates what is the case in any sort of description rooted in theoretical analysis: there
are unprovable and often value-laden claims underlying the analysis which prevent a
sharp fact/value distinction.23 This is even the case with the philosophical program of the
logical positivists, as the verification principle itself appears to be neither empirically
verifiable nor clearly analytically included in the definition of meaningfulness, at least in
any ordinary usage of the term.24 Any positive description of “facts” would thus appear to
depend on non-facts in a way that undermines a strong distinction between the facts and
values of the sort advocated by the logical positivist interpretation of the
positive/normative distinction.
Given the unprovable and often value-laden foundations for models and theories,
is it not possible to still affirm a pure positive economics that simply avoids using such
models and theories? This is the suggestion of Geoffrey Brennan, who believes that “the
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epistemological autonomy of positive economics may be bought at a fairly high price.”25
Brennan claims that this high price may ultimately require sacrificing so many key
elements of economic theory that the remaining elements are no longer particularly useful
to the normative theory that now contains most of the material traditionally analyzed by
economists. Nevertheless, presumably Brennan would admit that pure data collection on
interest rates, expenditures, capital investment, price fluctuations, and so forth could be
classified as a positive economics dealing with facts as opposed to a normative
economics that is enmeshed with value judgments. However, even this solution faces
three very significant problems. First, in the real world there are so many possible facts
that could be collected that the selection of specific facts as significant requires certain
value judgments that are based on our presuppositions. In this way, our presuppositions
shape the outcome of any “factual” analysis by restricting the domain of possible relevant
facts and therefore of possible conclusions.26 Second, even within a specific set of
selected data various categories of description for the data are still possible. A particular
economic action can simultaneously be profitable, unjust, unexpected, utilitymaximizing, immoral, and culturally aberrant. Choosing one category of description over
another will not be a value-neutral exercise.27 Third, even when we chose descriptive
terminology, many terms are what Hilary Putnam calls “thick ethical concepts.” These
are concepts such as “cruel” or “rude” in which fact and value are entangled. The terms
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can be used in a purely descriptive way in an accurate and meaningful fashion, but they
are also value-laden in a way that suggests there is no sharp fact/value distinction.28
Perhaps the positive/normative distinction can be salvaged without resorting to
drastic measures like Brennan. Mark Blaug argues that we cannot claim that there are no
objective statements because that very statement would then be objective, requiring us to
lapse into pure subjectivity.29 He admits that there is “no absolutely watertight distinction
between positive and normative economics,” but suggests that the distinction is
methodological and points to “an ideal at which to aim.”30 While values do tend to seep
into positive analysis, the main distinction between positive and normative approaches
lies in the fact that positive analysis places a priority on producing and testing falsifiable
theories in line with scientific methodology, while normative analysis depends upon
value judgments that cannot be adjudicated in this manner.31 Such a methodological
distinction appears to offer the hope of evading the problem of unprovable foundations in
positive economics by suggesting that they may be falsifiable if their predictions are not
validated. This methodological dichotomy would then allow for a positive/normative
distinction in line with Whately’s views, where normative analysis could be open to a
different methodology, perhaps one where theology could be utilized.
While plausible at first look, in the end Blaug’s proposal fails due to the fact that,
unlike the physical sciences, economic theories and predictions affect what they predict.32
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The final three chapters of this work will point to numerous examples of this being the
case, so I will delay providing examples until that time. What the influence of predictions
on the economy means is that, methodologically speaking, falsification may not be
possible. A theory that may not accurately represent the reality described at the time the
theory is developed may have influenced that reality in such a way that the representation
is far more accurate by the time predictions can be tested. If this occurs, an originally
untrue theory will not be falsified but will instead change the world it describes. As D.
Stephen Long points out, economists’ discussions of facts are often a matter of poesis,
discussions of “a brute factum” forgetful of the associated creative act (facere – to make)
bringing about such facts.33 The creative nature of economics results in what James K. A.
Smith has aptly called the perpetual “contestability of the empirical.”34
Here one might stop to object that a theologian making such arguments is
overstating the case. John Lunn and Robin Klay, for example, object to what they view as
“postmodern” attempts by some Christian economists, theologians, and philosophers to
challenge the positive/normative distinction. Lunn and Klay argue that making a
statement about historical growth in the money supply and making a statement about how
the money supply ought to change in the coming year are clearly two different sorts of
statement.35 This may well be the case, but admitting that economists have different
objectives in mind when doing positive and normative analysis, or to grant that positive
and normative statements have different intended meanings, does not require an
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acceptance of the claim that a positive/normative distinction corresponds to a fact/value
distinction and that, therefore, theology can only contribute to economic analysis by
providing value parameters after the facts have been described by the economists.
I intend only to object to what I will call a strong positive/normative distinction,
where a strong positive/normative distinction is one that: (a) correlates a
positive/normative binary with a fact/value binary, (b) suggests that the facts uncovered
by positive analysis are purely objective in the sense of being distinct and autonomous
from the researcher and research process, and (c) relegates religion to the realm of values
and normative analysis (provided such normative analysis is even admissible). Such a
strong distinction would provide prima facie reason to abandon the current research
enquiries given that I propose to explore the religiously significant elements of economic
modeling to determine how God could act through them and/or how human beings could
use them in a manner that undermines their ability to participate in the redemptive actions
of God. If such modeling was an entirely objective and detached description of economic
facts, then it would seem that there could be little to no human responsibility for any
malformation of economic agents in the market, nor any hope for resisting such negative
effects through human efforts. The above arguments suggest that a strong
positive/normative distinction is untenable. When economists describe the world, they
use models and theories and labels that are not value-free, and their economic
methodology cannot have the degree of scientific objectivity sought by Blaug because
economic analysis affects the object of study. Therefore religion should not be relegated
to the realms of values and normative analysis because there is no reason to provide
economics a privileged or exclusive role in constructing the social world and because
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theologians are arguably better equipped on the whole to deal with the values that
inevitably enter economic analysis.
A weak version of the positive/normative distinction that recognized the problems
in a fact/value dichotomy would fit with Lunn and Klay’s description of the distinctions
without requiring that I abandon the current project.36 Indeed, some version of the
distinction must be maintained, as entirely abandoning it would bring about the suspicion
that the economy is infinitely malleable, purely a construct of values divorced from any
material constraints. This is not the end I am seeking, first, because philosophically
speaking equally plausible arguments can be raised against collapsing facts purely into
constructed values as can be raised against fully divorcing the two domains. Second, and
more importantly, because theologically we must remember that God created the material
world and called it very good (Gen. 1:31). Whatever material or natural constraints come
into play in economic modeling, these very constraints are part of the cosmos that the
Scriptures claim is waiting in “eager longing” for the final redemption toward which God
is working (Rom. 8:19). It is not through a denial of the material, historical, or natural
constraints of the economy that theology is rendered relevant, but rather through a
recognition that these material, historical, and natural constraints as inescapably related to
God, and thus unavoidably the subject of theological analysis.
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Theological Approaches to Economics
If economists do not have a monopoly on describing the economy and identifying
significant economic data, theology is related to all aspects of the economy. This is not to
suggest that economics can be collapsed into theology, but it is to say that no aspect of
economic theory is fully devoid of theological significance. Theologians and economists
do not use the same methods or deploy the same analytic tools, but they do speak about
the same realities, and they can do so in complementary or conflicting ways. It is not easy
to move from this general recognition toward specific dialogue between economists and
theologians, in part because theological approaches to economics are themselves quite
diverse, and often seemingly incommensurable. The present study illustrates the fact
well. Two lines of enquiry will unfold in the following chapters exploring whether God
acts through the economy and asking how human beings might be able to refuse to
participate in this action if it occurs. Unfortunately, questions of divine agency are rarely
at the forefront of existing theological studies of the economy, and it is difficult to know
precisely how to relate diverse existing approaches to one another in a manner that will
produce helpful material for the development of a study on such agency. Therefore,
before the bulk of the work can proceed, some effort must be made to relate existing
approaches to one another in a manner that will be useful to this study while remaining
fair to the projects of the considered authors.
The task at this stage is not primarily to evaluate the specific claims of how
economic interactions may play a role in the formation of human beings, or to identify
the extent to which such formation may be identified with divine action or resistant to it;
the time for such evaluation will come. Rather, this initial survey serves three purposes.
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First, it provides justification for the research questions at hand by attempting to identify
ways that the economy shapes individuals in redemptively significant ways. Chapter 2
will offer a longer discussion of the term “redemptively significant.” For present
purposes it is sufficient to know that the term specifies any sort of formation of or action
by an economic agent that fits with the theological description of how a human being is
transformed through the process of redemption, particularly in sanctification. Insofar as
God accomplishes salvation, such formation through the economy must be understood in
some fashion as a divine action. As the survey will show, a wide range of approaches
have made claims consonant with the hypothesis that God works in the economy and that
human beings can resist this divine action, so the survey will provide plausibility to the
thesis and an initial foundation of data for further consideration. Second, even though I
will not yet significantly evaluate the claims uncovered in the survey, I will identify ways
in which existing approaches have failed to attend to the question of divine agency, a gap
that this study will attempt to rectify. Third, I will begin the task of sorting theological
approaches to economics into categories that can be used later in this study.
Due to the substantial amounts of material for analysis, this initial survey will
limit itself either to larger schools of thought or to individuals whose methods can be
aggregated into something similar to a school of thought, even if the particular authors
considered might not recognize any allegiance to one another. Furthermore, the following
analysis will restrict itself to approaches that have been prominent in roughly the last
half-century. Limitations of this sort are necessary given the reality that both theology
and economics are dynamic fields whose approaches and emphases are constantly
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changing.37 This restriction will allow me to uncover theological conclusions still
significant for any contemporary application in economic questions, while limiting the
material to a manageable (yet still formidable) amount.
Since the middle of the twentieth century, numerous different approaches to
systematic theology and economics have filled volumes of published books, not to
mention thousands of academic journal, magazine, and newspaper articles. I will address
major groupings in the following categories that I believe best capture this wide range of
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In approximately the last fifty years, for example, liberal theology has been eclipsed by
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publications in manageable units. Among approaches focusing on macroeconomics38 a
legitimizing approach seeks to use theology to commend a particular existing economic
system, while a re-imagining approach focuses on reconceiving the economy as a new
economic system rooted in some theological contribution. The radical orthodoxy
movement explores the hidden theological aspects of particular macroeconomic
economic theories and systems, though arguably this approach has split into two camps
with an American branch concentrating on more microeconomic concerns. The Catholic
encyclical tradition has proven particularly fruitful in assessing the economy from a
theological perspective, spawning three significant movements. A redistributionist
approach common among several grassroots movements that began before the timeframe
considered remains influential in its emphasis on developing an economy of just
distribution. Economic personalism is a movement that focuses on re-working economic
models by using the idea of a person as drawn from personalist philosophy to replace the
individualistic homo economicus. Liberation theology, particularly in its Latin American
form, deploys Marxist analysis and appropriates themes from popular spirituality to
explore how theology can identify and support a liberating praxis that overcomes
oppression, poverty, and violence. Two final approaches tend to focus on religious
aspects of the economy through sustained dialogue with other social sciences. An
economics as religion approach identifies various aspects of economics that fit with
religious belief widely construed. This approach has a decidedly anthropological leaning.
A sociology of religion approach seeks to use sociology to identify ways that the
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Macroeconomics refers to the study of the economy on a large scale, focused on the
aggregation of the economic decisions of individual firms, consumers, or workers, and paying
particular attention to the roles of government policies and legal and social frameworks.
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economy may effect religious beliefs and practices through use of an analytical
framework informed by sociological analysis.
To an extent, the groups discussed below may seem arbitrary, and in many
instances alternative categories could easily be imagined.39 However, the groupings are
selected with an eye toward the basic ways that each group sees theology influencing the
economic subject or economics influencing religious subjects so that they can help
identify basic ways that God may be working through the economy toward redemption,
or how human beings may fail to participate in this redemptive activity. Therefore, while
certain perspectives are left out,40 and while categories could be changed, the above
groups are more easily able to contribute to the task at hand than other possibilities.
Macroeconomic Approaches
Three predominant schools of thought are characterized by an emphasis on
macroeconomic concerns. In other words, these approaches typically reach conclusions
about an economic system as a whole by drawing on a variety of theological resources in
order to either endorse or vilify capitalism (the most common economic system discussed
in recent literature). The legitimizing approach, the re-imagining approach, and radical
39

While the basic contours of liberation theology should be quite clear to most in the
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concerns. For example, Phillip Goodchild, Daniel Bell, and Kenneth Surin could be fittingly
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re-imagining approach, Bell in radical orthodoxy, and Surin is neglected altogether in this
discussion. Kenneth Surin, Freedom not yet: Liberation and the Next World Order (Durham:
Duke University Press, 2009); Bell, Economy; Phillip Goodchild, Theology of Money (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2009).
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feminist voices in theological economics such as Marion Grau have methods and perspectives
seemingly incommensurable with the task I have set myself. Voice like Grau’s will unfortunately
be entirely neglected moving forward: Marion Grau, Of Divine Economy: Refinancing
Redemption (New York: T&T Clark, 2004).
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orthodoxy all have such a macroeconomic focus, though exceptions particularly among
radical orthodox theologians will be discussed below. Of these three groupings, the
legitimizing approach is perhaps the most common.
The school of thought that I am calling the “legitimizing approach” does not
consist of any self-consciously collaborative effort, and the theologians who fit into this
grouping are not unified by any specific set of shared theological or philosophical
commitments. Rather, the various authors whose works fit in this category come from a
broad spectrum of theological orientations, ecclesiastical affiliations, and academic
specializations. Despite such diversity, the authors considered do share a common
objective: utilizing a wide variety of theological resources to demonstrate the superiority
of a particular economic system (often coupled with a particular set of governmental
policies). Though there are some who defend socialism in this fashion, since the downfall
of communism in the USSR defenses of capitalism are by far the most common examples
of the legitimizing approach, particularly in English-language works.41 Given this
prevalence, my analysis will focus on those who defend capitalism.
Specific details often widely vary. Some defend capitalism on the ground that its
success depends on certain virtues, virtues which capitalism is in turn able to reproduce.42
Others suggest that capitalism is the only economic system sufficiently grounded in
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Sometimes the legitimizing approach defends the “market” per se: Robert Sirico,
Defending the Free Market: The Moral Case for a Free Economy (Washington, DC: Regnery,
2012); Jay W. Richards, Money, Greed, and God: Why Capitalism is the Solution and Not the
Problem (New York: Harper Collins, 2009). At other times, the legitimizing approach defends the
market in conjunction with a particular set of policies or with a particular macroeconomic theory:
Brand and Pratt, Seeking. See also Michael Novak, The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism
(Lanham: Madison Books, 1991); Scott Rae and Austin Hill, The Virtues of Capitalism: A Moral
Case for Free Markets (Chicago, IL: Northfield, 2010).
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Biblical principles.43 Though specific lines of argumentation may vary in their content
and methodology, all of the groups in the legitimizing approach share a concern for
identifying the existing economic system that is most theologically acceptable. I choose
the word “legitimize” recognizing its ambiguity. In a psychological context, legitimizing
may be understood as arising from a psychological need to defend the status quo, and at
times certain texts in this group may tend to have a panegyric flavor to them. However,
the best representatives of this approach fit under a second meaning of “legitimize:” to
render legitimate. These theologians, of whom Daniel Finn is perhaps the best
representative, seek to articulate the conditions under which a particular economy would
be rendered morally legitimate.
Finn rightly recognizes that the polemical debates between central planning and
the free market present a faulty dilemma insofar as there are numerous possible
formulations of the “free market.” Using the metaphor of a fence that determines the
limits of a space, Finn demonstrates that there are numerous possible fences that allow
for possible spaces of free exchange within a wide variety of legal and institutional
parameters.44 One does not simply choose between central planning and capitalism, but
rather determines what sort of capitalism will be constructed.45 Furthermore, moral
evaluations of a market must consider the entire “ecology” of a market, which he
suggests includes four elements: the provision of goods and services, the morality of
individuals and groups active in the market, the underlying civil society, and the
43
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character of the market.46 While Finn does not directly evaluate specific markets, his
suggestions for how such a legitimizing analysis should proceed offer a persuasive
foundation.47 Any “economic defense of self-interest is conditional,” and the conditions
of a proper ecology must be fulfilled to render a market morally legitimate.48 In Finn’s
own words, we might say:
For all the advantages of markets, it is morally naïve for proponents to argue that
‘free’ markets (perhaps, those regularly approximating the fences in the U.S.
economy) ought to be implemented everywhere without regard to the presence of
the proper substructuring of the other three elements in [the] moral ecology.49

Finn’s analysis demonstrates that any viable legitimizing approach will need to
address the contingency and variability intrinsic in any constructed reality like the
market. This claim is tremendously significant for present purposes. If the particular ways
in which human beings act within the market leads to morally permissible or
impermissible outcomes depending on a wide range of largely human-controlled
variables, then any redemptively significant outcome arising from a particular market will
be contingent upon a certain set of variable possibilities obtaining. The theologian cannot
imagine a particular economic system as handed down from heaven in a way that renders
it unconditionally a rightly-ordered space. Conversely, human beings also possess the
capability of moving the fences or modifying the four elements of the moral ecology of
markets to undermine the moral nature of the market. One possible redemptively
significant way that markets shape economic agents is to provide them a context for
virtuous economic actions made possible by a proper moral ecology, and such formation
46

In the same argument Finn also claims that “the question ‘Are markets just?’ ignored
the political, social, and cultural contexts of markets.” Finn, Ecology, 108.
47
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aspects of the market that may be morally relevant.
48
Finn, Ecology, 142.
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must also be somehow understood as divine action. If this is true, then it stands to reason
that certain human actions establishing maladaptive moral ecologies of markets would
then be examples of human beings subverting some aspect of the divine work toward
redemption through the economic sphere.
In contrast to the legitimizing approach, the re-imagining approach does not find
the existing set of economic options appealing. Often particularly abhorring capitalism,
proponents of this approach preferr instead to imagine a new economic world with
contributions from Christian theology. Notable advocates of this approach include Sallie
McFague, Philip Goodchild, David Schindler, and Kathryn Tanner.50 While these
theologians may differ in many of their conclusions and assumptions, each of them
allows theology to function in a similar manner in terms of their engagement of markets.
The re-imagining approach attempts to help us, using McFague’s terminology as
illustrative, “reconceive ourselves”51 to enable a “fundamental shift to community
values”52 that facilitates a new idea of economy. In McFague’s eyes this means
advocating an “ecological economy” instead of the existing neoclassical one. The
ecological economy begins with a view of humans as individuals-in-community who
possess individuality only by virtue of being part of a community, while the community
50

Sallie McFague, Life Abundant: Rethinking Theology and Economy for a Planet in
Peril (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2001); Goodchild, Money; David L. Schindler, Heart of the
World, Center of the Church: Communio Ecclesiology, Liberalism, and Liberation (Grand
Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1996); Kathryn Tanner, Economy of Grace. (Minneapolis,
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common approach but reach different conclusions using different tools, the theologians and
economists who advocate distributism tend to share similar tools, theological assumptions, and
conclusions. We will also discuss M. Douglas Meeks in the next chapter, who could have also
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McFague, Life, 102.
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Ibid., 114. Such values include recognition of money as a means, not an end, an
emphasis on frugality, and a prioritization of sustainability.
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itself exists only insofar as individuals-in-relation constitute it. While the focus of this
discussion is centered on humans, such interconnectivity necessarily includes all of
creation. A community can only survive if the world itself survives, and McFague claims
such survival requires a distributive justice that balances income for all humans without a
communist insistence on “absolute parity in material goods.”53 Instead, the ecological
economy must arise from “envisioning [an] alternative world view” with significant help
from theology.54 McFague’s proposal, which needs no further explanation for present
purposes, illustrates the basic contours of the re-imagining approach: theology is
appealed to in order to provide a fundamental reorientation of the paradigm offered by
(typically neoclassical) capitalism. This reorientation requires certain basic shifts in
worldview, in cultural values, and in the basic way that economic agents understand the
economy and its exchanges. It results in an entirely new form of economy.
The pattern evident in McFague is repeated when David Schindler suggests that
human creativity should be seen as a gift “generously extending to others what has first
been given and what we have therefore always-already first received.”55 With such a
view of gift in mind, Schindler interprets the papal encyclical Centesimus Annus as
endorsing a sort of liberation theology (to be discussed below) which “calls forth a free
response to the gift of creation”56 in a way that the document’s “civilization of love” is
something distinct from contemporary liberalism and capitalism. This theological insight
serves as the basis for re-imagining the economy. Similarly, Kathryn Tanner advocates a
53
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type of formal analysis that compares the relations between theological concepts to the
relations between economic ideas57 to help “imagine alternatives to capitalism.”58 Tanner
ultimately identifies the theological idea of the unconditional, universal, and
noncompetitive grace of God as a point of “relevant intersection and intervention” from
which a change can be made.59 Philip Goodchild’s analysis, though quite different in
style and content from McFague, Schindler, and Tanner, reaches a similar conclusion. In
his case, the re-imagined economy would include a “secondary tier of the economy”
which would allow for the “production and distribution of effective evaluations.”60
The fact that each of the theologians in the re-imagining group sees a need to
appeal to theology to fundamentally alter existing neoclassical conceptions of the basic
nature of the economy suggests that these authors tacitly recognize that the particular
economic mindsets can influence elements of what for now I will call a worldview in
ways that are contrary to sound theology. For Goodchild, this recognition is explicit. He
fears that modern democracy constructs a homogenous collective will that disguises the
fact that citizens are controlled by consumer desire and money.61 In fact, he sees the
entire modern social and economic world as an abstract, idealized representation that
pretends to be obtained in order to sustain the sphere of value and the valuation of the
money that circulates in this sphere.62 In reality, the utopian pretension of secular
freedom and economic prosperity is an illusion. Money itself has the power, and
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“reconstitutes the social order as an order of interdependence, of desire, and of credit.”63
These claims, if correct, would suggest that money has a tremendous influence on human
desires and social relations: “The market effects its own disciplining and ordering of
desire.”64 The question then becomes whether this disciplining is consonant with divine
action toward sanctification of desire or dissonant with it.
While divine action itself is not a central theological concern for many in the reimagining approach, the emphasis on the transformative role that theology can play in reimagining the economy shared by theologians in this group suggests that God may be
working to transform the world through theology, at least if we suppose that theology is
something more than a purely human effort and accept some notion of revelation as an
action of God. While extensive treatment of divine action must be delayed until chapter
2, it is at least plausible for a religion of the book like Christianity to grant some form of
revelation, and thereby to also concede that any deployment of a theology grounded in
revelation that is transformative in a redemptively significant manner must be understood
in some sense to be a deployment dependent upon divine action. Ultimately, I hope to
show that the case can be made in a much stronger fashion.
The Radical Orthodoxy movement, a third significant approach to
macroeconomics, draws its name from an effort to be orthodox in a modern age by
drawing on historical roots (radix – root) of Christianity to strongly (here also radically)
critique the modern project.65 The various contributors to the “Radical Orthodoxy” series
frequently speak of economics, and several have continued to write on economic subjects
63
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in later volumes. Setting aside smaller elements of diversity among the various
contributors, Radical Orthodox theologians typically challenge modern conceptions of
the economy as ultimately nihilistic and agonistic, flaws that arise from the nominalist
metaphysic undergirding modern social sciences that eliminates the possibility of
participatory metaphysics where the immanent, material world is suspended in the
transcendent.66 For example, John Milbank claims Ockham’s move toward voluntarism
helped construct a view of the political as pure power, while a nominalist emphasis on the
strongly simple will of God that displaced a Trinitarian theology placed an emphasis on
individual willers, eliminated an ontology of participation, and helped bring about a
contractual view of society.67 Once these shifts in political thought opened up the
possibility of the idea of a just contractual society, early economists sought to develop a
view of providence to maintain such a just contractual society.68 However, this approach
viewed justice in terms of an internal disposition and not a final telos,69 resulting in a
neo-pagan notion of the market as a space of agonistics.70
The broad strokes of Milbank’s approach are found in other radical orthodox
theologians writing on economic matters. Like Milbank, D. Stephen Long seeks to
overcome the “all-consuming subjugating power” of capitalism by locating it within a
particular history.71 Particularly relevant for present purposes is Long’s claim that both
what he calls the dominant tradition and the emergent tradition identify the political
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sphere with a conflictual realm of pure power, something he traces to Max Weber.72 Long
offers a counter-narrative rooted in a historically informed notion of the true, the good,
and the beautiful as manifest in Milbank, Bernard Dempsey, and Alasdair MacIntyre as a
means of overcoming a formalized capitalism and a misunderstanding of the political
sphere as a realm of pure power. Continuing in this trend, Daniel Bell’s Liberation
Theology After the End of History, Radical Orthodoxy’s initial major engagement with
liberation theology (discussed below), criticizes the liberationists’ understanding of
politics as statecraft.73 In Bell’s understanding, “politics as statecraft” is an approach that
treats the state as the primary agent of political and/or economic transformation to the
exclusion of the church. Such reliance on the coercive power of the state, coupled with an
emphasis on distributive justice, leads liberation theology to “exacerbate” the violent and
conflictual nature of global capitalism that the liberationists so heavily criticize.74 Here
again, a concern for the agonistic character of the economy is at the forefront. If these
concerns about the conflictual nature of capitalism are correct, and if the final state is a
state of peace, then it stands to reason that an economy grounded in agonistics and
perpetuating such conflict is one that resists the redemptive working whereby God makes
the kingdom present in partial form today.
Interestingly, Bell’s disquiet about politics as statecraft in his early work points
toward a divergence that would develop between British contributors to the radical
orthodoxy project and American contributors. Generally, the British contributors focus on
macroeconomic solutions often through policy changes, practically serving as a
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legitimizing strategy for a certain brand of socialism.75 American radical orthodox
thinkers like Bell, Long and James K. A. Smith, however, have taken a more
microeconomic turn.76 Bell’s work will be particularly important in later chapters, so it
will only be briefly explained now. In his earliest work, Bell had already argued that
capitalism deploys “technologies of desire” to discipline individual desires in a way that
undermines various theological, political, and cultural values.77 By the time of his later
work on theology and economics, Bell makes this aspect of capitalism far more central to
his analysis, focusing on the way that capitalist technologies of desire distort a right view
of the individual economic agent, of God, and of the good.78 His end conclusion is that,
“The capitalist economy of desire is a manifestation of sin because it both corrupts desire
and obstructs communion.”79 This emphasis on the way that capitalism can discipline
desires, forming an economic agent in ways contrary to a theologically proper formation
yet again suggests that human beings can seemingly resist God’s work in transforming
the world through particular aspects of the economy.
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Roman Catholic Claimants to the “Third Way”
With the publication of the papal encyclical Rerum Novarum in 1891 the Roman
Catholic Church began a fruitful tradition of theological reflection on economic matters.80
Critical of both Marxism and laissez-faire capitalism81 and rejecting both collectivism
and individualism, as the encyclical tradition developed in the later Quadragessimo anno
and subsequent texts it began to point toward a “third way.” Historically, significant
economists like Heinrich Pesch (1854-1926), John Ryan (1869-1945), and Bernard
Dempsey (1903-1960) sought to develop economic tools to build the third way, and
attempts to do the same continue to the present. Three claimants to the title “third way”
warrant particular consideration: redistributionist approaches, economic personalism, and
liberation theology. The redistributionist approach encapsulates several distinct
movements that developed in the early twentieth century but which continue to have
varying degrees of influence today. Common among those I am including under the
redistributionist approach is prioritization on distributive justice as a central means of
transforming the economy and an emphasis on practical efforts to secure such justice.
Two significant movements that fit into this category are the Focolare movement and
distributism.
The Focolare movement began in the city of Trent in Italy during World War II
when a small group of individuals led by Chiara Lubich and desiring to help those who
were suffering as a result of recurring bombings formed a community intent on
80
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distributing goods to aid the needy.82 The movement, whose name is derived from the
Italian word for “hearth,” developed initially through decentralized efforts to establish a
community that extended to all those in need, welcoming them as if into a single home.
Two practices sustained this passion in the early Focolare movement. Some community
members named the focalarini pledged all their salaries, property, and future earnings to a
community fund that would be distributed to those in need. Others gave periodically
without pledging everything, often through the annual process known as “bundling”
where unneeded possessions were put into a community pile to be redistributed to those
with need.83 This economic redistribution was later augmented with efforts to help those
who were not poor through counseling, religious instruction, and other services, but
redistribution as a basis of economic justice remains central to the identity of the Focolare
movement.84
In 1991 the Economy of Communion (EOC), a significant new Focolare business
project on economic justice through redistribution, was launched as a result of a speech
given by Lubich. By 2006, 753 businesses were participating in the project across several
continents. Profits from EOC businesses are divided in thirds, with one third going to
help those in need through Focolare redistribution efforts, another third being reinvested
in the business to ensure stable growth, and a final third funding educational structures to
advance the culture of giving that the EOC was founded on.85 In addition, EOC
corporations often implement pay or benefits increases, apprenticeships for the poor or
82
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disabled, and participative management strategies, each of which effectively redistribute
wealth, power, and opportunities.86 This entire project sees itself as a third way rooted in
a Trinitarian theology; a Focolare spirituality of God’s perichoresis, kenosis, and agapic
self-giving forms the basis of the Focolare efforts.87
Distributism emerged a century ago largely through the efforts of G.K. Chesterton
and Hilaire Belloc.88 Recent efforts have re-invigorated the earlier movement, updating
its ideas and providing a backing in economic theory.89 Perhaps most notable in this
regard is the work of John Médaille, whose main insights can be summarized with his
claim that, “The simplest way to overcome the opposition between capital and labor is
simply to dissolve the difference between the two, to make the workers the owners of the
capital they create.”90 Médaille suggests that this redistribution (or, rather, re-thinking of
distributive justice) will also bring about an equilibrium that avoids prolonged recessions
because consumption and profits will balance in ways that are not possible when a few
wealthy elites control more profit than they could possibly use up through consumption.91
Médaille identifies the central element in the distributist platform to be re-moralizing the
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market by making concerns of distributive justice central.92 This plan does not require redistribution through government intervention; rather, Médaille suggests that government
intervention is what has allowed such disparities to arise.93 Like the Focolare movement,
distributism sees itself as validated through the practical grassroots successes of
corporations following a distributist mindset. The Spanish Mondragón Cooperative
Corporation, a multi-national corporation with $33 billion in assets with 80% of the
employees being owners, is the most notable example of success from corporations
adopting a distributist mindset.94
What the Focolare movement and distributism demonstrate for our present
purposes is that alternative formulations of economic firms are possible. Further, the
authors in the redistributionist approach all emphasize that the economy can operate in an
unjust way contrary to any possible divine action (for “God is not unjust” – Heb. 6:10),
but that humans can also contribute to more just forms of economic interaction. Each of
these claims suggest further need to explore whether and how God acts through the
economy and how human actions can resist or participate in such divine intentions.
Further, the focolare movement’s explicit appeal to the Trinity as a means of justifying
the movement reveals the manner in which the movement understands God to be actively
working in its development.
Economic personalism is another significant and predominantly Catholic foray
into theological economics, but with slightly different emphases than those the
redistributionist approach, perhaps in part due to the significant role that professional
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economists have played in the development of this approach.95 In the words of economic
personalist Edward O’Boyle, personalist economics is “the most advanced thinking about
economic affairs from the perspective of Catholic social thought in its more than 100year history of development.”96 The point is granted with respect to economic models
(though not to philosophy and theology) given the extensive efforts to redevelop
economic theory from a more robust notion of the economic agent as person instead of as
individualistic homo economicus.97 Here the idea of a person is drawn from philosophical
personalism, particularly from the work of Emmanuel Mounier, with Karol Wojtyla also
quite significant.98 A modified concept of the economic agent that considers motives
beyond self-interested utility maximization can be the basis of an economic theory that is,
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quoting Peter Danner, “both more humane and more realistic.”99 The emphasis on
realistic models is quite important for many economic personalists, with improved
predictive abilities often an explicit goal.100 The economic personalist approach can thus
be summarized as an approach applying personalist philosophy to economic models and
theories in an attempt to develop models and theories that can better predict human action
through recognition of the moral dimensions of the human person. While various
economic personalists reference aspects of the personalist philosophies of Wojtyla and
others that suggest the economy may have a formative role on humans,101 so far the
authors in this approach have done little to explore the nature of such formation to any
degree that may be helpful to our questions at hand concerning how God can work
through the economy, or how humans can fail to participate in such action. This project
therefore has the potential to expand the scope of the work done by personalist thinkers
insofar as it, like the personalists, will seek to extensively engage economic models.
Liberation theology is perhaps the most famous of the three main contemporary
Roman Catholic perspectives on theology and economics. This theological approach
arose from a number of Latin American theologians in the nineteen sixties and seventies,
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continuing into the present.102 Resisting the (at that time) dominant Christendom model
of political theology because of violence by totalitarian regimes, governmental
exploitation of indigenous populations, and extreme poverty that was attributed to
government corruption and exploitation by the developed nations, Liberation theology
instead sought a radical change, liberation instead of development.103 To accomplish this
change, theology must be understood as “critical reflection on historical praxis,”104 to use
Gustavo Gutiérrez’s famous words, so that practice to some degree determines
Christianity’s truth105 and so that, to cite Clodovis Boff, “faith is first and foremost,
although not exclusively, orthopraxis.”106 What praxis do the liberation theologians
advocate? According to Ignacio Ellacuría, theology must be concerned with the task of
taking the crucified people down from the cross.107 Particularly, theologians must be
attentive to the ways that macroeconomic structures trap the poor in poverty and to the
102
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ways that the international political system buttresses violent Latin American regimes. It
must proclaim a theology that is both informed by the experiences of those who suffer
and insistent on the need to end such suffering in part through the elimination of
ideology.
The two emphases of liberation theology just mentioned, being shaped by the
experience of suffering and acting in solidarity with those who suffer toward the
elimination of such suffering,108 relate directly to the questions of how God is working
through the economy and how human beings can resist or cooperate with this divine
action. The experience of encountering the poor serves as the basis of a powerful
spirituality of liberation, something that has been an important part of the project of
liberation theology since its inception109 despite criticism of an increasing emphasis on
popular spirituality by some important liberation theologians.110 The spirituality of
liberation insists that political and economic liberations “are the vehicles of spiritual
liberation itself,”111 a practice that “brings the Christian face to face with ultimate
realities”112 so that, when one responds to such ultimate realities in honesty and
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faithfulness, the encounter with the poor can “mediate the otherness of God.”113
Liberation theology is clear: To encounter God’s activity in the economy, we must
encounter God’s activity on behalf of and through the poor. Of equal importance for our
line of enquiry is liberation theology’s emphasis on praxis.114 God acts in history for the
liberation of the oppressed, and calls the Church to join in such action.
Like the previous two approaches, liberation theology claims for itself a “third
way” status, rejecting the exploitations of capitalism, and the false collectivism of
Marxism.115 However, many proponents of liberation theology are dependent upon
certain Marxist economic conclusions like dependency theory, which suggests that
underdeveloped nations are struggling economically as a result of the way that the
international economic system forces them to be dependent upon exploitative wealthy
nations.116 Reliance on dependency theory and other aspects of Marxist economic
analysis, while perhaps necessary given the generally Marxist milieu in which these
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theologians were writing,117 resulted in significant criticism from ecclesiastical
authorities118 despite protestations that Marxist philosophy and atheism was rejected
while Marxist raw economic data was retained.119 Such debates over Marxism can
obscure the liberationist claim that praxis (even if praxis is understood in a Marxist
fashion) is the first moment in theology, the best means of participating in the divine life,
and that certain concrete economic practices participate in the divine act of liberation,
while certain other concrete economic practices do not. Here my hypothesis is laid out in
bold: certain economic actions by humans put out the Spirit’s fire, while others
participate in God’s redemptive act of liberation.
Theology Utilizing Other Methods
Two common approaches tend to utilize the methods and conclusions of other
social sciences in reaching their conclusions. The economics as religion approach takes
on an anthropological slant by appealing to a broad conception of “religion” and trying to
fit economics within this definition, and a sociology of religion approach draws on
sociological analysis to explore capitalism’s influence on religious beliefs. Each approach
points to significant ways that the economy can shape religious beliefs and practices.
Unlike the re-imagining approach, the economics as religion approach tends to
emphasize the way that economic processes influence religious experiences, rather than
how theological views of the world may potentially shape economic processes. I include
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a range of authors including Robert Nelson, Joerg Rieger, and Jung Mo Sung into the
economics as religion approach. Despite differences in content, in terms of formal
approach each draws on a broad definition of “religion” to show how economics fits
these categories. For Sung, a religion is characterized by the basic elements of paradise,
original sin, and a means of entering paradise.120 Economics rests on a number of
unproven assumptions that are validated through myth.121 In this case, capitalism has relocated paradise as a future state of perfection obtainable through technological and
economic growth.122 Market intervention is seen as the original sin, where good
intentions actually derail economic progress. The sufferings of the poor are construed as
necessary sacrifices, a temporary step toward a future state of global prosperity.123
Economics adopts a “mythico-religious” dynamic because it “assumes a faith in a…
supra-human law of history to enhance such a passage.”124 When the progress of history
does not appear to be approaching the paradisiacal future state, various “priests” of the
market must restore our faith in this supra-human law of progress to save our consciences
from the recognition that the sacrifice of the poor was not for a higher end.125 Drawing on
Sung’s arguments, Joerg Rieger suggests that there is a bi-directional influence between
religious and economic institutions. “Oracles” of the market (Rieger’s equivalent to
Sung’s “priests”) are more effective in promoting a version of “market fundamentalism”
in contexts where religious practitioners have been taught not to question religious
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authorities.126 Conversely, market fundamentalism’s religious nature can transform
religious ideas of God in ways mirroring market and corporate ideals.127
Economist Robert Nelson reaches similar conclusions to theologians Sung and
Rieger. He too suggests economics has a fundamentally religious nature insofar as it
offers an “alternative vision of the ‘ultimate values’ or ‘ultimate reality.’”128 Nelson
points to a wide range of evidence to support his claim, including quasi-religious hopes in
Marx and Keynes for a final stage of history filled with economic abundance,129 Paul
Samuelson’s appeal to a tautological “market mechanism” that lacked a scientific
foundation to the exclusion of other considerations as if on religious faith,130 and to
Chicago economist Harry Johnson’s self description of his economic work as
“missionary” in nature.131 Ultimately, concludes Nelson, the success of many economists
depends primarily upon “the overall quality of their artistic performance.”132 Nelson
shares with Rieger and Sung a strategy of offering a broad definition of religion in
general (non-scientific/artistic efforts to describe ultimate values and reality) which can
then appropriately be applied to economics.
The economics as religion approach is less obviously related to the question of
divine action, a fact stemming partly from an essentialist account of religion that may be
untenable. Each author posits core elements shared by all religions and then attempts to
show how economics shares the same core elements. Though none make any specific
notion of a deity or of divine action central to the essence of religion, the extreme variety
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of phenomena falling under the category of religion makes virtually any essentialist
account a simplification of matters (though for this approaches’ purposes, often a helpful
one). That being said, given the contestability of what counts as religion, it would do little
harm to the broader projects of authors like Rieger, Sung, and Nelson to reinterpret their
essential categories so that religions are said either to arise as a result of divine action or
to mimic such action. In other words, because there is no undisputed “essence” of
religion, additional elements can potentially be imported into the proposed essences put
forward by these authors without any clear basis for prohibiting such expansion. Such
supplementation would simply arise from another subjective, contestable perspective
about what constitutes religion. A Christian who understands Christianity to be a religion
precisely because it is a response to a perceived divine action could interpret other
religions on the basis of divine action with equal plausibility and subjectivity to Rieger’s,
Sung’s, or Nelson’s contestable claims to identify the essence of religion. All such
essentialist accounts of religion face similar counter examples and debates over the
centrality of certain religious motifs vis-à-vis others. Thus, a theologian concerned with
divine action can supplement Sung’s concerns over the sacrifice of the poor with the
claim that this is a problematic and idolatrous attempt to replace the divinely ordained
and right sacrifice provided through divine action without undermining Sung’s
conclusions, provided that the addition of talk about divine action does not obscure the
overriding concern for injustice done to the poor. Therefore, while the economics as
religion approach does not require any consideration of divine action or of human
resistance to such action, its conclusions can be easily adapted to such concerns. In fact,
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from a certain subjective theological standpoint, such adaptation would strengthen the
argument as a whole by better representing the essence of true religion.
Vincent Miller and Bruce Rittenhouse exemplify the sociology of religion
approach, deploying sociological arguments coupled with theological insights to critique
consumerism. Miller argues that ideological critiques of consumerism fall short because
they ignore the non-intentional aspects of consumerism and because capitalist societies
are able to commodify dissent in a way that actually reinforces the basic problem.133
Drawing on a wide range of cultural critics, sociologists, and economists,134 Miller
suggests that a consumer culture is one in which “elements of culture are readily
commodified.”135 Consumerism demands an ever-increasing amount of goods, but makes
these goods interchangeable and so hollowed out.136 Miller identifies a wide variety of
modern religious phenomena ranging from pop cultural elements like Touched by an
Angel to the academic theologies of Karl Rahner and Paul Tillich that he sees fitting this
consumeristic commodification. In order to overcome these tendencies, economic agents
must be re-situated in the economy and the religious community in roles that exceed that
of consumer by becoming involved with production processes, by reconnecting
commodities to their production process, and by re-embedding religious practices and
doctrines in communities and traditions.137
Bruce Rittenhouse criticizes prior approaches to consumerism (including Miller’s)
for being inadequately empirical and for failing to recognize the fundamentally religious
133
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motivation behind consumerism.138 He surveys a number of existing critiques of
consumerism put forward by theologians and by sociologists and then demonstrates that
the empirical data does not fit well with any existing proposals.139 For example, most
consumerism theories assume that consumerism is not a problem for the lowest economic
demographics, which is demonstrably not the case.140 Furthermore, the presence of
consumeristic tendencies in the upper economic classes calls into question theories that
would suggest wealthy elites are using advertizing to manipulate the middle class.141
Rittenhouse offers a different explanation informed by the theology of Paul Tillich,
where consumerism is one possible answer to the question of human existence.142 As a
meaning strategy, consumerism attempts to provide a means of self-assertion against the
risk of existential disappointment. Therefore, consumerism is best overcome when an
alternative meaning strategy such as the one offered by Christianity is substituted in
instances where the consumeristic meaning strategy fails, such as in financial crises or
during health problems.143 Rittenhouse argues that this existential religious explanation of
consumerism better fits empirical data144 while resting on solid (Tillichian) theological
foundations.
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With the sociology of religion approach we again see claims that particular
aspects of the market can form individual economic agents in ways that either
fundamentally alter their religious lives or that result in an economic substitute for
religious life. Divine agency is not a focus in either of the authors mentioned above, and
many views of such action are likely incommensurable with the Tillichian emphasis of
Rittenhouse. Nevertheless, in identifying ways that the market can substitute for religious
meaning strategies or fundamentally alter religious beliefs, the sociology of religion
approach still contributes to our current lines of enquiry. If God’s acts include any
attempt to bring human beings into relationship with Himself, then the sociology of
religion approach has identified ways that consumerism can impede such relationship by
substituting an immanent meaning strategy that requires no turn to God, or by
commodifying religion in such a manner that it no longer serves as a means of facilitating
communion with God, but rather functions as a disembodied set of symbols linked with
unintended meanings entirely unrelated to God’s self-revelation. Furthermore, behind
such critiques lies an implicit claim that the economy could unfold in a nonconsumeristic fashion more amenable to authentic religion. In this study’s terminology, a
version of the market that allows for authentic religion is one that contains within it the
potential of redemptive significance, which must be understood as arising from divine
action.
The survey of various existing approaches to theology and economics has
uncovered a wide range of pertinent data. Various approaches suggest that the economy
can form human beings in ways that are contrary to Christian formation, while some hold
out hope that a properly ordered market can actually contribute to the process of
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transformation in various redemptively significant ways. Admittedly, many of the
theologians considered do not explain their ideas in terms of divine agency, and some do
not even consider the potentially transformative nature of the economy at all. Despite
this, chapter 2 will suggest that there are good theological reasons to analyze the raw data
provided by this survey in terms of divine action and in terms of human assent to or
rejection of such divine action.
The approaches studied above will all contribute in various ways to the full
development of such a theology of divine action in the economy, though the information
discussed in this chapter must first go through one additional step of sorting by which the
various approaches discussed above can be collected into groups more usefully deployed
in analysis of specifically trinitarian divine action. The Christian God is, after all, Triune.
Consequently, while this survey has provided the general contour of the sorts of questions
that will be addressed in this study, and while it has demonstrated that a wide range of
approaches consider the claim that God acts through the economy and that human beings
can resist such action within their own perspectives, the results of this survey of existing
literature is only the first step in what must be a much larger argument. We now have
some basic theological data that can be evaluated and fit into a theology of divine action
to provide a coherent answer to our basic research questions. Before such a task can be
completed, one final preliminary point must be made.
I have gone to great lengths to identify some theological approaches that will be
helpful in the subsequent chapters, but I have made almost no remarks on the pertinent
economic data. It would be a mistake to believe that economic theory itself can play no
role in answering the sorts of questions this project is asking. Therefore, while I began
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the chapter arguing that theological questions can be brought to bear at every stage of
economic analysis, I must end the chapter by insisting that such theology can never fully
replace the methodology of economics, which provides a number of important tools that
theologians typically cannot. Of particular importance, and the major economic focus of
the duration of this project, are economic models.
While specific economic institutions, legal frameworks, and practices will all be
pertinent to the analysis, it is the economic model that will be the main object of analysis
moving forward. “Economists rely on models to understand economic phenomena,”
writes Randall Holcombe, “a common bond that unites all economic methodology.”145 If
Bell raises concerns about capitalist “technologies of desire,”146 his concerns must be
applied to the specific technological apparatus used by economists to construct the
market: models. Objections to homo economicus raised by so many of the approaches
considered above but especially by economic personalists are objections to a certain
vision of economic agents contained in standard economic models. Various economic
models coupled with moral, legal, and political constraints allow policy makers to decide
on the proper fences that would render a market legitimate. It is the model that allows
economists to speak as priests or oracles with special insights in the way that worries the
economics as religion approach. Models are used to describe the ideal practices of the
market, to defend the market structures that liberation theologians consider oppressive,
and to exclude or ignore the distributive justice concerns of the redistributionist approach.
Despite the significance of economic models, which are the standard pedagogical tools of
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the economic classroom and the standard economic language of economic researchers,147
of the approaches considered at length above, few directly engage economic models.
Those approaches that do assess models and theory, like economic personalism or John
Médaille’s distributist analysis, have paid far less attention to the sorts of formative
influences that the economy can have on human nature than have other approaches, and
these formative roles are essential to determining whether/how God acts through the
economy and whether/how human actions can refuse to participate in this divine action.
The model is extremely important, but underexplored in regards to this question.
Therefore, the economic model will be the primary economic object of this theological
study. Now we must turn to the question of how it is theologically comprehensible to talk
about God acting through the market or of human beings resisting such divine action.

147

Paul Samuelson makes the point that mathematical modeling is simply another
language, another way of representing reality. The mathematical model is the predominant
language of most modern schools of economic thought, with the notable exception of the
Austrian school. Paul Samuelson, “Economic Theory and Mathematics: An Appraisal,” in The
Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson, Vol. II ed. Joseph E. Stiglitz (Cambridge, MA:
The M.I.T. Press, 1966), 1751-2. I will attend to the linguistic nature of models in more depth in
chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 2 – ECONOMIC ACTS OF THE TRIUNE GOD OF GRACE
Even through a providence whose main task is preservation, the world is being led forward.
In other words, it is hard to distinguish between the providence that acts to preserve and the
providence that acts to lead.
- Dumitru Staniloae1

The scriptures do not present God primarily as a first cause, the metaphysical
ground of being, though Christians rightly can conclude that these are proper ways of
speaking about God. No, the main Biblical category for divine action is that of speaking,
where God’s speech is “expressed supremely in the christological Word made flesh and
secondarily in the canonical polyphony that in turn presents Jesus Christ,” in the words of
Kevin Vanhoozer.2 God is the one who speaks, and creation bursts into existence (Gen.
1:3, 6, etc.). God speaks through the prophets (2 Pet. 1:21), and ultimately through his
Son (Heb. 1:1-2), the Word who makes the Father known (John 1:1, 18). If speaking is
the primary Biblical category for divine action, and if such speaking culminates in the
incarnation of the Word, then our study of divine action cannot be divorced from study of
revelation and of redemption through the Word. For this reason, I will proceed with the
working hypothesis that study of divine action must explain how this action reveals the
God who is Triune.3 Therefore, this chapter will proceed with two emphases. First, we
will explore the nature of divine action, initially taking creation as paradigmatic and
therefore focusing on the God/world relation. Properly speaking, all created reality must
1

Dumitru Staniloae, The Experience of God: Orthodox Dogmatic Theology Vol. 2 – The
World: Creation and Deification, trans. and eds. Ioan Ionita and Robert Barringer (Brookline,
MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2000), 192.
2
Kevin J. Vanhoozer, Remythologizing Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), 24. See also, Henry, Carl F. H. God, Revelation, and Authority Vol. II: God Who
Speaks and Shows, Fifteen Theses, Part One. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1999), 51.
3
Chapters 4-6 will connect this theology to redemption and the ordo salutis. This chapter
will explain why revelation is connected to acts in the order of creation.
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be understood as radically dependent on the continued, concurrent, sustaining action of
God. When human action conforms to the divine action on which it depends, we must
speak of this conformity as the result of grace and oriented toward communion with God.
When human action fails to participate in divinely ordained ends, we must speak of sin.
Second, we will explore the God who acts in history and is revealed in history. The
Christian God is a Triune God, so this section will need to explore how God acts as
Father, Son, and Spirit. The short answer to this question is that each person acts
inseparably in self-revelation toward the redemption of the world brought about through
the redemption of the Church, though specific acts can rightly be ascribed more fully to
one particular person, either Father, Son, or Spirit. A third related task will be the focus
of chapter 3: we must explore orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathy as three dimensions
of human transformation arising from Triune action on human beings. Only when these
theological foundations are established can we move to analyze the market as a site of
divine action or human failure to participate in that action
A Theology of Divine Action
The act of creation is in important respects paradigmatic for all divine action.
Insofar as creation is, from a creaturely perspective, the first of all divine acts, it stands as
a logical precondition for all subsequent acts in the order of creation. Furthermore,
insofar as God’s acts of redemption bring about a “new creation” (2 Cor. 5:17, Gal. 6:15),
they should be interpreted as in continuity with the first creation which constituted, from
a human perspective, the first divine act. Therefore, to understand God’s action in the
world we must first begin by attempting to understand God’s relation to creation.
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Among contemporary theologians, Kathryn Tanner’s depiction of the God/world
relation is perhaps most helpful and most theologically sound. Tanner points to two
traditional Greek conceptions of transcendence. The first contrastive view understands
divinity as “set off oppositionally, as a realm of eternal, changeless intelligibility, over
against the world as a whole characterized by contradictory predicates.”4 In such nonChristian Hellenistic contexts, the more transcendent God was understood to be, the less
God was thought to be engaged with the world. This view is not radical enough in its
understanding of transcendence because it understands God to exist in the same domain
of existence as the created order such that divine transcendence must be understood as
contrasted with this created order.5 Partly spurred on by post-Reformation confessional
debates about free will,6 this contrastive view has been predominant in modern
theological thought.7 Often this contrast occurs in spatial terms such that God is “above”
while creatures are “below,” or such that God is “outside” time while creatures are
“within” it.8 However, if God is Creator of the universe, including space-time, then there
is a sense in which space is not real for God, and neither God nor the God/world relation
can be defined in terms of space, except perhaps analogically.9 At other times, such
4

Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment?
(Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1988), 38-40.
5
Ibid., 46.
6
William Placher traces the “domestication” of transcendence through its reduction to
contrastive terms in Lutheran synergists, Catholic Molinists, Arminians, and federal covenant
theologians. William C. Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modern Thinking
about God Went Wrong (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1996), 162-3.
7
A helpful reading of modern theology in light of debates surrounding transcendence and
immanence is offered in Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, 20th Century Theology: God and
World in a Transitional Age (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 1992).
8
Such contrastive transcendence is often assumed but rarely argued for. One exception
occurs in Klaus Kremer, Gott und Welt in der klassischen Metaphysik: Vom Sein der ,Dinge‘ in
Gott. (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1969), 94-96.
9
Emil Brunner understands this conclusion to not only follow philosophically from the
fact that God is Creator of space-time, but also exegetically from the prohibition against idols.
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contrast comes in temporal terms. Thus, Emmanuel Durand insightfully points out that
both science and analytic philosophy (and even certain forms of Aristotelian philosophy)
push the theology of divine action in the direction of discussions about cause and effect
in a temporal sequence such that divine action must either precede or follow subsequent
to a particular human action.10 Such temporalizing again weakens divine transcendence,
reducing God to one agent among other univocal agents sharing a common temporal
sphere and a common space in a singular causal network. A radical understanding of
transcendence recognizes God as Creator of all the aspects of the universe, including
space and time, such that contrastive definitions that reduce transcendence to a
contrastive position within a common domain are unnecessary.
Against an oppositional notion of transcendence, Tanner points to a noncontrastive understanding of transcendence that was common to a wide range of
theological traditions and even to certain schools of Greek philosophical thought:
A non-contrastive transcendence of God suggests an extreme of divine
involvement with the world – a divine involvement in the form of a productive
agency extending to everything that is in an equally direct manner. Divine
involvement with the world need be neither partial, nor mediate, nor simply
formative: if divinity is not characterized by contrast with any sort of being, it
may be the immediate source of being of every sort.11
“The protest against making an image of God does not only mean that He is unlike the world, but
also that He is not tied to space.” Emil Brunner, Dogmatics: Vol. 1 – The Christian Doctrine of
God, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1950), 257-8.
10
Emmanuel Durand, Évangile et Providence: Un theologie de l’action de Dieu (Paris:
Cerf, 2014), 61.
11
Tanner, God and Creation, 46. Thomas Tracy objects to Tanner’s position, arguing that
God’s transcendence cannot be defined in purely non-contrastive ways because at the very least
there must be a contrast such as God being defined without contrast and creatures being defined
through contrast. It would seem that Tracy misunderstands the object of non-contrastive claims
about God. The claim is not that there is no contrast between God and creation. After all, Tracy’s
point is made far more simply by noting that God is God and creation is not God, a contrast.
Rather, the proper claim is that transcendence is not defined in contrast to immanence, such that
one must be sacrificed to obtain the other. God’s being immanent in the world does not require
that God sacrifice certain aspects of transcendence, nor visa versa. Thomas F. Tracy, “Divine
Action, Created Causes, and Human Freedom,” in The God Who Acts: Philosophical and
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Understood in such radical terms, God transcends the world precisely because of an
ontological distinction whereby both complementary binaries such as time and space and
contrastive binaries such as being and becoming or the one and the many, can only
maintain their proper distinctiveness through the immediate sustaining effort of God.12
Space and time do not exist because of a divine self-limitation where God is limited and
thereby separated from creation,13 but because the God who transcends both space and
time is also radically immanent to all of space and time, providentially sustaining each
instant as well as the entire expanse of the universe.14 Nor is God the One opposed to the
created many, because in the Triune God both unity and plurality find their perfection.15
All aspects of non-divine being and existence are “in a relation of total and immediate
dependence upon God.”16
A non-contrastive view of transcendence has significant implications for a theory
of divine agency. Tanner suggests a “principle of direct proportion”: “The more one talks

Theological Explorations, ed. Thomas F. Tracy (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1994), 85-87.
12
Colin E. Gunton, The One, The Three, and the Many: God, Creation and the Culture of
Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 161.
13
Here, for example, Jürgen Moltmann’s use of zimsum, the self-limitation of God that
gives space to creation, weakens transcendence by making God captive within a space shared
with the created order. Moltmann tries to overcome this problem by positing panentheistically
that this space simply is God, but such claims do not defend the notion of transcendence as much
as they collapse the ontological distinction between Creator and creature. In the end, the primary
difference in Moltmann’s theology between the divine works ad intra and the divine works ad
extra is a difference in space. Jürgen Moltmann, God in Creation (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
1993), 86-89; cf. Jürgen Moltmann, The Coming of God, trans. Margaret Kohl (Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1996), 297; Jürgen Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom (San Francisco:
Harper & Row Publishers, 1981), 108.
14
As Carl Henry explains things with clarity and brevity: “For Christian theology, divine
transcendence and immanence are corollary conceptions.” Carl F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and
Authority Vol. VI: God Who Stands and Stays, Part Two (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1999), 48.
15
Bonaventure, Disputed Questions on the Mystery of the Trinity, trans. Zachary Hayes
(New York: The Franciscan Institute of St. Bonaventure University, 1979), II.2.
16
Tanner, God and Creation, 84.
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of the realization and perfection of created beings, the more one must speak of God’s
immediate creative working.”17 If human agency is a power, then this power is only
perfected to the extent that God is immediately active within this agency. However,
keeping in mind a non-contrastive view of immanence, this correspondence of divine and
human agency does not suggest that the divine agency is therefore not transcendent, as if
God’s agency is somehow “added on” to the creature’s as a supplementary contributor
operative in the same way within the same common domain as the created order.18
Rather, each action must be understood as fully and entirely human when considered
horizontally with only the order of creation in mind, but both the capacities and the actual
act itself must also be understood as radically dependent upon the creative action of God.
The claim may be put in other terms. David Burrell explains that theologians affirming
non-contrastive transcendence view God as the creator not only of being, but of
existence. God is radically transcendent to and immanent within activity as well as
being.19 This view of divine agency strives to simultaneously affirm salvation by grace
alone, providence as the drive behind history, and a genuine space for human
responsibility through human freedom.20 Human acts are free but only insofar as they are
fully dependent upon grace.

17

Ibid., 85. Elsewhere, Tanner writes that “everything nondivine, in every respect that it
is, is dependent upon God’s creative activity.” Kathryn Tanner, “Human Freedom, Human Sin,
and God the Creator,” in The God Who Acts: Philosophical and Theological Explorations, ed.
Thomas F. Tracy (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 115.
18
Tanner, God and Creation, 94.
19
David B. Burrell, “Human Freedom in the Context of Creation,” in The God Who Acts:
Philosophical and Theological Explorations, ed. Thomas F. Tracy (University Park, PA:
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 103-109.
20
These points are summarized quite nicely by Alexander Jensen, who advocates a
similar view of transcendence and divine agency that is in certain respects indebted to Tanner.
Alexander S. Jensen, Divine Providence and Human Agency: Trinity, Creation and Freedom
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014), 111.
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The perspective Tanner advocates has a long history as the doctrine of
concurrence (concursus), beginning with certain scriptural sensibilities.21 As far back as
the narrative accounts of the Old Testament, God’s omnipotence was not seen as
something in conflict with human freedom. Thus, when God used the nations to punish
Israel or Judah (for example, Hab. 1:5-11), divine omnipotence was not seen to conflict
with human responsibility.22 The Old Testament depicts a God who is somehow above a
creation (Eccles. 5:2, Isa. 55:9) that is utterly dependent upon Him (Job 12:10, Ps.
104:29-30). This transcendence does not preclude the immanence of God, who not only
has written every day of our lives in his book (Ps. 139:16), but who establishes our very
steps (Prov. 16:9). Despite this strong view of providence, the accounts still depict
humans as responsible to freely live in a way that glorifies God. Yet, God acts through
these free acts, be it in Pharaoh hardening his heart while God also hardened his heart
(Ex. 8:32, 9:12), or the Lord’s use of Joshua’s brothers’ intention to betray Joshua as part
of a divine intention for good (Gen. 50:20). This Old Testament pattern is continued in
New Testament didactic passages. The same transcendent God who has only been seen
by the Son and those to whom the Son chooses to reveal Him (John 1:18) is also the God
who is “not far from each one of us” and in whom “we live and move and have our
being” (Acts 17:27-28). Particularly significant here is the Pauline account of salvation,
where human beings are urged to have faith, while this faith is somehow depicted as
radically dependent, not “our own doing” but the “gift of God” (Eph. 2:8-10), the God
“who accomplishes all things according to the council of his will” (Eph. 1:11). In regard
to sanctification, Paul can speak of God working through his own toil: “For this I toil,
21
22

Of course, Tanner is well aware of this. Tanner, God in Creation, 93.
Jensen, Providence, 116.
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struggling with all his energy that he powerfully works in me” (Col. 1:29). In the Bible
we see an inchoate view of non-contrastive divine action that is simultaneous with human
action.
As systematic theology developed through the centuries, a philosophically
informed account of these patterns emerged. The doctrine of concurrence was already
prevalent in medieval thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas23 (though for present purposes I
will focus on the Reformed tradition for the methodological reasons noted in the
introduction). Simply put, concurrence is the co-operation of God’s power with all
created powers in every step of activity in such a way that these powers are not reduced
to mere occasions of divine action but retain a status as genuine, free powers.24 The
doctrine allowed Calvin to affirm both providence and free will, though we must keep in
mind that he did not consider the will free to do good due to its bondage to sin. He writes,
“The Lord has furnished men with the arts of deliberation and causation, that they may
employ them in subservience to his providence, in the preservation of their life.”25 The
theme is muted in Calvin,26 but is far clearer in other early Reformed theologians like
Girolamo Zanchi and Zacharias Ursinus.27 Ursinus teaches that all things are necessary
23

For example see: Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles. Book III: Providence –
Part 1, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (Garden City, NY: Hanover House, 1956), §69-70.
24
Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Carlisle, PA: Banner of Truth Trust, 1958), 1713.
25
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Peabody,
MA: Hendrickson, 2008), I.17.4.
26
Here Jensen overstates the case in suggesting Calvin eliminates any roll for freedom
through appeal to providence, and for treating Calvinism instead of the more inclusive Reformed
theology. Jensen, Providence, 47, 97. William Placher is far more accurate in his reading when he
suggests that Calvin “believed that God, on one order of efficacy, is the sustaining cause of every
event, while at the same time each event has its own cause.” Placher, Transcendence, 122.
27
“Scientia et voluntate nihil contingit in mundo, omnia fiant necessario; respectu tamen
nostri causarumque secundarum non omnia necessario, sed quamplurima contingenter fieri et
evenire.” Girolamo Zanchi, De religione Christiana fides ed. Luca Baschera and Christian Moser
(Leiden: Brill, 2007), 6.i.
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from the divine perspective, but also contingent “as far as we are concerned who are
ignorant of their true causes.”28 Against a claim that providence undermines liberty, he
writes:
Contingency is the order between a changeable cause and its effect: just as
necessity is the order between a necessary cause and its effect…. But the same
effect may proceed from a changeable and necessary cause in different respects,
as is the case with all things which God does through his creatures; of which both
God and his creatures are the cause. Thus in respect to God there is an
unchangeable order between cause and effect; but in respect to creatures, there is
a changeable order between the cause and the same effect.29
.

This view of concurrent human and divine action, called either concurrence or meticulous
providence, was prevalent in a number of Reformed theologians up until the modern
period.30
It must be admitted that certain aspects of Reformed theology began to lose the
non-contrastive view of transcendence advocated by Tanner that was the basis of the
doctrine of concurrence. For example, Ursinus introduced the notion of a covenant as a
bilateral agreement. When coupled with his claim that there was both a covenant of
works and a covenant of grace, the bilateral nature of the covenant of grace led to debates
over which part of faith was a human contribution and which part was divine.31 Debates
of this sort often weakened transcendence and began to claim that whatever is attributable
to a divine contribution reduces human contribution, rather than granting that faith is both
fully a free human act and fully a divine act, where the human act is entirely dependent
upon God’s grace. Perhaps the most notable example of this perspective is evident in the
28

Zacharias Ursinus, The Commentary of Dr. Zacharias Ursinus on the Heidelberg
Catechism trans. G.W. Williard (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing
Company, 1985), 154.
29
Ibid., 161-2.
30
Oliver D. Crisp, Retrieving Doctrine: Essays in Reformed Theology (Downers Grove,
IL: Intervarsity, 2010), 13.
31
Placher, Transcendence, 156.
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debate over Arminianism. Ultimately, debates between Reformed and Arminian theology
that ignored non-contrastive transcendence wound up with disparate views of
concurrence. Reformed theology ultimately identified concurrence with God causing the
secondary cause in a way that diminished human freedom, while the Arminian position
spoke of “passive” concurrence that diminished God’s agency.32 Such trends were not
universal. In the twentieth century, for example, Herman Bavinck argued that
Pelagianism tries to drive a wedge between the natural capacity to do something, and the
will to do something. For Pelagians, God’s providence relates to the capacity/natural
world, but not to the will/moral world.
One cannot designate a point in creation where the counsel and governance of
God and the independent will and action of humans begin… If God and his
human creatures can only be conceived as competitors, and if the one can only
retain his freedom and independence at the expense of the other, then God has to
be increasingly restricted both in knowledge and in will. Pelagianism,
accordingly, banishes God from his world. It leads both to Deism and atheism
and enthrones human arbitrariness and folly. Therefore, the solution of the
problem must be sought in another direction. It must be sought in the fact that
God – because he is God and the universe is his creation – by the infinitely
majestic activity of his knowing and willing, does not destroy but instead creates
and maintains the freedom and independence of his creatures.33

The argument, which could also be applied in a limited sense to Arminianism,34
demonstrates a continued Reformed concern for presenting God’s transcendence in a
non-contrastive way such that human and divine agency can be concurrent.
32

Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God (Grand Rapids, MI: William B.
Eerdmans, 1994), 117.
33
Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics Vol. 2: God and Creation, ed. John Bolt, trans.
John Vriend (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2004), 376-7.
34
Richard Muller surveys Arminius’ teaching on concurrence and concludes that he takes
a decidedly molinist position where there must be a “balance of coordination of primary and
secondary causes.” This balance must ensure that “divine determination must be somehow
limited or withheld if there is to be any freedom and contingency in the created order.” Here one
sees that for God to be transcendent to an act, God must be less immanent within it. Richard A.
Muller, God, Creation and Providence in the Thought of Jacob Arminius: Sources and Directions
of Scholastic Protestantism in the Era of Early Orthodoxy (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic,
1991), 265-6.
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The historical debate between Reformed scholastics and Jesuit theologians again
demonstrates the potential misunderstandings of concurrence where both sides began to
lose the strongest sense of coincident divine and human action. Following Francisco
Suárez, certain theologians affirmed “simultaneous concurrence,” where both the human
will and the divine will contribute to the outcome of any choice but the human will itself
is not affected by the divine. Against this, Reformed theologians defended “previous
concurrence,” where God affects the human will through prior action as well as
determining the outcome of any choice.35 Both sides move away from non-contrastive
transcendence. If divine transcendence does not require a corresponding reduction in
immanence, then God’s transcendence of particular human exercise of the will need not
entail that God is not somehow also operative within that choice, against Suárez and his
companions. However, the proper way to reject this interpretation of concurrence is not
to encapsulate God and creatures in a common chain of causes and effects, so that God
must act as a temporally prior cause to any secondary human causes. Here a common
Reformed scholastic position is mistaken. A more proper understanding of concurrence
can appeal to supervenience as a basis for simultaneity that still identifies human free
action as radically dependent upon divine grace in terms of both human capacities and the
actual human acts chosen.

35

The debate is helpfully summarized in J. Martin Bac, Perfect Will Theology: Divine
Agency in Reformed Scholasticism as against Suárez, Episcopius, Descartes, and Spinoza
(Leiden: Brill, 2010), 449-50. What is in mind here is the problem of reducing divine action in
such a way that it is contained fully within the same causal order as that within which human
beings operate. I do not intend to deny that God acts in a previous way in the sense that the
conditions for the human action were already provided by God. Nor is it to deny that the decree
of grace preceded the creation of the world. Karl Barth Church Dogmatics III/3 – The Doctrine of
Creation, ed. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, trans. G.W. Bromiley and R.J. Ehrlich
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1960), 119-120.
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Frank Kirkpatrick offers a helpful contribution here in his recent philosophical
exploration of divine action.36 With an eye to naturalist criticism of any form of divine
action, Kirkpatrick argues that it is mistaken to analyze divine action in terms of an
intervention into a chain of causes and effects. Such a perspective treats cause and effect
as “primordial,” so that at its core reality is most fundamentally a matter of impersonal
causes and effects. However, theism considers personal agency to be primordial, insofar
as the entire chain of causal events are the result of personal agency. Personal agency is
not a result of deterministic chains of cause and effect. Rather, if one affirms human free
will, then one must also affirm that human persons somehow supervene upon natural
causal processes such as the firing of neurons that bring about a specific voluntary motor
action. To truly be free, human action is irreducible to this deterministic chain of causes
and effects. Human agency is immanent in this chain of cause and effect, but this agency
transcends the causal chain and is therefore irreducible to it.37 If this possibility is denied,
Kirkpatrick argues that there is no free will and the causal nexus is fully determinative.38
On the other hand, if human persons can operate through such supervenience, then we
have no reason to deny the possibility that a divine person can do the same, albeit in an
analogical sense.
Kirkpatrick does not apply the notion of supervenience to a non-contrastive view
of transcendence,39 but arguably in such a view God’s agency is analogous to human
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Frank G. Kirkpatrick, The Mystery and Agency of God: Divine Being and Action in the
World. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2014).
37
Ibid., 102.
38
Ibid., 110.
39
Despite his insight into divine agency, as a whole Kirkpatrick offers a muddled and
incorrect view of the God/world relation, which he depicts as a choice between ontological
monism, ontological dualism, and ontological pluralism. Kirkpatrick sides with the latter position,
thereby constraining God and created beings within a common sphere that is apparently not
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supervenient agency insofar as God’s acts utilize a chain of causes and effects such that
God remains fully immanent to this chain without thereby eliminating the transcendence
of God above this causal chain. To speak in a different manner, the causal chain becomes
the immanent term of the transcendent God’s supervenient act. The main difference
between human agency and divine is that Tanner and other advocates of non-contrastive
transcendence claim that God supervenes upon all created existence, including free
human actions, whereas human agents only supervene upon the biological and physical
causal chains occurring within their bodies.40 If supervenience is possible, as it seems an
affirmation of human free will requires, then Tanner is correct in claiming that the main
reasons for denying concurrence become theological rather than empirical.41 As we have
seen there are solid theological reasons for affirming concurrence to ensure a proper
notion of transcendence.
Divine Action, Grace, and Revelation
Tanner’s theology of non-contrastive transcendence coupled with the doctrine of
concurrence provides the foundation for a theology of divine action in the economy, but
created by God and undermining God as the source of all being. He does not consider the
classical ontologies of analogy, nor any view of transcendence similar to Tanner’s. Rather,
dualism comes at the complete cost of immanence, while monism comes at a complete cost of
transcendence. In both cases, Kirkpatrick believes God is reduced to unknowability. This may be
the case, but Kirkpatrick presents a faulty dilemma in not considering other options. See
especially: Ibid., 104, 106-7.
40
This may be the first step (but only the first) toward a response toward the objections
raised against Tanner by William Hasker on the basis of libertarian views of free will. If human
agency, understood through the lens of supervenience, allows for a biological process to be
simultaneously freely chosen and a determined order of causes and effects, then the possibility of
something being both free and determined is open. It is not immediately obvious why divine
actions supervening concurrently on human actions could not also be simultaneously free and
determined. Because this study will not defend libertarian freedom, I need go no farther in
engaging Hasker. For Hasker’s arguments, see William Hasker, “God the Creator Good and
Evil?” in The God Who Acts: Philosophical and Theological Explorations, ed. Thomas F. Tracy
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 137-146.
41
Tanner, God and Creation, 89.
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alone it is insufficient to fully support the present research questions. This is the case for
two reasons. First, concurrence allows us to view all human actions as coincident with
divine actions, but if all human action in the marketplace can equally be considered
divine action in the same way, the theological claim that God acts in the market loses
much of its significance. If all human action is understood as divine action in the same
way, we cannot easily distinguish certain human actions as rejecting the divine offer of
redemption in comparison to others yielding to God’s plan. That is not to say that a
theology of economics that views all human action as concurrently divine without
attending to further distinctions would lose its significance entirely. One could still argue,
as does Miroslav Volf, that work is better viewed through the category of co-creation
than through that of vocation, insofar as human beings work together with God in all
divine action, including market interactions.42 One might also argue with Sergei
Bulgakov that all human creativity, including economic activity, is a participation in the
divine Sophia.43 Each claim could no doubt bear fruit in our understanding of what we
are doing in the market, but taken alone neither claim provides much insight into what it
would mean for certain possible formations of the market to more easily facilitate our
sanctification and the development of virtues through cooperation with the divine
action.44 Nor would such a view of concurrence, taken alone, explain how certain aspects
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Miroslav Volf, Work in the Spirit: Toward a Theology of Work (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1991).
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of the economy may transform us in redemptively significant ways while others do not.
Neither claim can therefore be the basis of a theology capable of evaluating certain
constructions of the market, or of proposing constructions that are superior to present
market formations.
The second problem is the inverse of the first. If all human actions are so radically
dependent on divine action so as to be accurately considered coincident with that divine
action, how do we explain those aspects of the market that can form us in maladaptive
ways? In other words, how do we explain sinful human actions? Tanner herself develops
a partial answer to this question, explaining the classical notion of sin as a deprivation of
being and thus not a creation of God before moving on to suggest that sin is ultimately
inexplicable, though she suggests this is precisely what we would expect given that God
is the explanation of all that is.45 While theologically sound in its basic contours, this
response is incomplete for present purposes precisely because it is unable to provide a
theological apparatus by which we can distinguish between sin and concurrent action.
While it may not be possible to fully explain how such sin occurs, we must at least
distinguish such resistance from other concurrent divine/human actions in order to have
any hope of constructing an economy that provides less opportunity for such resistance.
Without such a distinction, we cannot easily aim for market constructions that lead to
more positive outcomes. Furthermore, while sin is absurd, it cannot be treated as merely
absurd, or else we are left unable to identify factors that are more or less likely to spur
human beings on to sin. Therefore, it is necessary to augment the theology of noncontrastive transcendence and concurrence that provides a means of describing God
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working through human economic activity with a theology of grace and a theology of
revelation.
We begin by rejecting certain tenets of the Barthian strand of Reformed theology.
In the first volume of his Church Dogmatics, Barth famously criticizes the Roman
Catholic analogia entis as the “invention of the antichrist.”46 Barth is concerned to ensure
that the basis of all human knowledge of God is the divine self-revelation Revealed by
the Father in the Son who is the Revelation which is possessed as Revealedness of the
Holy Spirit within the church. He therefore criticizes all prior categories that can be
imposed onto God’s self-revelation and that would thereby distort or limit it.
Constraining the basis of revelation in this manner is admirable,47 but, perhaps influenced
by too heavily relying on a Kierkegaardian dialectical notion of God and creation as
separated by an infinite qualitative divide,48 Barth fails to recognize the way that creation
is ordered toward revelation, at least in his early works.49 Therefore, he severs created
being from God too drastically. This objection was initially raised by Hans Urs von
Balthasar, who rightly noted that the incarnation “presupposes the order of creation,” as
“oriented towards the Incarnation,” such that “it possesses images, analogies, and
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dispositions that truly are presuppositions for the Incarnation.”50 Human beings had to be
created in the image and likeness of God (Gen. 1:27) in order for the very Image of God
to be incarnate as the man Jesus Christ (Col. 1:15). Alan Torrance strengthens the
argument, suggesting that a rejection of the analogia entis falls subject to the same
“duplex cognitio” of God that Barth so heavily criticized.51 The analogia entis only
counts as the superimposition of a prior category onto revelation if we divorce creation
from revelation, reaffirming a two-story hierarchic antinomy of creation and divine
revelation. Against this division, Torrance convincingly argues that “revelation and
reconciliation are intrinsic, and not extrinsic, to God’s act of creation” such that not only
is the order of creation presupposed in God’s revelatory act of incarnation in the Word (a
la von Balthasar), but it is also the initial movement of a single act of divine selfrevelation that is completed in the incarnation.52
This basic ordering of creation toward redemption that the analogia entis drives at
is traditionally manifest in Reformed theology with the doctrine of common grace, which
was most adeptly articulated by several Dutch and Dutch-influenced Reformed
theologians of the early twentieth century. Herman Bavinck, who is particularly helpful
for present purposes,53 puts the point quite nicely when he writes that “special grace is
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encircled by common grace… the God of creation and of regeneration is one.”54
Common grace is, for Bavinck, the basis of relating nature and grace. Socinians collapse
the ordo supernaturalis by abandoning the notion of a special grace by which God
redeems the elect thereby retaining nothing but nature, claims Bavinck. Anabaptists
abandon the ordo naturalis by denying the presence of any grace common to the world
apart from the special grace of the Church.55 Bavinck argues that Roman Catholics, on
the other hand, maintain a stark distinction between nature and grace through the
acceptance of a state of humanity in puris naturalibus completely divorced from grace.56
Against this wide range of mistakes, Bavinck argues that the content of history is not
exhausted with the history of Israel and the Church as the recipients of special grace,57
but that through grace God restrains sin in creation as a whole because this creation is
part of the divine plan.58 Life and being itself is not “natural” but is dependent entirely
upon grace.59 (Note here the echoes of Tanner’s claim that every aspect of created being
and existence is immediately dependent upon the continued preserving work of God.)
Ultimately, Bavinck insists that we relate nature and grace, creation and re-creation in the
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way that the Scriptures do. The first promises of grace are made to Adam and Eve and
pertain to the entire human race and special grace emerges from this common grace.60
The two forms of grace are fully united in Christ,61 who is the pinnacle of the old creation
and the firstfruits of the new creation.
Setting aside the question of whether Bavinck describes various theological
alternatives with adequate accuracy, we can say that in terms of the relationship between
creation and God, the distinction between common grace and special grace is attempting
something very similar to what von Balthasar and other members of the nouvelle
theologie are attempting with their version of the analogia entis and the
nature/supernatural distinction.62 Like Bavinck, the theologians of the nouvelle theologie
reject the idea of a “pure nature” as a later invention,63 instead pointing to the same
fundamental ordering of the natural toward the supernatural that Barth was keen to
dismiss.64 However, in preferring to speak of common grace and special grace instead of
nature and the supernatural, the Reformed notion offers two distinct advantages over the
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analogia entis. First, even if a doctrine of pure nature is rejected, continuing to speak of
created nature as beneficiary of common grace allows one to more firmly maintain that
creation’s orientation toward the regeneration made possible through special grace is
entirely a result of (common) grace, avoiding the potential pitfalls of a semi-Pelagian
interpretation of the way that nature possesses an aptitude for grace that can be found in
certain varieties of the nature/supernatural distinction.65 The language of common grace
grounds any free human act which is a condition for the historical manifestation of
special grace in God’s concurrent gracious action with this human act, thereby preserving
sola gratia. Second, speaking of common and special grace, or more broadly of grace and
sin, rather than of nature and the supernatural, the Reformed distinction draws more
attention to existence and actions than to an underlying distinction of being.66 That is to
say that both common grace and sin are terms that are inescapably historical, whereas
nature is not. Thus, we see Reformed discussions of common grace focusing on culture,
economy, art, science, and any number of other aspects of the historical development of
human civilization.67 Such an emphasis on history and action brings the discussion back
to the question at hand.
If a non-contrastive view of transcendence and the doctrine of concurrence
compel us to see all human acts as coincident with and radically dependent upon divine
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acts, the doctrine of common grace compels a variegated view of the divine acts upon
which all human acts are founded. In other words, if divine action supervenes upon
created causal chains and created human decisions, the manner in which this
supervenience occurs can vary. When God’s act is the ground of human regeneration, we
speak of special grace and acknowledge a form of concurrence that most perfectly draws
the created order toward the new creation that will exist in communion with God. This
regeneration and the subsequent sanctification and (eventually) glorification that follow
upon it allow creatures to act in ways that are ever closer to the divine intentions for the
world, in increasing consciousness of the way that their actions are concurrent with
God’s. Special grace is a means of speaking about God’s direct action on the Church for
the benefit of the Church in mission to the world.
While common grace contributes to the same ultimate redemptive end as special
grace precisely because the divine acts of creation and redemption are inseparable (and
consequently nature as sustained by common grace and special grace are inseparable),68
common grace is distinguished from special grace in several regards. First, common
grace does not necessarily lead to the regeneration of the particular human being who is
the beneficiary of such grace. Common grace restrains sin in all individuals, but it also
contributes to cultural and historical developments that may be external conditions or
68

This is an important claim that overcomes a possible dualism within the common grace
and special grace distinction that makes it objectionable to certain theologians. Hans Boersma, for
example, in an insightful but unfortunately all too brief review notes that the Kuyperian version
of common grace frequently reduces the telos of common grace to mere created ends completely
separate from the telos of special grace. On the one hand, this can seem to put certain areas of
human life outside of the reach of redemption, while, on the other hand, this seems to reintroduce
something akin to pure nature through the back door by suggesting nature can have a purpose
completely separate from special grace. If we properly link God’s act of creation and redemption
and thereby make common grace ordered toward special grace, we can overcome Boersma’s
concerns. Hans Boersma, “The Spirit in Theology: Appropriating the Legacy of Abraham Kuyper
(Review),” Calvin Theological Journal 40.2 (November 2005): 431-434.

84	
  
means for the application of special grace toward regeneration or toward the
sanctification of believers.69 This latter aspect of common grace justifies its designation
as “grace” against a number of objections.70 If grace is that which restores human
communion with God,71 common grace is properly called grace not because communion
is restored between God and those human beings who are the object of common grace,
but because such people are the conduit of grace toward the Church. This is the case
69
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precisely because the Church cannot fully be extricated from the world any more than
grace can be severed from nature, salvation from history, or theology from cultural
influences.72 This is evident throughout the history of Christianity, as demonstrated by
the transformation of ancient near east creation myths by the author of Genesis, by the
adoption and reinterpretation of Hellenistic philosophical terms in patristic theology, or,
significant for present purposes, by the way that the economy can provide an opportunity
for the development of certain Christian virtues.
Another way of speaking about common grace as a divine action is to return to
the terminology used in chapter 1, where I sought to identify aspects of the economy that
various approaches to theology and economics considered redemptively significant. One
of the goals of a non-contrastive view of transcendence was to preserve both the gratuity
of salvation and human responsibility. If human and divine agency operate in the same
domain in the same way (as is the case in a contrastive view of transcendence), then the
more immanently within human faith God operates, the less God transcends that faith and
the less it can therefore be properly called human. Non-contrastive views of
transcendence attempt to affirm human responsibility while ensuring that regeneration is
entirely a work of grace. With that aim in mind, if we can identify aspects of the
economy that play some role in allowing for the sanctification of a believer, that is for
something redemptively significant, then we must be able to speak of this redemptively
72
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significant contribution as arising from divine action that is coincident with the human
actions contributing to the development of sanctification. Common grace allows for such
a claim without dissolving the divine actions associated with special grace into other
divine actions in the world, which is to say without dissolving the Church into the world.
The second way that common grace is distinguished from special grace is in terms
of human awareness of God. Whereas special grace brings one into personal awareness of
God as Father, Son, and Spirit, common grace, though it often precedes such awareness,
need not always result in it. Here we do well to speak in terms of communion with God, a
common theological notion most clearly defined for Reformed theology by John Owen:
Our communion, then, with God consists in his communication of himself unto
us, with our return unto him of that which he requires and accepts, flowing from
that union which in Jesus Christ we have with him.73

Owen teaches that communion is voluntary and in actions,74 and he always speaks of
communion as a peculiar relationship with the three divine Persons. Communion is a
distinctive result of special grace and is not guaranteed to arise from common grace.
In order to understand communion, we must distinguish between a relationship to
a person and a personal relationship. All human actions bear some relationship to the
divine persons insofar as all aspects of created existence are radically dependent upon
God for their continued existence, but these actions are not related to God in a personal
way. A personal relationship requires, in the words of Petro Chirico, “a mutual exchange
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in the area of intellect and will.”75 Through communion we have a personal relationship
with Father, Son, and Spirit, knowing each distinctively and willingly responding to each.
We must also distinguish between possession and communion, drawing on Leonard
Hodgson. Possession allows God to act through an individual to perform a particular
work in a more elevated manner than otherwise possible, while in communion one has
awareness of speaking to another.76 As was stated at the beginning of the chapter, the
primary Biblical category for divine action is that of speaking, or, in other words, that of
revelation. However, God’s activity is not limited to such revelation. Through special
grace, God brings the Church into communion with himself, resulting in a threefold set of
personal relationships with distinctive awareness of Father, Son, and Spirit. This is made
possible jointly through the self-communication of God and through our union with
Christ by the power of the Holy Spirit. Through common grace, God possesses human
beings, elevating them to act in a manner above their natural ability thereby contributing
to a historical process wherein creation as a whole contributes to the preconditions for the
communion made possible through special grace. Common grace thus describes God’s
work through creation and history for the benefit of the Church, while special grace
makes possible a communion with God that then inspires mission from the Church back
into the world.
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Reformed theology has traditionally taught that grace is irresistible, but this claim
should be interpreted only in regards to special grace.77 The common grace by which
human culture and history as a whole contribute toward the redemption of the Church can
be resisted in two ways. First, while common grace is intended to contribute to
communion with God, it is also quite possible that human culture and society may render
the experience of communion with God more difficult to obtain. Western secularization
is one example of culture rendering God more hidden in a variety of ways, among the
body of believers and particularly for those outside the Church. Second, common grace
can be resisted even more forcefully through sin, either in individual or social forms. Our
rule about non-contrastive transcendence suggests that a sinning person cannot exist
autonomously from God, and so it is possible to speak of God as allowing sin to be
manifest in resistance to such common grace. Traditionally, Reformed theologians have
distinguished between God’s sovereign or effectual will and permissive will to make the
point, where God merely permits sin by not giving the efficacious grace that would
prevent it.78 More commonly, however, the Reformed tradition has exercised caution and
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attributed full causal responsibility for sin to man to safeguard the goodness of God.79 In
both theological strategies, common grace is not eliminated insofar as the creature does
not sin to the point of reducing itself to oblivion. The permissive will of God merely
facilitates a change in the ratio of grace operative on the Church indirectly as common
grace relative to the direct operation of special grace. Common grace is merely
diminished through the permissive will of God, or else sin is diminished through the
increased activity of God through common grace. When sin increases in this manner, it
not only renders communion with God more difficult, but it can impede the sanctifying
work of the Holy Spirit operating through special grace within the Church to the extent
that Christians who are the object of such special grace may also be contaminated by and
participants in the sin occurring in the wider culture. Therefore, society and culture
cannot be seen as a monolithic conduit for God’s common grace for the benefit of the
Church but must be seen as a variable and historical reality that can either more or less
fully contribute toward communion with God and the sanctifying application of special
grace. The perfect harmony of the created order and the redeemed Church, of common
grace and special grace, and of nature with all forms of grace will not be complete until
the last day when God will be “all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28).
I can now speak more precisely about divine action in the economy than was
possible merely on the grounds of the doctrine of concurrence coupled with a noncontrastive view of transcendence. All human economic activity must be seen as in some
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sense radically dependent upon the action of God and coincident with God’s own
providential care for the world as a result of this understanding of the God/world
relationship. However, while God may operate upon a believer through special grace
within the economy, such grace is primarily operative through the Lord’s Supper,
baptism, liturgy and preaching within the Church. This is not to deny that special grace
may contribute to the sanctification of believers through certain extra-ecclesial actions,
including acts of mercy and charity just as much as acts of personal prayer, the reading of
the scriptures, or exercise of the various spiritual disciplines. However, when I speak of
God’s work in the economy in this study, I will primarily be speaking about how the
divine work of common grace that is concurrent with human activity in the market can
contribute in redemptively significant ways to the overarching redemptive plan of God.
This plan is being brought to fullness through the special grace that is primarily operative
within the Church, but also importantly in a secondary sense through common grace
operative within a certain subset of actions within the market, the focus of this study.
When I speak of human resistance to such divine actions in the market, I have in mind
either the manner in which the market is constructed such that it undermines common
grace’s contribution toward communion with God, or else the direct actions made
possible through the permissive will of God whereby sanctification can be directly
impeded as a result of individual or corporate sins in the marketplace. In discussing
God’s action in the economy and human failure to participate in this action, I am
discussing the diminishment or increase of common grace’s presence in the market, and
thus of the increase or decrease of the creation’s yielding to the redemptive historical
activity of the Triune God.
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The Triune God Who Acts
So far our analysis of concurrent divine action has been explored from below,
beginning with the two forms of grace made manifest by God’s activity in creation and
moving from these forms to explore how communion with God may be facilitated by
these two forms of grace. The same notion of communion can be explored from above,
beginning instead with Trinitarian theology as the basis for elucidating the personality of
the God who acts in the world through common and special grace. It would be
inappropriate to discuss divine action so extensively without pausing to reflect on God as
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit acting within creation, and specifically within the market.
Theologians have already considered how the Trinity relates to the market, so before I
turn to my proposal for how to deploy Trinitarian theology, I should first explain the
shortcomings of the two predominant existing means to deploying trinitarian theology in
theological analysis of economics: the exemplary method and the genealogical method.
Once it is evident that these approaches are inadequate, it will be more clear that a proper
Trinitarian approach must attend to divine action.
The term “exemplary method” refers to a broad range of theologians who see the
Trinity as an exemplar of ideal society or economy. While one occasionally finds an ideal
human society as the means of understanding the unity and diversity present in the
Godhead, as for example in the writing of Taymans d’Eypernon, it is much more
common to see a move from the ideal relations of the Godhead toward a theology of
economy or society.80 Quite often the theologians using this method are critical of
80
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capitalism, as for example when Jürgen Moltmann suggests that Trinitarian monotheism
that views God as a single subject leads to political absolutism, but a proper view of the
social Trinity of three Persons existing in relation to one another through perichoresis
compels us to affirm the category of community against that of individuality, and to
defend “personal socialism” against both “possessive individualism” and more
pantheistic varieties of socialist thought.81 Moltmann’s exemplary method is therefore an
example of what I called the legitimizing approach in chapter 1. Similarly, Leonardo Boff
advocates a “perichoretic-communion” model that he claims points us to correct political,
economic, and ecclesial organization.82 He, too, believes that strict monotheism leads to
totalitarianism, and adds that exclusive emphasis on the Father alone leads to oppression
by normativity, exclusive emphasis on the Son leads to oppression by leaders, and
exclusive emphasis on the Spirit leads to anarchy.83 Boff teaches that socialist societies
are on the right track in emphasizing communal ownership of means of production,
though they have often not gone far enough in allowing expressions of difference. The
fact that the persons of the Trinity are different despite perfect harmony speaks against
homogenizing tendencies in both capitalism and socialism.84 “Everything in God is
triadic, everything is Patreque, Filioque and Spirituque,” with the Son proceeding from
the Father and the Spirit (Spirituque) and the Spirit proceeding from the Father and the
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Son (Filioque),85 a fact which challenges capitalism’s exclusion of the poor from real
participation in the economy and its individualist nature. Both Boff and Moltmann treat
the Trinity as an example of ideal human relationships and thus as a ground for criticizing
economic structures.
M. Douglas Meeks treats the Trinity as exemplary in the same manner, but he also
makes a genealogical account of how theological and economic concepts are historically
interconnected much more central to his theology than do the previously considered
authors.86 Paying attention to the Trinity provides a basis for critique of the economy,
while exploring the loss of Trinitarian thought in previous generations explains in part
how our current malformed economy was able to emerge.87 The Trinity thus
“demythologizes” the god concepts undergirding capitalism by showing how the concept
of God as a perfect monad, sovereign, free, and transcendent was eliminated with the
decline of religion around the time of the rise of capitalism. These traditional divine
attributes, “stripped from their metaphysical moorings in the divine ousia are now lodged
in the market definitions of the human being.”88 Against the early capitalist notion of God
as monad whose residue contaminates economic theory, Meeks points to social
trinitarianism’s communal view of God as constituted by reciprocal relationships, a lack
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of domination and hierarchy, and distinctive identity and work for each of the Persons
who possess all things in common.89 Such a view of God challenges the individualistic
view of property ownership90 derived from a theology of God as monadic self-possessor
as well as collectivist visions of property, instead advocating a view where property and
capital is “a means to nurture koinonia.”91 For Meeks, the Trinity serves as an exemplar
to critique exclusionary and individualistic views of property while a theology of God as
monad instead of as triad lies behind our current problematic conceptions of property.
Theologians like Giorgio Agamben and John Milbank focus on the genealogical
method while largely avoiding the exemplary method found in Moltmann, Boff,
d’Eypernon, and Meeks. Their intention is to show how historical changes in trinitarian
theology lie in the background of modern developments of political and economic
thought. As discussed in chapter 1, John Milbank considers the medieval nominalist
emphasis on a strongly simple will of God a replacement for an earlier trinitarian
metaphysic. This replacement resulted in an individualistic view of economic and
political agents agonistically competing in economic and political spaces in a way that
was inconceivable in an earlier trinitarian ontology of participation such as that found in
Thomas Aquinas.92 A similar argument is deployed by many theologians that form the
Radical Orthodoxy approach. For Giorgio Agamben it is not a loss of trinitarian theology
that explains the modern economic and political situation, but the development of
trinitarian thought itself. Agamben traces the development of early Christian notions of
89
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the divine oikonomía, the work of God in the world as distinguished from God as Trinity
in se, through the medieval period and into modern political philosophy. He claims the
early theological notion of oikonomía allowed for a division of divine action without a
fracture of divine ontology,93 but what was initially a pragmatics of divine activity
ultimately became a philosophical division between ontology and praxis.94 This resulted
in a division between Kingdom (ontology/sovereignty) and Government
(praxis/ordering),95 leaving us with the modern condition of an impotent sovereign
(typically the people) upheld by spectacle and glory coupled with a powerful bureaucratic
government.96 This spectacle of glory is also the basis of capitalist economics insofar as it
distracts us from the bureaucratic and corporate management of daily economic affairs.97
Both Agamben and Milbank share the same basic genealogical method, where the history
of the rise or decline of theological thought on the Trinity lies behind modern economic
thought.
Despite certain benefits offered by each perspective,98 ultimately I find both the
exemplary method and the genealogical method deficient. The exemplary approach is too
confident in our human ability to correlate the relationships between the members of the
immanent Trinity with a particular version of human society. An analogical
93

Giorgio Agamben, The Kingdom and the Glory, trans. Lorenzo Chiesa (Stanford, CA.:
Stanford University Press, 2011),14.
94
Ibid., 53.
95
Ibid., 79.
96
Ibid., 246.
97
Ibid., 276.
98
The exemplary approach, no doubt, will serve in pastoral contexts far more than the
theology I will develop in this work. Preaching on the Trinity as manifesting a different form of
community can be far more illuminating for laity than a protracted metaphysical analysis of
divine action and the impact of models on the socially constructed market. Similarly, the
genealogical approach’s alternative narrative of history offers something of an aesthetic
apologetic that will be (and has been!) beneficial in a number of academic circles where the
current project would perhaps make little headway.

96	
  
understanding of the relationship between God and creation (which is both assumed in
the exemplary method’s treatment of the Trinity as analogous to human society and
demanded by a non-contrastive view of transcendence) admits a greater dissimilarity than
similarity between Creator and creature.99 Consequently, while Christ himself gives some
validity to the Trinity being exemplary of human community when he prays that the
Church may be one as the Father and Son are one (John 17:21), if theologians press the
analogy too far it is quite easy to develop the argument in a surprisingly wide range of
directions. Thus, one can also argue against Boff, Meeks, and Moltmann100 that the
distinctive and yet cooperative missions of the Son and Spirit affirm capitalism’s
emphasis on freely working together to meet one another’s needs through markets,101 or
that distinctive work through specialization and trade mirrors the Trinity as differentiated
yet one,102 or that the eternal taxis between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is the basis for a
wide range of created hierarchies within society.103 It is often quite difficult to adjudicate
between these diverse positions precisely because they tend to be most innovative and
thereby to deviate furthest from classical doctrine precisely at the points where the
analogy is most sharply drawn. This is particularly the case with Boff’s emphasis on how
“everything in God is triadic, everything is Patreque, Filioque and Spirituque.”104 In
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introducing the novel theological terms of “Patreque” and “Spirituque” such that divine
procession is equally from all the Persons, Boff is shifting his theology in a clearly
communitarian direction in such a way that it is unclear whether his theology drives his
politics or whether his politics drives his theology. The case can equally be made in
regard to numerous other theologians who use the exemplary method.105 Those less
common theologians like d’Eypernon who move from society to the Trinity are no better
off precisely because such a move requires a prior vision of the ideal society which is the
basis for understanding the Trinity. In either case, it is not clear that trinitarian theology
itself contributes anything to our understanding of society and economy.
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The genealogical method is at times problematic due to a lack of historical rigor.
This is the case, for example, in the work of Agamben, who frequently misrepresents the
historical development of trinitarian theology. For example, Agamben treats the Arian
controversy as a debate about whether praxis is grounded in being and therefore whether
it has an arche, or whether “the Son – that is, the one who has assumed the economy of
salvation – is unfounded in the Father.”106 The debate never concerned “chronological
precedence,” or “a problem of rank,”107 claims Agamben, citing Arius’ letter to
Alexander of Alexandria. Against Agamben’s interpretation, it is clear in Arius’ letter to
Eusebius of Nicomedia that the eternal existence of the Son is at issue, which Arius
denies in teaching “before he was begotten or created or ordained or founded, he was
not.”108 Indeed, rank was equally contested, as Arius considered the Son only God by
grace and not by nature.109 These two issues were of grave concern to Alexander of
Alexandria, the first to accuse Arius of heresy.110 Strangely, Agamben also treats the
creed emerging from the Western representatives at the council of Serdica (343 AD) as
demonstrating that the main issue of the Arian debate was whether the Son was anarchic
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(without arche).111 However, claiming that Serdica clearly reveals what was at stake in
the Arian debates is methodologically dubious given that the council dissolved due to
terminological misunderstandings between the Latin West and the Greek East.112 Despite
this methodological warning, it is still clear enough that Serdica was concerned both to
refute Arius’ claim that the Son had a beginning and Marcellus of Ancyra’s (purportedly
misinterpreted) claim that the Son would have an end.113 The first lines of the Profession
of Faith of the Western bishops clearly rejects those who deny true divinity to the Son or
claim that being begotten means that he came into existence.114 The rank and eternality of
the Son remained central, and Agamben’s claim that the entire debate puts praxis and
ontology in conflict misreads the situation. Rather, the debate attempted to ontologically
ground praxis (insofar as we can identify the Son with praxis) in the Father, not to divide
the Son from the divine being. This misreading is only one of numerous examples that
one could point to in Agamben that undermine the validity of his genealogical narrative.
Even when theologians like Milbank and Meeks who have a far better grasp of
theological history than Agamben attempt a genealogical account, the result remains
either highly contentious or theologically underdeveloped.115
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One final problem with both the genealogical method and the exemplary method
lies much closer to the heart of this project and brings the focus of discussion back in line
with earlier portions of this chapter: Neither means of using the Trinity in a theology of
economics treats the Persons of the Father, Son, and Spirit as active within the economic
sphere. Instead, both the exemplary and genealogical method emphasize the impact of the
idea of the Trinity on the economy. For the genealogical strategy this is most clear.
Whether the genealogical account emphasizes the historical development of Trinitarian
thought or its decline in later history, the main concern is illustrating how the history of
theological ideas resulted in certain political and economic ideas and practices grounded
in and/or justified by an inaccurate notion of God. These historical questions are
important, but do little to help us identify how God is working in the economy today or to
help us discover how human beings might resist this action. The exemplary method also
emphasizes theological thought about God by making correct understanding of the
immanent Trinity a prerequisite of (or in d’Eypernon’s case partly a result of) correct
understanding of society. Yet society is not properly formed through careful reflection on
the Trinitarian processions ad intra, but by yielding to the work of Father, Son, and Spirit
ad extra through the society and economy.116 The primary appeal of Trinitarian theology
lies in its ability to uncover the work of Father, Son, and Spirit that is concurrent with
human economic acts, and in its ability to clarify how such works result in communion
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with God as Trinity. Our task is not primarily to return to our roots and an earlier
articulation of trinitarian theology, but to return to the God who is acting toward
redemption today as Father, Son, and Spirit.
God’s work ad extra in creation as Father, Son, and Spirit is traditionally referred
to as the oikonomia, or the economic Trinity. I can now re-state the task of this project as
follows: our task is to correlate the oikonomia or economic Trinity with the human
economy, exploring how concurrent human and divine actions unite human aspirations in
the market with God’s redemptive work in the oikonomia as Father, Son, and Spirit
through common grace or, conversely, how human economic interactions may undermine
such common grace by the permissive will of God.
Most classical thought on the Trinity has affirmed the claim that the opera dei ad
extra indivisa sunt. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit do not work independently of one
another in redemption history, but cooperate in all divine action. Such principles derive in
part from metaphysical concerns (which will be addressed shortly) and in part from
Scriptural patterns, as seen in particular instances like the simultaneous presence and
cooperative work of Father, Son, and Spirit at the baptism of Jesus (Matt. 3:13-17 and
pars.), or more significantly through the Biblical accounts of the works of creation and
redemption. At creation, the Father speaks and creation begins to exist in the manner
spoken (i.e. “God said, ‘Let there be light,’ and there was light.” Gen. 1:3). The New
Testament depicts the Son as the very Word of God (John 1:1), the one who proceeds
from the Father and in whom “all things were created, in heaven and on earth… all things
were created through him and for him” (Col. 1:15-16). This work of creation does not
exclude the Spirit, who “was hovering over the face of the waters” (Gen. 1:2). Psalm 33:6
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summarizes well: “By the word of the Lord the heavens were made, and by the breath of
his mouth all their host.” The Hebrew word for “breath” here, ruach, is the same word
found in Genesis 1:2 typically translated as Spirit; in the Septuagint, the word used is
pneuma, also meaning Spirit/breath. The three divine Persons worked in harmony in
creating the world, and continue in harmony in sustaining that world. Even in the act of
the incarnation of Christ, while it is accurate to say that only the hypostasis Son is
incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth, it is still necessary to affirm that there is a work of the
Father and of the Spirit that is in cooperation with the Son at all times, insofar as the Son
who is the Image of the Father does only what he sees his Father doing (John 5:19), and
these acts are always in the Holy Spirit’s power (Matt. 12:17,28, Heb. 9:14, Luke 4:1,
etc.).117 Such patterns illustrate the indivisibility of the work of Father, Son, and Spirit.
Affirming the indivisibility of the divine works ad extra was central to the
development of trinitarian theology. The unity of the divine work affirmed the
consubstantiality of the three Persons in a manner that retained monotheism. To this end
Gregory of Nyssa explains that the divine nature itself is ineffable in such a fashion that
when we speak of God we primarily speak of the divine works God brings about on our
behalf in creation. In fact, the very word “Godhead” (theotēs) is derived from
“beholding” (thea). God is the one who beholds all. The Scriptures not only petition the
Father to see all through prayer (as in Ps. 84:8), but also teach that Jesus knows the
thoughts of those who condemn him (Matt. 9:4), and indicate that the Spirit sees even the
lies within one’s heart (Acts 5:3). Because our language about God relates foremost to
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God’s acts and secondarily to the nature, Nyssa argues, we can reasonably infer the unity
of Father, Son, and Spirit from the unified acts of the three because the Father does not
work without the Spirit or Son, nor the Spirit without Father and Son, nor even the Son
without Father and Spirit. We can properly speak of one Godhead and one act of
beholding, shared indivisibly by Father, Son, and Spirit, three persons who are one God.
“The action of each in any matter is not separate and individualized.”118 (Here we might
benefit from recalling Irenaeus of Lyons’ metaphor treating the Son and Spirit as the
“hands of the Father.”)119 Yet such indivisible unity of action does not entail that the
contributions of the Father, Son, and Spirit are indistinguishable. Though the three divine
Persons do not blend three distinct works into a composite single work, Nyssa suggests
that the same single work can be said to issue from the Father, be actualized through the
Son, and be completed by the Spirit.120 In fact, uniformly among the Cappadocians, the
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indivisibility of the divine work was meant to preserve the monarchy of the Father, but
not at the expense of discernible experience of the Father, Son and the Spirit in the work
of redemption.121 Such an emphasis persisted through successive generations, where
Nyssa’s formula was often reproduced. Perhaps the most interesting reformulation of his
pattern is offered by Bonaventure, who appropriates efficient causation to the Father,
formal causation to the Son, and final causation to the Holy Spirit.122
The notion of the indivisibility of the work ad extra was also important as a
means of ensuring that the divine Persons were distinguished by their processions alone,
again to ensure the unity of the Trinity. This function of the indivisibility of the Triune
works ad extra was particularly central to a number of early medieval debates. When
Roscelin of Campiégne argued that the Father, Son, and Spirit must be three discrete
things (res) in order for it to be possible to speak of the Son being incarnate but not the
Father, he was probably using a theory of language where words pick out individual
things, so if we are to say that the Son alone was incarnate, the word “Son” must point to
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the cost of divine simplicity, even jeopardizing the homoousion.123 Anselm of Canterbury
offered an initial response to Roscelin, arguing that we have no means of discerning three
separate things within the Godhead on the basis of distinct action because Father, Son,
and Spirit share a common will and activity in their consubstantial nature. If the one will
and action of God do not ensure this unity but rather arise from a unity between three
things that is otherwise established, we must not only conclude that God is composite, but
that God’s perfection is derivative of some force outside of the will, power, and nature of
God.124 Anselm rightly recognizes that he must articulate a metaphysical basis for the
distinction of the persons grounded in a different theory of theological language to
properly respond to Roscelin, which prompts his earliest discussion of relational
opposition, a doctrine claiming the persons are distinguished through personal predicates
that cannot logically be stated of the same person such as “Father” and “Son.”125 The
positive outcome of the doctrine of relational opposition was the resulting guarantee that
the persons were only distinguished by their processions and not by discrete external
works. This guarantee ensured aseity because distinguishing the processions was
adequate for the Son to eternally be the Son and not the Father; particular relations to
creation such as the incarnation were not necessary to distinguish the persons from one
another. Were such relations to creation necessary, then the Triune God would require
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creation to exist in order to be Father, Son, and Spirit. However, it should be noted that,
as articulated by Anselm, relational opposition alone risks reducing the persons to a
formal distinction based on a logical contradiction between the personal properties,126
while failing to account both for Scriptural patterns of language about Father, Son, and
Spirit that do not depend upon opposition and for specific reasons why the Son was
incarnate and not the Father or Spirit. More work had to be done.
Theological discussion of how the Son can be called the “wisdom of God” in 1
Corinthians 1:24 dates at least to the time of Augustine of Hippo.127 However, what had
been a peripheral matter in Augustine became of central concern in one of Roscelin’s
students, Peter Abelard, who sought to address the metaphysical question raised by his
teacher in a more vigorously philosophical manner than had Anselm.128 Here again
theological language and the distinction of the persons are of central importance. Abelard
argued that the single simple being of God was at once powerful, wise, and good such
126
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that the three properties of Power (potentia), Wisdom (sapentia), and Goodness
(benignitas) that were three irreducible ways of defining the highest good served as the
basis for the distinction between a powerful Father, wise Son, and good Spirit.129 Abelard
was condemned twice for his theology, first at the Council of Soissons (1121) and then at
the Council of Sens (1141). Though his opponents appear to have had difficulty fully
understanding his theology, the condemnation of Abelard was ultimately justified. His
theology sought to ground the personal distinctions in three related but irreducible
essential properties instead of in personal relations, an approach inevitably tending
toward Sabellianism.
The indivisibility of the divine works ad extra means that we cannot ground the
personal distinction between the Father, the Son, and the Spirit in divided acts of each of
the persons. Trinitarianism chooses a different route than polytheism in this regard by
grounding distinction in relations of origin, thereby affirming monarchy over polyarchy
and refusing to posit a God of creation named the Father over and against a God of
redemption named the Son and a God of sanctification named the Spirit. Father, Son, and
Spirit all work in a unified manner in creation, redemption, and sanctification. Sound
theology must also avoid reducing the persons to a pure formal or logical distinction of
oppositional relations, as Anselm tends to do. The persons are the relations, but they
cannot be seen as only relations.130 Unlike created persons, the divine persons are
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subsistent relations,131 we might say three distinct tropos hyparxeōs, which requires us to
recognize that the relations between Father, Son, and Spirit are the basis for distinctive
aspects of the undivided divine work ad extra through which the believer can have
communion with God as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Each united work of God is
manifest in three aspects corresponding to the three distinctive ways in which the persons
eternally subsist in relation to one another, as ungenerated Father, generated Son, and as
the Spirit breathed forth to complete the eternal triadic communion of love. To
distinguish the persons as Abelard did on the basis of three dimensions of power
undermines the interpersonal and relational basis of this eternal communion.
These considerations bring us to a final medieval development that cannot be
ignored: the emergence of the doctrine of appropriations. Abelard’s use of power,
wisdom, and goodness was not novel. As noted above, since patristic times theologians
would frequently practice appropriation, the act of making a common attribute proper to a
person. In Abelard’s time, the as of yet unnamed practice initially served an evasive
purpose, allowing the author what Dominique Poirel has called a sort of “spiritual
license, similar to that of a poet.”132 Indeed, Abelard’s triad of goodness, wisdom, and
power had a long historical pedigree among theologians utilizing such license,133 but the
novelty of twelfth century trinitarianism lay in turning what had been a poetic practice
into a fixed logical relation. For Abelard, the fixity of the properties of goodness,
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wisdom, and power allows Jesus Christ to speak of God as Father, Son and Spirit. To cite
Poirel again, Abelard
Does not want to explain why some attributes, that the most rigorous theology
considers to be substantial and ‘common’, are sometimes applied as ‘proper’ to a
particular person, but why power, wisdom, and goodness, which he holds to be
‘proper’ attributes in themselves (per se dicta), can in certain contexts (in
contextu … orationis) become ‘common’ to the Three.134

Hugh of St. Victor, Abelard’s contemporary and a major theologian of the Victorene
school of theology, took the opposite approach, arguing that the personal properties are
the basis for appropriating essential attributes to a particular person. So Hugh argues that
while Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are all powerful, wise, and good, it is possible to
appropriate one property to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit respectively based on a
“likeness” between the relations of origin and a particular property. So the Father can be
called Powerful because he is the origin of the Spirit and the Son, and psychologically
Hugh is convinced that power is the source of wisdom and love in the soul.135 What is
important here is not the particular psychological analogy, but the fact that the divine
persons, which Victorene theology ultimately described as “an incommunicable existence
of the divine nature,”136 can rightly be associated with a substantial property if this
property is more clearly expressed in their personal mode of existence, which is to say in
their personhood.
What in Hugh and Abelard was manifest as a concern about divine properties,
with Hugh’s doctrine of appropriations clearly preferable, soon became a theology of
divine action, where specific divine acts could be appropriated to the Father, Son, and
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Spirit based on their personal properties and mutual relations. Thus the Father is most
fittingly seen as Creator because he is the source of the Son and Spirit, though the work
of creation is united among the three. The Son is most fittingly seen as Redeemer because
he is sent by the Father in the flesh in a way that corresponds to the eternal generation of
the Son, though the Father and the Spirit both work toward redemption. And the Spirit is
most fittingly known through the act of sanctification that brings redemption to
completion, because the Spirit completes the Trinity as a communion of perfect love.137
All the divine acts can be said to be the unified and undivided work of Father, Son, and
Spirit, who are each manifest in the single acts as source, manifestation, and perfection of
that act respectively, but in a manner that the particular act in question can still be
understood as primarily the act of Father, Son, or Spirit depending on whether that act
more closely conforms to and thus apparently terminates in the particular manner of
subsistence proper to the Father, Son, or Spirit. If the divine work was divided,
appropriations would be unnecessary, but since the works of God ad extra are undivided
works of the Triune God, and since this Triune God is nothing that is not the relations
between Father, Son, and Spirit, all the undivided acts ad extra must still reflect the
relations between the persons in such a way that appropriations are possible.
Both the doctrine of appropriations and the claim that the opera dei ad extra
indivisa sunt have come under significant criticism in modern theology. So Catherine
Mowry LaCugna argues that the indivisibility of the divine works “tends to blur any real
distinctions among the divine persons and thereby formalizes in Latin theology the
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breach between oikonomia and theologia.”138 She sees the doctrine of appropriations as a
means of hiding the modalistic tendencies of Augustinian trinitarianism.139 Colin Gunton
worries that the claim opera trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa is often so overstated that it
makes a distinction among the persons impossible.140 Even T. F. Torrance, who tends to
be less critical of the Western tradition than LaCugna and Gunton, considers the doctrine
of appropriations “an idea that is both otiose and damaging.”141 These modern objections
are mistaken. Rejecting the indivisibility of the divine works toward creation undermines
the monarchy of God, while making God’s eternal identity dependent upon unique
hypostatic relations to creation risks divine aseity for no reason. Modern theologians seek
to preserve the possibility of a distinctive relation between humans beings and Father,
Son, and Spirit, but this was consonant with the intent of the doctrine of the indivisibility
of the works ad extra as combined with the doctrine of appropriations. As Robert Jenson
reminds us, the three persons do not work in an undivided way because they “are
indistinguishable but because they are perfectly mutual.”142 Torrance himself recognizes
that the indivisibility of the work ad extra means that there is no hidden act of the Father
“behind the back of Jesus Christ or apart from the mission of the Spirit.”143 Yet we must
simultaneously affirm that for particular divine acts we can speak of the Father standing
further back while the Son is made more clearly manifest through an act that is properly
appropriated to him. We can affirm with William Perkins that, “The works of God are…
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common to the trinity, the peculiar manner of working always reserved to every person.
The end of all these is the manifestation of the glory of God.”144 The goal of the
undivided work of the Triune God is communion with God as Father, Son, and Spirit. As
Owen reminds us, “when we have communion with one Person principally through one
thing, we also have communion with the other two Persons in a secondary manner.”145
A Theological Starting Point
The starting point for connecting the market economy with the triune God is not
an exemplary analogy between the eternal communion of God and the market, nor is it a
genealogical narrative that unites an account of the development (or lack thereof) of
trinitarian thought with the emergence of capitalism, though these two approaches may
have secondary roles in a holistic theology. No, the starting point of our theology of
economics must be the work of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit toward the redemption of
the world operating undividedly in concursive actions throughout not only the market
economy, but also all of creation. Only such an approach properly links the creative
purpose of God with God’s self-revealing redemptive work in history. Our theology must
be able to articulate the ways in which God acts toward the redemption of the Church
through the market by common grace, facilitating increased communion with God as
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. This account will necessarily include an explanation of how
certain economic acts in which human and divine agency is coincident lead to a
distinctive awareness of and personal relation to God as Father, Son, and Spirit through
an account of how each person is manifest according to their proper mode of being. Thus,
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particular coincident acts must be appropriated to Father, Son, and Spirit. A theology of
the market must also be able to describe areas where human acts can hinder this
communion, undermining common grace according to the permissive will of God in a
way that Father, Son, and Spirit are neither revealed through human economic actions nor
actively bringing their redemptive purposes to fruition. Only with these goals in mind
will we be properly able to theologically speak about the market.
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CHAPTER 3 – ASPECTS OF DIVINE ACTION IN THE CREATED ORDER
What is truly predicated contingently of the divine persons has no correspondence of
truth without an appropriate external term.
- Bernard Lonergan1

The scriptures speak of the “purpose of him who accomplishes all things
according to his counsel and will” (Eph. 1:11), where it is clear that God wills that
salvation comes to humankind (1 Tim. 2:4, 2 Pet. 3:9). Chapter 2 sought to describe how
God works to accomplish all things indivisibly as Father, Son, and Spirit, and how in
each indivisible act it is nevertheless still possible to be aware of distinctive aspects of the
divine work that can be appropriated to Father, Son, and Spirit. Insofar as God wills that
salvation come to humankind, we can reasonably expect God to work in all things toward
salvation, either directly upon those who are being saved through special grace, or
indirectly using those who deny God as a conduit for a common grace that orients
creation toward salvation and contributes to redemptively significant transformation of
believers living in the created order. Common grace is distinct from special grace in that
the entire world is an object of this grace, serving as a conduit by which God helps to
transform the body of believers to facilitate their communion with God, an awareness of
God as Father, Son, and Spirit in the form of a personal relationship in the areas of
knowledge and will between a believer and God. Common grace, therefore, designates
that concurrent work of God and human persons within the market that tends toward the
transformation of the faithful.
Common grace is not absolute in two ways. First, human sin may render the
common grace of God ineffective as the permissive will of God allows human beings to
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be the authors of their own undoing through sin. In such instances, God’s redemptive
plan and decretive will are not thwarted, though in these instances God does shift the
application of grace toward the transformation of the Church away from common grace
and toward special grace. Second, certain constructions of society or the market may
hinder communion with God by making awareness of God as Father, Son, and Spirit
more difficult to obtain. Such impediments to communion, while technically distinct
from sinful actions, nevertheless indirectly resist common grace by counteracting its end.
As will become clear in subsequent chapters, though markets depend upon human actions
for their construction, they are enduring in such a way that they exercise a sort of agency
of their own independent of human actions, having an objective reality contributing to the
malformation of economic agents. The variability that the notions of common grace,
special grace, sin, and hindered communion through rendering God hidden provides
allows us to analyze possible formations of the market as either more completely the site
of divine concurrent action in the world, or as a place of human refusal to participate in
God’s redemptive working. We need not speak of the market as purely a site of sin or of
grace, but can instead seek aspects of sin, common grace, special grace, and hindered
communion as facets of the complex intermingling of the divine and human economies.
These theological claims do not yet provide a means of theologically analyzing
the economy in a manner that can yield both theological insights and viable economic
proposals. To reach a point where such analysis is possible, we need an account of the
immanent realities upon which the concurrent divine work of common grace supervenes,
such that we can discern the role of these immanent realities in the economy. In short, I
must connect three aspects of the indivisible divine work of redemption with three
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created realities significant in the economy. By the end of the chapter, I will have
developed three appropriated dimensions of the single divine work of transformation. The
terms of the immanent action and the resulting dimensions of transformation will not be
arbitrarily selected, but will be expressed in terms fitting the mode of agency proper to
each hypostasis and in accordance with scriptural patterns of speech, as will become clear
in subsequent chapters. I must again clearly state that these dimensions of transformation
should not be interpreted as the basis for distinguishing the divine Persons.2 These three
dimensions must then be articulated in a way that is theologically faithful, but in a form
capable of entering into dialogue with economic theory, and particularly with economic
models. This is where the notion of divine action as supervenience is particularly helpful.
To say that God’s acts supervene upon the created order is to claim that God works
through creation in such a way that both causal chains and free human choices are the
means by which God accomplishes his will. While economic theory should not be
expected to extensively engage in theological or philosophical discussion of divine acts,
it is quite possible that some of the created realities that God supervenes upon to bring
about transformation may very well be the sort of things economic theory attempts to
describe in different terms. Therefore, the second task of the chapter is to articulate the
three dimensions of transformation in terms amenable to engaging economic theory.
Three Dimensions of Redemptively Significant Transformation
Chapters 1 and 2 both explored the possibility that certain formations of the
market could transform an individual in a redemptively significant way and concluded
2
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that such redemptively significant transformation must be theologically understood to be
the result of divine action. When redemptively significant transformation is brought about
through participation in the economy as a whole, I argued that we must understand this
transformation as arising from common grace that is operative through the entirety of
society, the beneficiaries of transformation and those whose hearts are hardened alike.
This begins to provide a necessary degree of precision that will allow for a thorough
analysis of the market and models describing it. However, additional clarity is required.
Few of the numerous approaches to developing a theology of economics discussed in
chapter 1 speak about the economy in the same manner. As a result it is challenging to
see how to relate the various approaches to one another or to their various conclusions
about redemptively significant transformation, and there are often misunderstandings
between the approaches themselves when one perspective attempts to engage another.
One notable example of misunderstanding is found in a recent discussion between
James K. A. Smith and J. David Richardson in the journal Faith & Economics. The two
authors were charged with discussing globalization from theological and economic
perspectives, respectively, in order to foster a helpful dialogue between the two
disciplines. Unfortunately, in the initial papers and subsequent response papers the
authors largely talked past one another, only establishing a common objective for
discussion in the concluding remarks of the three stage discussion. In his initial
arguments, Smith explored the “ecclesial critique” of globalization made by theologians
who believe that economists see the world differently than theologians, with problematic
consequences.3 Richardson responds in frustration, complaining of Smith’s “refusal to
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envision, much less detail, alternative economic-globalization architectures.”4
Richardson’s first paper explores entirely different questions, asking whether or not it is
true that globalization brings about good consequences, and then questioning whether or
not these good consequences outweigh the bad.5 Smith responds with a worry that
Richardson simply takes “what is contingent as if it were natural.”6 Though he is
certainly concerned with ethical outcomes and true conceptions of the impact of
globalization, Smith here again reveals that his main emphasis lies elsewhere. For Smith,
the basic manner in which economists see the world must be addressed before questions
of goodness and accuracy. Similar divergences in emphasis are evident in the various
approaches treated in chapter 1, so it is imperative to classify these distinctions and to
explain how they relate.
I find the most helpful means of distinguishing the basic emphases of different
approaches in a set of terms developed by Jon Sobrino. Sobrino’s insight lies in adding
the term “orthopathy” to the more traditional terms of orthodoxy and orthopraxis.
Sobrino defines “orthopathy” as “the correct way of letting ourselves be affected by the
reality of Christ.”7 Sobrino’s distinction also provides a solid basis for understanding how
these three approaches relate to redemptively significant transformation. Orthopathy,
orthodoxy, and orthopraxis are three dimensions of the righteous life a Christian lives as
empowered by the transformative work of God.
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Years of theological reflection on the role of spirituality in liberation theology lie
behind Sobrino’s fairly simple definition of orthpathy, and a brief survey on this history
will clarify the relationship among the three terms. In his Christology at the Crossroads,
Sobrino clearly articulated the relationship between orthodoxy and orthopraxis. On the
one hand, Sobrino presents orthopraxis, or right practice, as the concretization of
orthodoxy, a means of overcoming “abstract orthodoxy” through concrete praxis.8 On the
other hand, there is a sense in which orthopraxis has “ultimate supremacy” over
orthodoxy. Sobrino claims that this is because “the contents of orthodoxy are limitrealities,” that is, concepts not directly accessible to human insight.9 When orthodoxy is
understood in terms of limit-concepts, revelation cannot directly manifest God to the
believer. Fortunately, Sobrino argues that God is revealed “in action,” not as “abstract
knowledge.”10 “Only in the praxis of following him [Jesus] do we glimpse the mental
categories that will enable us to understand the real nature of the kingdom of God and
formulate it in a meaningful way.”11
The distinctions between orthodoxy and orthopraxis in Sobrino are at this stage
clear. For Sobrino orthodoxy is abstract, referring to conceptual knowledge, while
orthopraxis is concrete, referring to actions that allow one to follow Jesus and thus to
understand the action through which God’s self-revelation occurs. However, at this early
stage Sobrino already is gesturing toward a third term, orthopathy, when he claims that
what is known about limit-realities “cannot be separated from the historical experiences
8
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that allow us to make general formulations that are reasonable.”12 Here he points to the
example of how the claim that Christ is the way to the Father can only be understood in
light of following Jesus. At this stage Sobrino does not yet clearly distinguish between
experience and practice, but the foundations for his three terms are in place.
By the time that Spirituality of Liberation is written, Sobrino begins to develop a
clearer notion of what experience is and how it differs from praxis. The fact that “there is
such a thing as a Christian practice of liberation” leads Sobrino to claim that “there must
be a spirituality underlying this practice.”13 Spirituality, which Sobrino defines as the
subject in relation to the whole of historical reality, is distinguished from praxis.14
Spirituality entails “doing what Jesus did,” but also and more importantly doing it “as
Jesus did it.”15 There is something beyond the praxis itself, a specific orientation of the
act that Sobrino will ultimately call honesty about the real and fidelity to the real. If we
are not honest about the real, things lose their “capacity to function as sacraments of
transcendence,”16 but if we are honest, and if we have fidelity to that honesty, hope and
love allow us to “correspond to the ‘more’ that is in reality.”17 Sobrino’s language
concerning “sacraments of transcendence” and of “corresponding to the ‘more’” in reality
point beyond mere praxis, though Sobrino clearly implies that true spirituality cannot be
divorced from orthopraxis.
In Christ the Liberator, a significantly later work, Sobrino finally fully explains
his distinction between orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathy. He is insistent that there
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are three aspects of the gospel of Christ that the Christian must respond to in three
different ways. Jesus’ gospel of the kingdom of God requires orthopraxis as believers
continue in acts of the sort that Jesus initiated. The gospel also requires orthodoxy as one
trusts in Christ’s death and resurrection. Sobrino sees a third aspect of the gospel “which
is not adequately brought about by the other two alone.” Jesus has a certain “manner of
being in his service to the Kingdom of God, and in his relationship to the Father” that
requires Christians to respond in orthopathy. The Christian is not merely called to believe
certain things and to act in certain ways. He or she is also called to believe and to act in
the same way with a similar manner. Sobrino points to how Jesus “is not ashamed to call
them brothers and sisters” (Heb. 2:11), a fundamental mindset that in itself is good news
apart from any specific act that Jesus does on our behalf and apart from his death and
resurrection that we respond to in orthodoxy.18 The full good news recognizes Jesus’
manner of being, the how of his love, and calls Christians to imitation of the same.
With these insights, we can now fully explain Sobrino’s term orthopathy.
Orthopathy indicates a broad and fundamental kind of orientation to God and the world,
what Sobrino often refers to in short-hand as “the real.” This orientation is neither
cognitional, as rational reflection on specific doctrines or historical truth-claims, nor
active, as fulfilled in the doing of certain actions. It does not consist of propositional
ideas or concrete actions. Rather, and here I begin to drift from Sobrino’s use of the
concept, orthopathy requires one to inhabit a pre-reflective orientation toward the world,
an orientation that makes certain acts possible and renders possible acts significant in
particular ways. Such an orientation is pre-reflective in the sense that it is not yet the
object of rational analysis, but its pre-reflective nature should not be taken to indicate that
18
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orthopathy has no bearing on human consciousness. Instead, the orthopathy (or lack
thereof) gestures toward an awareness that is frequently taken for granted, but that
simultaneously plays a determinative role in shaping our rational thought and volitional
action. Moving again to more closely follow Sobrino, we can say that the orientation is
one that allows us to adopt the same manner of being as Jesus in such a way that the how
of our actions can mirror Jesus’ how, so that we act as Jesus acts and believe as Jesus
believes but with a self-awareness of how our acts and beliefs fit into the coming of the
kingdom of God. Doing the same acts as Jesus is insufficient if we do not do them as
Jesus does, that is, having a similar awareness of the way that these right acts correspond
to reality. This orientation is made possible by a set of experiences, and these experiences
in turn render a certain significance to human actions and beliefs that might otherwise be
lacking, an added dimension to the mere undertaking of a right action or trust through
proper belief.
Sobrino’s distinction between orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathy is helpful in
a number of ways. First, it can serve to distinguish both the conclusions and the methods
of the various perspectives discussed in chapter 1 so that it is possible to incorporate the
various disparate approaches into a single analysis without requiring the groups to
abandon their distinctive characteristics. Different theologians conclude that the market is
potentially a means of encouraging orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and/or orthopathy, implying
that God must somehow work through the economy insofar as right thinking, doing, and
experiencing is not possible apart from divine action. Others claim that the market
fundamentally distorts human beings to prevent their living in orthodoxy, orthopraxis,
and/or orthopathy, suggesting that human beings can somehow reject God’s work
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through the economy. Once these three terms are distinguished it is easier to relate
various approaches to one another and to clarify certain attempts at dialogue across the
borders of the above perspectives. For example, we can suggest that Richardson’s papers
privilege something akin to orthodoxy and orthopraxis, emphasizing right knowledge and
moral outcomes, while Smith emphasizes orthopathy, the pre-reflective perspective we
must take when engaging the economy.
Second, the distinction between orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathy allows me
to connect the various forms of redemptively significant transformation within the
economy to chapter 2’s discussion of appropriated divine action. In part, this will require
me to push back against the sharp distinction that Sobrino appears to draw between
orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathy. For example, by emphasizing limit realities,
Sobrino seems to reduce orthodoxy to a conceptual affair, neglecting the doxological
elements that are the etymological source for the word orthodoxy itself, apparently
relegating these instead to the domain of orthopathy. A sharp distinction between these
three realities is untenable. Because the act of knowing is in a certain sense praxis,
orthodoxy is not perfectly divisible from orthopraxis, just as the connection between right
knowledge and right worship undermines too sharp a distinction between orthodoxy and
orthopathy. Nevertheless, some conceptual distinctions between what is ultimately
indivisible can be drawn here. Orthodoxy, orthopathy, and orthopraxis must be
understood as distinct dimensions of an undivided divine work of transformation still
wrought on believers by Father, Son, and Spirit in distinctive ways.
Orthopathy, orthodoxy, and orthopraxis can serve as conceptual distinctions that
allow us to better recognize the unique yet indivisible contributions of Father, Son, and

124	
  
Spirit in redemptively significant transformation. In dialogue with Sobrino, I have
suggested that orthopathy allows certain particular actions and ideas to be possible. As is
frequently made clear in the gospels, Jesus is able to “proclaim good news to the poor”
(Luke 4:18) because he first has compassion on them (i.e. Matt. 9:26, 14:14, Mark 6:3234). Jesus’ acts are possible based on a certain pre-reflective awareness of the created
value of all human beings. Jesus sees them as his Father in heaven sees them, based not
on social status or outward appearance but based on their hearts (1 Sam. 16:17, Luke
16:15). Insofar as orthopathy is the source of orthodoxy and orthopraxis in this respect,
we can properly appropriate it to the Father, the source of all divine action. Similarly,
insofar as orthopraxis perfects the revelation of God manifest in orthodoxy, it can
properly be appropriated to the Holy Spirit, the perfecter of all divine works. Finally,
deviating from Sobrino’s understanding of the relationship between orthodoxy and
orthopraxis, I will argue that orthodoxy can be seen as a means of preserving orthopraxis,
ensuring the ongoing actualization of right action. Therefore, it can properly be
appropriated to the Son, in whom all the divine works are actualized. These three
dimensions of redemptively significant transformation in the market conform to the
pattern established by Gregory of Nyssa, and, as will be shown in subsequent chapters,
the pattern of appropriations I am suggesting here follows scriptural patterns of speech.
Treating orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathy as appropriated aspects of the
unified and undivided divine work of transformation accomplished on the Church
through common grace operative within the market overcomes the potential objection to
Sobrino’s trichotomy noted above: there are countless ways of muddying the waters by
objecting to a strong distinction between thinking, doing, and experiencing. Since at least

125	
  
the time of Karl Marx it has been necessary to admit that thinking and sensing are both
forms of acting.19 Equally relevant is Michael Polanyi’s idea of a tacit knowledge
comprised of an embodied awareness that manifests itself as a certain skill or ability.
Acting may thus be spoken of as a form of knowledge.20 Examples could go on, but it is
clear that no pure distinction between knowing, doing, and experiencing/desiring is
possible. If the distinction between orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathy were treated
as real distinctions based in theoretical knowledge of three discrete elements of human
religious life, then the untenable nature of such a pure distinction between knowing,
doing, and acting would undermine the helpfulness of Sobrino’s terminology. However,
if orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathy are understood to be three conceptual
distinctions within an undivided divine work of transformation then the problem is
minimized. Given the fact that the opera dei ad extra indivisa sunt, we should not be
surprised that the three dimensions of this divine work of transformation cannot be
divided. I do not intend to draw an inviolable distinction between action, knowledge, and
experience as the basis for analyzing the economy. However, given that the end goal of
the undivided divine work is communion of the saints with God, and given that such
communion requires distinctive awareness of Father, Son, and Spirit through distinctive
appropriated aspects of the undivided divine work, it is perfectly acceptable to speak of a
distinction between orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathy. These three terms are
conceptual distinctions used to describe the immanent dimensions of a transformed
human life brought about by divine action. The more closely the concurrent divine and
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human works align in their telos, the more properly we can speak of orthodoxy,
orthopraxis, and orthopathy as the human manifestations of the divine work of
transformation, which is to say as the aspects of human life on which the divine work of
redemption supervenes.
Returning briefly to the notion of supervenience, it must be noted that divine
action in the world can be considered from the perspective of God or from the
perspective of creation. From the perspective of God, a discussion could emphasize the
divine motives for God’s work in a particular area, the philosophical plausibility of God
acting within the world, and the basis in God-given revelation for identifying any
particular reality as a divine work. Such discussions are important, but they are less
clearly related to economic theory. From the perspective of creation, analysis begins with
the immanent terms within the created order that God supervenes upon when acting in
creation. These elements can take the form of created realities that may be frequently
discussed in the social sciences, but here theology reveals that these created realities must
also be spoken of as acts of the Triune God. Such created realities are the immanent
terms of supervenient divine action, but such divine action is not reducible to these
immanent realities. The benefit of focusing on the immanent aspects of divine action
when discussing a theology of economics is that these aspects can be directly correlated
with the subject matter of economic theory.21 Only through such correlation can theology
provide insights capable of changing economics itself.
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With this in mind, I turn now to the task of identifying created realities on which
God superveinently acts to bring about redemptively significant transformation within the
economy. I will develop three created realities corresponding to the three dimensions of
transformation: orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathy. Each of these realities can be
appropriated to the Son, the Spirit, and the Father in a manner mirroring the appropriation
of orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathy to each of the divine Persons. However, divine
action is not reducible to any one of these realities or even to all three in combination.
The three created realities are simply the immanent terms of concurrent divine action that
are most easily relatable to both the divine work of transformation through common
grace and to the economic practice of modeling that will be the focus of the final three
chapters.
The Immanent Terms of the Divine Work of Transformation
Recognition, Norms, and the Work of the Holy Spirit
Among recent systematic theologians, Kevin Hector provides perhaps the most
intriguing account of the immanent terms of the divine action of the Holy Spirit.22 For
this reason his work serves as an excellent starting point in our quest to identify the
immanent terms of the undivided divine work of transformation. Hector’s Theology
Without Metaphysics develops what he calls a therapeutic and non-metaphysical theory
of language use to defend the possibility of speaking about God against theologians such
as Jean Luc Marion and John D. Caputo who fear that language directed towards God
results in a form of violence against God. For Marion, the concern is that theological
22
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language can result in idolatry instead of iconography, where an idol is that which closes
the horizon and turns the gaze upon itself. Such idols therefore are forms of knowledge of
God that constrain God per impossibile, which is to say they cause us to speak not about
God but about a constrained “god”, a mere projection.23 Marion believes we can only
think about God “under the figure of the unthinkable.”24 God is love without condition or
restraint, so in loving we can move “beyond the limit of a concept… but also beyond the
limit of every condition whatsoever.”25 For Marion, language is a limit that must be
exceeded in order to overcome idolatry. Caputo worries about “the violence theology
perpetrates on God”26 by making God “fall victim” to “anterior conditions.”27 While
Caputo follows Marion in certain respects,28 arguing that both Heidegger and Aquinas
“subject God to the anteriority of being with equal violence,”29 he also wonders whether
Marion’s theology of the icon and of love is nothing more than an alternative set of
anterior conditions.30 Ultimately, Caputo urges the reader to “give in to the violence of
discourse, the violence that discourse is… God does not speak… So there can be no
question of claiming access to the language God himself favors.”31 Language inevitably
constrains God, doing violence against God, but this is unavoidable and therefore to be
embraced.
23
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Hector rightly recognizes that both Caputo’s and Marion’s arguments assume a
correspondentist essentialist account of language, where Marion fears that our words
correspond to idols and seeks a way around such idolatry, while Caputo fears that any act
corresponding God to a mental category (where such mental categories are inescapably
linguistic) uses an anterior condition to violently constrain God. These concerns could be
overcome through what Hector calls a therapy, that is through an account of how
language need not operate in a correspondentist essentialist manner so that speaking of
God is not corresponding God to an idol, nor constraining God within an anterior
condition. In contrast to and Marion and Caputo, Hector hopes that his therapy can
salvage a form of positive theology, a participation in God’s talk about God. His nonmetaphysical account of language suggests concept use commits the user to “normative
assessment”32 to determine whether concept use goes on “in the same way as precedent
uses.”33 In other words,
in using a concept, one intends one’s own usage to be recognizable as such by
those whom one recognizes as users of the concept, and one intends this by
trying to use it in the same way as certain precedents.34

Valid concept use is concept use recognizable as such by those who already use the same
concepts. In this way, Hector escapes correspondentism and essentialism by substituting
a “reciprocal-recognition”35 process for the notion that applying a concept “assimilate[s]
that object to an antecedently defined, essence-like category.”36 For Hector, norms do not
entail that the resulting concepts used actually do correspond to the essence of a thing,
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and so he believes that he has sidestepped Marion and Caputo’s concerns. There is no
longer a need to fear that words somehow attempt to bind the unbounded essence of God
through the violent application of an antecedent category.
Hector further develops his theory of theological concept use by explaining that
theological language is a particularly Trinitarian affair in which the Holy Spirit “norms
one’s usage through a process of mutual recognition” determining whether the current
concept use carries on the trajectory initiated by Jesus Christ, “who is the standard by
which to determine whether one’s performances conform to God.”37 In other words, if
proper use of a word entails using that word in a fashion that continues a trajectory of
precedent uses, then such a trajectory is only possible through the norming work of the
Holy Spirit. This account builds upon Freidrich Schleiermacher’s notion that the Spirit
circulates within Gefühl (“feeling”), a “pre-reflective” attunement that provides intuitive
direction to knowing and doing,38 and upon Karl Barth’s notion that language about God
must be “an intra-triune affair” such that “to know God properly is to participate in God’s
knowledge of Godself.”39 Schleiermacher’s Gefühl allows Hector to connect his nonessentialist, non-correspondentist account of language to the work of the Spirit. In this
account, theological language is language whose norms of use originate, pre-reflectively
(i.e. without conscious deliberation), through the work of the Holy Spirit.
Schleiermacher, on Hector’s account, sees Gefühl as a collective matter, conditioned by a
37
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“we-consciousness” that conforms an individual’s attunement to that of a religious
community.40 If norms are derived from recognition, and if the type of recognition
operative within theological language use is Spirit controlled, then the norms are
themselves the work of the Spirit. Barth, in Hector’s reading of him, was similarly
concerned that God can never fit in human linguistic categories, but Barth overcomes this
worry by suggesting that our application of theological concepts to God must be a
participation in God’s knowledge of himself such that human speaking of God is a
practice of grace.41 Barth’s insight applies to Hector’s model because the norm that the
Spirit carries forward originates in the historical utterances of Jesus. Therefore, when
someone speaks about God within this trajectory according to Spirit-inspired norms, she
does so as a continuation of God’s talk about God as empowered by God. To speak of
God is to speak to the Father in the trajectory of Christ, according to the norms carried on
in the Spirit.
What would it look like to assess a theological claim using the theory of language
provided by Hector? Let us consider an illustration from the theology of economics to
clarify Hector’s pneumatological theory of language use. Gustavo Gutiérrez argues that
“the liberation of Israel is a political action,”42 a paradigmatic event continued in the
salvation offered by Christ, where “the struggle for a just society is in its own right very
much a part of salvation history.”43 The struggle for such a just society, Gutiérrez argues,
requires that Latin American nations be freed from their dependence on and domination
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by great capitalist countries and multinational corporations.44 Christ must be seen as
liberator, and growth of the kingdom of God must be seen in part as “a process which
occurs historically in liberation.”45 In Hector’s account of theological language,
Gutiérrez’s claims would be justified if they met at least two conditions. First, they must
be recognized as continuing a trajectory of theological talk about God and the kingdom
that began with Jesus of Nazareth (perhaps with his claim that he was sent “to proclaim
release to the captives” in Luke 4:18) and continued through centuries of faithful
discipleship. Second, the individuals who recognized Gutiérrez as carrying on in the same
manner as the precedent usage of Christ must have themselves been recognized as rightly
carrying on in the spirit of Jesus’ speech by other individuals who were equally
recognized as being in the chain by their predecessors, and so forth in continuity all the
way back to Jesus himself. Of course, this precedent chain does not require that we are
able to trace a specific series of moments where successive authorities analyzed and
affirmed one another. We need only posit that the pre-reflective norms circulating within
a particular group were passed from one generation to the next through mutual
recognition and through assimilation into a particular “we-consciousness” governed by
the same normative orientation present in the community established by Jesus of
Nazareth. Gutiérrez’s claims are not valid, therefore, on the condition that the kingdom of
God corresponds in its essence to an act of liberation, but rather on the condition that in
speaking of liberation Gutiérrez is empowered by the Holy Spirit to speak in a similar
fashion as Jesus but within a new context. Conversely, if Gutiérrez’s speech does not
“pick out” the same reality in the same manner, and if it deviates from the historical
44
45

Ibid., 88.
Ibid., 177. Emphasis in original.

133	
  
trajectory and is not therefore recognized as carrying on in the manner established by
Christ, then his claim would not be a participation in God’s talk about God and would
therefore be invalid. I will return to this example again in due course, but for now the
point is adequately made.
Before moving to a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of Hector’s
proposal, I should note from the start that I intend to table the questions of metaphysics
and language. It should be quite obvious that I engage throughout this work in
metaphysics in a number of ways that potentially exceed what would be permissible
given Hector’s theory of language use, but the nature and validity of metaphysics in
general and in relation to theology in particular remains outside of the scope of this work.
What is important in Hector’s work as related to the current project is not his conclusion
regarding metaphysics but rather his depiction of the pneumatological basis of language
use wherein the Holy Spirit is operative through intersubjective norms. Hector can be
entirely wrong about metaphysics and/or correspondentist essentialist accounts of truth,
but still quite insightful in terms of the mechanisms through which language is learned,
how language evolves, and what role norms play in language use. Norms provide us with
the immanent term that can place the appropriated action of the Holy Spirit in dialogue
with economic models and theory. Language use is but one human action, one example
of human doing, one element of praxis, and hence the immanent term which is the basis
of our appropriation of othopraxis to the Holy Spirit.46 In sidestepping the question of
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metaphysics, I do not intend to dismiss the importance of Hector’s primary concern as
much as to recognize the potential benefits of applying his basic insights elsewhere. As I
do not find myself convinced that I am inflicting violence upon God through theological
language as in the thought of Marion or Caputo, I instead prefer to focus on the fact that,
in Hector, language use is a practice.47 Thus, Hector speaks of “the practice of taking
true,”48 “the practice of reference,”49 and of an overall “normative-pragmatic explanation
of concept use.”50 If language use is a practice, presumably Hector’s insights may be
equally applicable to other practices, especially economic practices.
Hector’s pneumatology of recognition is not only appealing for its potential
application to concerns of praxis, but also because it has merit on Biblical grounds and on
the grounds of the Reformed theological tradition. Biblically speaking, the Spirit is often
depicted as anointing the prophets in their commission to preach (Is. 61:1; cf. 2 Pet.
1:21), and the Spirit’s role is clearly described as guiding us to all truth (John 16:13). The
Spirit is thus clearly connected to theological concept use and even more broadly to
human action in particular (Rom. 8:14, Gal. 5:16). The Scriptures at least allow for
recognition’s role in determining the Spirit’s presence insofar as we are compelled to test
the spirits (1 John 4:1-3) and to recognize true and false prophets by their fruit (Matt.
7:16). These notions suggest that Hector is not doing violence to the tradition in
developing a pneumatology centered on recognition and applied to concept use. As I will
relate to the question of practice and, hence, orthopraxy, which this project appropriates to the
Holy Spirit. The reader must remember, however, that the very idea of appropriation grants that
the action of the Spirit is not sharply and completely divisible with the action of the Father and
the Son, such that the difficult entanglements discussed between knowledge, practice, and
experience in the particular case of language do not undermine the basic approach of this project.
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argue more extensively in chapter 6, I am convinced that Hector’s proposal actually
conforms quite well to certain aspects of the Biblical witness.
Within the Reformed tradition, I also find affinities between Hector’s proposal
and the Reformed notion of common grace that I have presented as the theological basis
for any claim that communion with God arises in part through the economy as a result of
divine action. According to the doctrine of common grace, the Holy Spirit is active in the
life of every human through common grace whereby all human talents are preserved and
developed and sin is restrained.51 Only in special grace is grace given to the elect in such
a way that they are united with Christ unto salvation through the Spirit’s power. If we
suggest that the Spirit plays a role in norming human action, then common grace
becomes a logical necessity insofar as it is impossible to exclude those outside of the
Church from being influenced in some way by the redemptively significant norms active
in society, even if the force of these norms is much smaller outside of the Church body
and not efficacious toward salvation for all who contribute to the shaping of such norms.
This is but another way of arguing that if redemptively significant transformation occurs
within the market (in this instance as a result of reciprocal-recognition and norms), then
we must theologically speak of this transformation as arising from grace. Conversely, if
we affirm the proposed view of common grace, then we can say one of the main
differences between the Spirit’s agency within the Church and outside of the Church
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through these norms is the recognition of the Spirit as such an agent by those within the
Church.52
Given these scriptural and traditional supports for Hector’s view, one important
weakness deserves serious consideration. Hector’s description of the Trinitarian nature of
concept use could be misappropriated to support certain modalistic tendencies within the
Church. This is not to say that Hector is a modalist; anyone familiar with his broader
works will find such a conclusion untenable.53 However, insofar as Hector primarily
attributes to Jesus the role of offering a historical and paradigmatic reference to God54
which initiates the trajectory of the chain and serves as the standard to determine if our
concept use conforms to God,55 and insofar as Hector seems to attribute no active role to
the Father in said concept use, it would be easy to interpret God as acting in theological
concept use in three successive stages with Christ initiating valid concept use in the past,
52
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the Spirit sustaining the trajectory of such uses in the present, and the Father being active
at most only in an eschatological future in which we may hope these trajectories attain a
sort of beatific vision and discursive communion with God.56 This succession of three
different stages in which God acts in three different ways was the basis of the heresy of
modalism, and the contemporaneous activity of the three Persons was the main defense
against this mistake.57 Chapter 2 also argued that such contemporaneous action is vital to
any account of divine action, which would include any pneumatological role in the
transmission of norms (linguistic or otherwise).
In light of this risk, though Hector is certainly no modalist, his proposal would be
better off if it clearly articulated the distinctive and simultaneous roles of Father, Son, and
Spirit in concept use to mitigate the risk of introducing a foothold for modalism within
our notion of God-empowered human action. It will certainly also be more useful within
the current project if a role for the Father and the Son can be discerned in the present.
Fortunately, I believe that Hector has certain elements within his proposal that can be
modified, in the trajectory of his precedent concept use, to overcome these shortcomings
by introducing a stronger Trinitarian dimension that simultaneously makes better sense of
human action, including language. I intend now to tease out these elements.
56

At the very least, we can say that it is unclear precisely how current communion with
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Social Imaginaries and the Work of the Father
A constructive expansion of Hector’s proposal might begin by noting a dimension
of human experience of the world that seems largely overlooked in Theology Without
Metaphysics. Hector explains that to intend a meaning is to invite normative assessment
in hopes that the use of a concept is recognizable as such by an individual recognized as
having normative authority.58 On this account, norms are entirely intersubjective
phenomena rooted in reciprocal-recognition. However, it is important to acknowledge
that any particular action, and this is especially the case in concept use, is only intelligible
within a certain frame of reference that I will call the social imaginary. I prefer the
definition offered by Charles Taylor, who defines the social imaginary as
the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others,
how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that are
normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these
expectations.59

James K.A. Smith offers a helpful clarification when he notes that a social imaginary is
about “how we imagine the world before we ever think about it.”60 The idea of a social
imaginary originated with Cornelius Castoriadis, who used it as a means of moving
beyond the strong materialism found in the Marxist thought contemporary with his
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Smith, Desiring, 66. My use of Taylor will ultimately be slightly different than Smith’s
insofar as I will consider the social imaginary as that which brings about the possibility of the
perpetuation of pneumatologically enabled trajectories and also the possibility of a continuing
encounter with God. Smith tends to focus on the latter aspect in his reading of Taylor, couched in
the terms of an existential framework and discussions of meaning and significance. The different
in emphasis is largely due to the different ends to which we deploy Taylor, not due to a
fundamental disagreement that I may have with Smith. See James K.A. Smith How (Not) to Be
Secular: Reading Charles Taylor (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2014).

139	
  
writing. According to Castoriadis, the “social-historical” is not reducible to
intersubjective networks nor to institutions. He thus eschews the typical
base/superstructure dichotomy offered by many forms of Marxism.61 Castoriadis instead
suggests that a network of symbols makes any human action and thus history itself
possible,62 and that institutions themselves have drawn their source from an imaginary, a
network of symbols and ideas that makes the very instantiation of institutions themselves
intelligible.63 This imaginary will be vital to the task of expanding Hector’s proposal.
For Castoriadis society cannot be understood exclusively in material or functional
terms because society is constantly constructing its own needs and pursuits, toward which
the material and institutional aspects of society then develop.64 This symbolic
construction of needs yields a material consequence which may fulfill a function, but the
function itself is not the ultimate explanation insofar as this very function is not natural
but needs explanation. Yet, the notion of a social imaginary is not a sort of idealism.
Idealism is a pure extraction of ideas from other factors, but the idea of a social
imaginary is meant to indicate that the material actions and structures that constitute a
society contain within themselves a certain idea that makes the very practices
intelligible.65 Action and idea are inseparable, and so the social imaginary stands as a sort
61
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Taylor, Imaginaries, 2.
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of ambiguous middle ground between knowledge and action.66 As a precondition of
action, the social imaginary is nevertheless not fully distinguishable from action insofar
as action sustains and perpetuates a particular imaginary. As a precondition to our
thoughts and ideas, the social imaginary always exceeds our full definition and
understanding,67 and it always contains within it certain elements that impress upon our
conscious thought but which are not themselves conscious ideas. In the words of Arjun
Appadurai, social imaginaries are “a constitutive feature of modern subjectivity.”68
Through the social imaginary, a given subject can conceive of various “imagined
worlds,”69 which allows an individual to orient their agency within “globally defined
fields of possibility.”70 To use Hector’s terminology, social imaginaries determine which
future trajectories are possible when continuing a chain of precedent concept uses.
Let us return to the above example of Gustavo Gutiérrez’s theology to illustrate
how a social imaginary complements Hector’s proposal to allow us to better interpret the
truthfulness of a theological claim. Hector would suggest that Gutiérrez’s theology is a
participation in God’s talk about God if it is recognized as carrying on a precedent
trajectory initiated by the incarnate Son of God. If the trajectory continues to participate
in God’s talk about God, then the norms that facilitate such a trajectory must be
understood as the work of the Spirit, which Hector, following Schleiermacher, describes
66
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in terms of Gefühl. This is all well and good, but it is missing an important component of
what it would mean for Gutiérrez to continue a precedent chain of concept-use.
Gutiérrez’s claims that Christ is liberator and that the kingdom of God unfolds in the
historical process of liberation compel him to call for the liberation of Latin American
nations from their exploitation by and dependence upon major capitalist nations and
multi-national corporations. However, neither the nation-state nor the corporation is
purely an empirical reality. In fact, nation-states are, in the words of Benedict Anderson,
“imagined communities.”71 According to Anderson, as vernacular languages replaced
Latin as the language of court across Europe, and particularly as these languages
circulated through “print capitalism,” the vernacularization allowed individual Europeans
to imagine themselves as part of nations of fellow men and women who spoke the same
language. These imagined communities made possible ideas, acts, and discussions of
nationalism. Anderson’s example illustrates the connection between particular ideas (a
language-based nation of people) and particular social and material developments (print
capitalism, vernacular language use) that exceeds either action or knowledge. When
assimilated by a culture and taken for granted (i.e. accepted in a pre-reflective manner)
such interconnected social and material developments are constitutive of a social
imaginary.
If Anderson’s account is correct, and it seems to me that it is, then for us to say
that Gutiérrez’s theology rightly participates in God’s talk about God, we would not only
need to say that he continues a precedent trajectory through the power of the Holy Spirit,
but also that the imaginary within which his particular speech acts occurs renders those
71

Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, revised edition, (London: Verso, 2006).

142	
  
acts socially significant in a similar manner to how Jesus’ speech acts were significant
two thousand years ago. Jesus did not speak of corporations or nation-states because
these realities were not imagined in the same manner in first century Palestine. Gutiérrez
quite obviously operates in an entirely different symbolic world. An account of
reciprocal-recognition alone does not account for the impersonal and non-intersubjective
factors contributing to Gutiérrez’s theology, which would include the impact of print
capitalism on the development of the notion of the nation-state that is central to
Gutiérrez’s account of liberation as the freeing of Latin American nation states from their
dependency on their northern counterparts. The non-contrastive account of transcendence
put forward in chapter 2 requires us to see the often-impersonal factors leading to a social
imaginary as radically dependent upon God. The same chapter’s account of common
grace compels us to identify these factors as the immanent aspects of God’s work of
common grace if they contribute to Gutiérrez’s properly speaking about God. Therefore,
some effort must be made to further distinguish between the Holy Spirit’s work in norms
and an additional work of God the Father within the social imaginary that conditions
Gutiérrez’s God-talk as well as within the factors leading to such an imaginary.
If the social imaginary plays a role in conditioning God-talk, and if such talk is
only valid if it is a participation in God’s talk about God, then Hector’s proposal must be
expanded to account for the Father’s role in conditioning the social imaginary. The point
can be made in weak or in strong form. In weak form, we can say that there is nothing in
human nature that would lead necessarily to a real encounter with God. Any doctrine of
sin at least holds within it the possibility that we can move so far away from
righteousness as to preclude any ability to find God. Therefore we must account for some
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act of God in the social imaginary to prevent the complete hiddenness of God within that
imaginary. This restraining of sin such that God is knowable is brought about through
what Reformed theologians call common grace. In strong form, we might say that it is
not possible to encounter God apart from grace. If we share Hector’s commitment to
Barthian conceptions of revelation (even though Barth himself would not equate a social
imaginary with the activity of the Father) there is reason to affirm the stronger version.
For Barth, revelation simply is God the Son incarnate.72 Such a revelation is only possible
given the fact that the Father is Revealer, and the resulting (in Hector’s construal) norms
that allow the believer to recognize this Revelation which is the historical life, ministry,
death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ is the very Revealedness that is the Holy Spirit.73
Hector’s theology has a historical, non-contemporary place for Christ as Revelation and
for the Spirit as the norms which constitute the Revealedness of the divine self-revelation.
What is the Father’s revealing act? Here Barth would not admit anything in nature that
would function as a precondition for the self-revelation through the Word. However, as
discussed in chapter 2, in this claim Barth arguably has too sharp of a divide between the
doctrines of redemption and creation, at least in his early work.74 Insofar as Barth asserts
that revelation is a historical event, “a concrete relation to concrete men [sic],”75 one
72
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could argue in a semi-Barthian fashion (i.e. by taking account of the need for a unity of
creation and redemption but otherwise retaining the major elements of Barth’s system)
and claim that it is precisely through that aspect of history whereby such concrete
relations are rendered intelligible that the Father acted to prepare the revelation of the
Son. In other words, the Father’s work as Revealer required not only the sending of the
Son, but the social-historical preparation for the Son’s appearance through what I have
called the social imaginary. Nor is this exclusively a divine activity in pre-Incarnational
times; if the self-revelation of God in Christ is known today, it is known as a result of the
continuing act of the Revealer to bring about a Revealedness of the divine Revelation,
and this in a historical fashion to particular individuals situated in particular societies. In
short, God is sovereignly immanent within all of creation,76 and is therefore operative in
whatever forces facilitate the social imaginaries that make theological concept use
possible.77
The relationship between norms and the social imaginary provides the basis for
distinguishing between the roles of the Father and the Spirit in the united divine work of
transformation accomplished by common grace through aspects of society like the
market. A first means of distinguishing between the work of the Spirit and the Father
relies on the direction of influence between the world and human persons. It is important
76
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to distinguish between, on the one hand, the pre-reflective thoughts and actions of an
individual as a force operative on the world and thereby contributing both to the social
imaginary and to the social, political, economic, cultural, and aesthetic structures that
enable particular social imaginaries, and on the other hand, the social imaginary as also
operative prior to intentional, reflective thought within an individual but arising from
many factors that exceed the intersubjective influence of norms. In fact, this imaginary is
partly responsible for shaping which actions are recognizable as carrying on in the
trajectory in which the individual imagines herself taking part. Insofar as a social
imaginary arises jointly from structures and ideas outside of the control of any particular
individual or even any community, one could say that through a social imaginary the
world is operative on the individual or community. More than this, insofar as the
symbolic becomes reified in certain institutional facts that endure outside of the influence
of a particular chain of reciprocal-recognition, a subject that will become clear in chapter
4, a social imaginary’s influence on a subject must be distinguished from the patterns of
recognition that respond to intersubjective influences with more fluidity. In other words,
there is a sense in which the pre-reflective attunement of an individual as conditioned by
and operative within norms can be operative against the prevailing social imaginary,
thereby shaping the latter, and there is also a sense in which the social imaginary can be
against those norm-related aspects of pre-reflective attunement of an individual such that
the attunement is also perpetually shaped within and directed by that same social
imaginary in ways that may be contrary to the forces operative within the process of
reciprocal-recognition. If we are to posit that God is active through society, as our
previous metaphysical considerations necessitate, I believe that the bidirectional nature of
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this influence between norms and social imaginaries necessitates a distinction between
the two directions in terms of divine agency.78
A second means of distinguishing the work of Father and Spirit without dividing
the single divine work lies in the relationship between social imaginaries and social
norms. Norms are not identical to the social imaginary insofar as they require the
imaginary to be intelligible to a subject in the first place. Without a degree of overlap in
the area of symbolic imagination, a subject cannot recognize acts in such a way as to
receive them as normative. However, social imaginaries are also never extricable from
the historical and social processes that they condition, insofar as these processes are
always advancing the social-historical itself into new formulations, thereby modifying the
imaginary.79 This inextricable connection between imaginaries and historical and social
processes like the unfolding of norms supports my decision to speak of appropriated
aspects of the unified divine act. Nevertheless, the indivisible nature of norms and the
imaginary does not preclude distinctive roles in the act of transformation for Father, Son,
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and Spirit. As a social imaginary makes particular norm-based trajectories possible, we
can appropriate God’s work in an imaginary leading to proper God-talk to the Father,
from whom issues all divine works. Similarly, because norms carry a possibility latent in
an imaginary through to completion, they are properly understood as the immanent
aspects of the Spirit’s perfecting or completing of the undivided divine act. Neither of
these two distinctions is fully elucidated in Hector’s use of Gefühl.80
While this theological basis justifies the move toward appropriating any
revelatory act through the social imaginary to the Father, a final step must be taken for us
to recognize a social imaginary as the immanent term by which the Father brings about
orthopathy. If any act is only intelligible as a result of a prior imaginary frame of
reference (where such imagination is distinct from both the conscious application of
purely noetic conceptual apparatus to an external reality and any act that arises within
that imaginary), then any particular intelligibility (orthodoxy) or action (orthopraxis) has
specific imaginaries as a sufficient condition for their respective realization. To return to
the example of a nation-state, both conscious reflection on the governmental structures of
a state and intentional actions within that state such as voting depend upon a prior and
80
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pre-reflective awareness of an imagined reality called “the state,” a reality whose
existence depends upon both personal and impersonal forces that have shaped an
imaginary. Therefore, such an imaginary is in part the efficient cause of any particular
idea or act, but only in part. I say in part because we cannot exclude that human agency
whereby one of the many possibilities intrinsic to a social imaginary is actualized. Yet
insofar as this human agency is seen as concurrently divine agency, we must attribute
both the human/personal and the impersonal factors contributing to a particular social
imaginary to God. If we are to continue in the theology put forward in the patristic era
where all divine acts originate with the Father, and we do well here to note Bonaventure’s
appropriation of efficient cause to the Father,81 then we can only attribute orthopathy and
the social imaginary to the Father, and not to the Son or the Spirit insofar as an imaginary
is the source from which any change originates. Interestingly, this is also in line with Jon
Sobrino’s early deployment of the idea of orthopathy.82
It is important to recognize that linking the Father’s sovereign action to the social
imaginary is not contrary to Hector’s position. Insofar as he acknowledges that Gefühl is
derived from the internalization of custom, he recognizes God as active through custom.83
And yet, recognizing the Father as sovereignly directing impersonal forces whose
influence exceeds the limits of any norm-laden community while the Spirit operates
through custom internalized as norms acquired through reciprocal-recognition allows a
81
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more clearly Trinitarian explanation of human action. To put it simply, a social imaginary
determines what trajectories are possible, while the process of recognition determines
what possibilities continue a trajectory. God’s work of transformation in a market would
therefore potentially include a shift toward orthopathy through the development of a new
social imaginary that made right action possible as well as a shift toward orthopraxis
under the influence of intersubjectively established norms. Conversely, human efforts in
the market that undermine common grace would distort a social imaginary and/or operate
according to inappropriate norms.
Identity and the Work of the Son
A social imaginary is not a monolithic reality. Just as there are distinctive
subcultures within a given culture, so too there are distinctive yet overlapping social
imaginaries within a society. Therefore, it is generally more appropriate to speak of social
imaginaries in the plural, where the social imaginaries in a single society may coincide in
significant ways while each imaginary may retain distinctive elements, or to speak of a
social imaginary, rather than the social imaginary. The cross-pressure between sociocultural forces outside of the norm-producing intersubjective networks that result in the
social imaginary as the set of possible trajectories that a new action subject to norming
can take and the process of recognition itself through which internalized norms carry
forward precedent acts in one of the possible trajectories creates a continual conflict for
an individual precisely because different social imaginaries may conflict with different
norms. I find this situation of continual conflict and cross-pressure aptly summarized by
what Edward Rommen calls “being-in-the-world,” or the “individual’s relationship to
external frameworks of reality, in particular other human beings” as navigated “through
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the ongoing history of one’s interface with the physical as well as social and cultural
dimensions of the world.”84 Rommen suggests that being, identity, and self-awareness are
the three dimensions of human efforts to navigate being-in-the-world, and he further
notes that a late modern individual suffers a loss of self due in large part to the radical
reflexivity of the late modern thought that denies any ontological basis for identity or
self-understanding. Rommen’s call for a reprioritization of essence over existence and a
return to the imago dei as a means of ontologically anchoring the self with respect to
being focuses on being as a means of navigating being-in-the-world to the neglect of
identity. Nevertheless, Rommen’s suggestion that identity can serve as a basis for
navigating being-in-the-world sets the course for the second amendment to Hector’s
theology.
The radical reflexivity that Rommen correctly identifies as operative in late
modernity creates problems for maintaining continuity in the trajectory of precedent uses.
Because an individual is ultimately unable to define herself reflexively, and because no
ontic ground is admissible in the late modern context, she inevitably establishes identity
rooted in a variety of social roles.85 Since these roles vary, identity can be fragmented.86
This is especially the case in the context of multiple social imaginaries. In his epic A
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Secular Age, Charles Taylor argues that our contemporary social imaginaries render the
plausibility structures that lead to theistic belief subject to challenge.87 In many cases,
such plausibility structures are no longer even the default; unbelief is the norm. Taylor
addresses numerous aspects of this situation, but two aspects directly relate to the issues
raised by Rommen above. First, Taylor posits that we live in an “Age of Authenticity,”
wherein each individual pursues a sort of expressivisim that is embodied in a mutual
display of self-expression and resulting social responses. This interplay of expression and
social responses is often more fundamentally the basis of individuality than are aspects
derived from spaces of collective action like the public square or market, but such
expression is a mode of authenticity that challenges the role of all social norms.88 This is
but another way of saying that each individual is defined reflexively in relation to
himself, Rommen’s radical reflexivity. Taylor sees this as a unique aspect of modern
secular social imaginaries. Second, Taylor speaks of a “fragilization,” a weakening of any
particular faith commitment rooted in the presence of a plurality of religious options
coupled with the real possibility of a conversion to an alternative religious or irreligious
option. Such fragilization in the face of cross-pressures leads to the possibility of reduced
religious commitment.89 This corresponds to the “religious and cultural” elements that
87
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Rommen points us toward. Taken together, these factors are one way of illustrating that
norms, of which religious commitments would be a particular subset, are often
challenged as a result of certain ideals of authenticity and as a result of religious
pluralism understood within a social imaginary that can picture conversion between
religious groups, or even a move away from religion altogether. Such fragilization and
radical reflexivity leads to a fragmentation that allows for numerous possible selves with
possible commitments, possible norm-laden trajectories. These fragmented possible
selves can essentially function as different perspectives subject to different internalized
norms and operating with different “we-consciousnesses.”90 Insofar as aspects of a social
imaginary may allow for alternative possible selves with their own perspectives and
norms contrary to those established by the Spirit in the pneumatology of recognition
described by Hector, an inescapable possibility given the fallen nature of the world, the
continuity of the trajectory is at risk in the event that these alternate perspectives become
operative.
The problem can be put a different way: if individuals’ self-understanding can be
fragmented by the competing pulls of a social imaginary and of recognition-based
internalized norms, then one faces the very real problem that an internalized norm can
very easily be abandoned in some fragments of the self. In other words, if Hector is
anything similar to fragilization. Furthermore, while the terms imply a psychological focus,
Taylor often analyzes the phenomena from a “God’s eye perspective” that focuses on social
forces and not psychology, making the psychological nature of the chosen terms somewhat
curious. Abbey, “Secularity 3,” 107-109. It remains unclear why granting exceptions to the
fragilization thesis reduces its validity. Statistically speaking, the experience depicted may indeed
be on the rise even with such exceptions, and arguably any particular individual may experience
times in which religious beliefs appear fragile, and times in which they appear strong. Therefore,
the idea of fragilization is still germane to the discussion at hand.
90
On fragmentation as a result of our ability to adopt various perspectives from within
various personages or identities, each with differing levels of involvement, see Richard S.
Hallam, Virtual Selves, Real Persons: A Dialogue Across Disciplines (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), chapter 4.
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correct in his claim that conformity to Christ only counts as such if an individual can
recreate “Christ-conforming performances as one’s own” and “on one’s own,”91 we must
ask how an individual once recognized as being able to do so would be able to maintain
that ability through time. This is especially the case in situations where the original
authority or community who recognized an individual as enacting Christ-conforming
performances is no longer present to continue to judge. To be sure, I agree with Hector
that recognition results in a norm that is internalized, but we must wonder how such a
norm, once internalized, remains static enough to ensure the ongoing trajectory of
precedent uses. What would stop the impersonal forces that contribute to a social
imaginary and which are largely externally operative on a trajectory from derailing the
norms internal to a particular chain of reciprocal-recognition?
Let us return again to the example of Gutiérrez to illustrate the role of identity in
stabilizing a trajectory of concept use. Gutiérrez argues that salvation is necessarily
historical so that it must touch human lives and human society through the process of
liberation. God acts toward liberation, and so human beings should participate in such
action. If Gutiérrez is incorrect, then we might suppose (as Daniel Bell seems to) that
Gutiérrez is influenced by a social imaginary that only imagines political actions in terms
of statecraft. Such an imaginary could preclude either right talk about the role of the
Church in enacting liberating transformation, or right actions toward such liberation.92 In
this case, human beings might be “putting out the Spirit’s fire” as a result of a symbolic
framework that made it impossible to envision God working through the Church toward
transformation. Common grace would, by the permissive will of God, cease to operate in
91
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Hector, Metaphysics, 87.
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the social imaginary Gutiérrez was shaped by such that his theology would no longer
continue the trajectory established by Jesus as God’s talk about God and such that his
theology no longer facilitated communion with God as Father, Son, and Spirit operating
through the Church for the transformation of the world.
On the other hand, perhaps Gutiérrez was not mistaken. Suppose that Gutiérrez
was, at the time of his writing in 1971, rightly inspired by God and speaking
prophetically in his context under the inspiration of the Spirit in a manner that carried on
the trajectory established by the incarnate Son. Suppose that at that time Gutiérrez was
recognized as carrying on (speech) acts in a manner similar to Christ, and that he was so
molded through Spirit-empowered norms as to be able to recreate these acts as his own
on his own. Many years have passed since the time Gutiérrez wrote his text. What would
guarantee that Gutiérrez is still speaking in a fashion that carries on the trajectory
established by Christ? Jung Mo Sung raises exactly this sort of criticism against certain
forms of Latin American liberation theology that have failed to change with the times.
The Latin American Church has moved from a contestatory context to an administrative
context where Christians have an increasing degree of authority that they must use to
manage scarcity.93 Sung argues that there must be a corresponding shift in action and in
the basic framework for understanding the world, a shift away from dependency theory
and its primarily state-centered imaginary toward a focus on inclusion in markets through
trade with a corresponding imaginary centered on non-state actors. If Sung is correct,
then Gutiérrez would no longer be engaged in orthopraxic liberation arising from an
orthopathic understanding of the world. In the likely absence of the community that first

93

Sung, Desire, 106.

155	
  
taught Gutiérrez to recreate Christ’s work as his own and on his own,94 and facing the
likelihood that the state-oriented imaginary that is apparently influential on Gutiérrez
may no longer allow for proper continuation of a trajectory continuing Jesus’ solidarity
with the poor, some third factor must make it possible for Gutiérrez to return to the
original accuracy of his position that we assumed for this thought exercise.
This is where identity comes into play, and here I think I am not deviating far
from Hector’s intention. Near the end of Theology Without Metaphysics, Hector suggests
that the practice of taking-true requires involvement on the part of the believer in terms of
“identification and transformation,” which Hector links with justification and
sanctification respectively.95 (This connection between justification and sanctification
will become increasingly important in subsequent chapters). Hector suggests that
identification is commitment to a belief that transforms other beliefs by causing the
believer to abandon or modify these beliefs.96 I propose to extend Hector’s link between
identification and justification a step farther. If we are to follow Martin Luther, for
example, we can say that, in justification, an “alien righteousness” makes “everything
which Christ has” ours,97 such that we can say, “Mine are Christ’s living, doing, and
speaking, his suffering and dying.”98 This is but another way of saying with Paul, “It is
no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me” (Gal. 2:20). Our identification is a
commitment not just to a belief, but to the person of the Son to whose image we are
94

This is, of course, not to suggest that the Church is no longer present, nor that Gutiérrez
is no longer a part of the body. It is simply to note that the actual historical community with
which Gutiérrez interacted and which normed his actions and language in 1971 is not identical
with the actual historical community norming Gutiérrez today.
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conformed. In Christ, we receive a new identity as a gift of God, and it is as a result of
this identity that we can act in the Spirit towards our sanctification. To put things in
Hector’s terminology, if the Spirit is active in recognition to develop norms then Christ is
active as the one each believer encounters on a continued basis spiritually, through the
Scriptures, and through faithful preaching as bestowing an identity that allows for a
degree of self-norming. Through our identity in Christ, we ensure the continuity of
identity that allows our internalized norms to carry forward the precedent trajectory even
in situations where the process of recognition is no longer active.
Identity serves as a basis for regulating the cross-pressures between often-secular
social imaginaries and the Spirit-enabled intersubjective norms of the religious
community in several ways. First, in the context of fragmentation and numerous possible
selves, that part of identity which is challenged is often the one clung to most
tenaciously.99 Therefore, when there are social-historical pressures that coerce a
trajectory to shift in such a way that it no longer picks out God, an identity that is
integrally tied up with the maintenance of this trajectory would resist this cross-pressure.
The preservation of the trajectory would be secured. Second, human thinking is largely
narratival. Identity plays a key role in the narrative by allowing for re-identification of the
self in the narrative plot. This re-identification pushes an individual toward perpetuating
particular roles that were assumed (or imagined to be assumed) in the past parts of the
narrative. Without identity and without such re-identification, such continuity is much
less easily preserved.
With this understanding of identity in mind, I must again turn to the question of
why I will appropriate identity to the Son, and why such an attribution is appropriation
99
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and nothing more. The attribution of identity to the Son is particularly clear insofar as the
doctrine of justification includes within it the imputation of a new status or identity.100
While it is “God (the Father) who justifies” (Rom. 8:31),101 that justification leads to
believers’ “adoption as sons” (8:23) and conformity to the image of the Son (8:29). The
actual identity received is the same identity that Christ possesses: sonship and imagebearer. Beyond the Scriptural basis for such an attribution, the pattern also fits with the
basic model of appropriation I have presented above. Formal cause is appropriated to the
Son in Bonaventure’s triad, and identity is arguably that which gives arrangement or
shape to the cross-pressures of the social imaginary and particular norms. Or, to return to
the formula offered by Nyssa, identity is what actualizes and sustains a particular set of
norms and a potential self-understanding within a particular imaginary. Within a specific
identity, a person regulates their course along a trajectory, maintains a specific relation to
other social forces, and retains a specific orientation amid a symbolic network of possible
worlds. Thus, identity more than other factors accounts for why a particular person is the
sort of person that they are, given multiple possible trajectories and even various possible
social imaginaries. Identity gives form to the particular, and insofar as this form is in
conformity to Christ, it serves as an immanent term to the action of God within the
social-historical world. Given that theology explores, to quote Calvin, “the knowledge of
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I recognize that justification is the topic of extensive debate in recent New Testament
studies, but I will address the topic at greater length in chapter 5. For now, it is sufficient to say
that I am convinced a case can be made for the fact that justification bestows such identity,
regardless of whether one accepts the “new perspective” on Paul or the “old.”
101
Following the logic of appropriations laid out in chapter 2, we can say that the Father
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God and of ourselves,”102 we can also say that identity is the immanent term for God’s
transformative work on a Christian in the dimension of orthodoxy.
The concept of identity rounds out the proposed modifications to Hector’s
pneumatology. Norms that reinforce particular practices (whether linguistic or otherwise)
continue a trajectory established by Christ – and here we ought to note that even Christ’s
paradigmatic work continued in certain respects trajectories traceable to the prophets,
priests, and kings whose roles he more perfectly fulfilled – a trajectory empowered by the
Holy Spirit. Such a trajectory is made possible through the illuminating work of the
Father and maintained through identity of sonship brought about by conformity to the
Son. Norms, identity, and the social imaginary are all aspects of the created order, and as
such must be seen as radically dependent upon God. The acts and events that bring about
such norms, particular identities, and various social imaginaries are acts and events
coincident with the providential work of God.
Assuming the connections I have outlined above do exist, on what grounds do I
limit these connections to mere appropriation? The restriction of the identification of the
divine work through social imaginaries, particular identities, and social norms by which
an individual or set of individuals can be brought into communion with God to an
appropriation with the Father, Son, and Spirit respectively follows just as strongly from
the interconnected nature of the social imaginary, identity, and social norms as it does
from any a priori commitment to the indivisibility of the divine actions ad extra.103 For
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imaginary significations: “The imaginary element in the social-historical complex is to be
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example I have attempted to suggest that language use is but one subset of acts that are
learned and regulated through reciprocal-recognition, and I have accepted Hector’s
proposal that such norms contain within them pre-reflective elements that may be
attributed to the Holy Spirit. However, insofar as these elements are pre-reflective, do
they not impinge upon the domain of the social imaginary? There is admittedly an
overlap here, though the specific pre-reflective elements in hand can be incompletely
distinguished from the social imaginary. This is true, first, because particular sects in
which social norms are especially strong may act against a dominant social imaginary,
and may do so in a way that leads to psychological conflict within various adherents of
the sect in question. This example of what I have called the cross-pressure between social
imaginary and social norms suggests at least a partial distinction between the two, even
granting that a full distinction is not possible given that particular (norm-regulated) acts
contain within themselves symbolic elements that contribute to the development of a
particular social imaginary. A lack of a full distinction requires appropriation: the
influence of social imaginary, identity, and norms in transformation can be distinguished,
but one is never operative fully independent of the other. Given that God is at work as
Father, Son, and Spirit through history to bring about the possibility of divine-human
two aspects (or, to put it another way, with experiential data and rationalizing efforts) as the
modus operandi of the imaginary source, and therefore also of the significations which it brings
into being. And the picture becomes even more complicated when we add that the interaction is
not a matter of contacts between clearly demarcated domains: rather, the three factors
interpenetrate in complex and often ambiguous ways. Imaginary significations shape patterns of
perception as well as frameworks and horizons of rationalization… Conversely, inputs from
perceptual experience enter into the making of imaginary significations, and the imagination
cannot articulate its themes without an admixture of rationalitation.” Johann Arnason, “Social
Imaginary Significations,” in Cornelius Castoriadis: Key Concepts, ed. Suzi Adams (London:
Bloomsbury, 2014), 33-34. While I do not develop the same threefold distinction that Arnason
describes in Castoriadis, particularly abandoning the distinction between perception and
imaginary significations (I classify the latter as a subset of the former), the inextricable
relationship between the terms considered by Castoriadis still remains in my own analysis.
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communion, this is but another way of saying that the Father, Son, and Spirit do not act in
isolation from the other persons, even though the divine acts can be distinguished through
appropriation. Therefore, the immanent terms of the divine redemptive act considered
here neither give exhaustive understanding of divine agency, nor exhaustive
understanding of human consciousness, human history, or human society. Divine acts
will always, of course, include those special interventions that include the special grace
offered to the Church, which will always exceed those elements of common grace
available to all of humanity. Yet these acts lie outside of the scope of economic theory.
While they remain of vital importance to the Church, they are somewhat less helpful to
any theology of economics.
From a Theory of Providence to the Identification of Providential Acts
With the above modifications to Hector’s proposal, I have now identified three
created realities which can conform to the divine work of redemption in common grace or
which can impede the efficacy of that common grace in the market. Each of these
realities – the social imaginary, identity, and norms – constitute the immanent terms that
may be coincident with concurrent divine action and which can be appropriated to the
Father, Son, and Spirit respectively. Of course, it would be equally possible to speak of
these terms as aspects of human consciousness and subjectivity. This recognition would
require us to speak of God superveniently acting through three distinctive mental acts in
human minds by which human beings are guided in experience, knowledge, and action
by social imaginaries, identity, and norms respectively. While this psychological
dimension of the immanent terms should remain in the background of the reader’s mind
throughout the duration of the work, I have chosen instead to speak of norms, identity,
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and social imaginaries as quasi-autonomous realties through which God works because
these realities can each, at times, take on a form of agency for themselves by which they
operate on human subjects. A more important reason lies behind this choice: speaking of
the immanent terms of imaginaries, identity, and norms results in a form that is relevant
to recent analysis of economic models more easily than would speaking of three aspects
of human consciousness.
This chapter concludes the theoretical foundation for this project, and the next
will begin my concrete analysis of the market, with a special emphasis on the role of
economic models in constructing the market in a manner that either impedes communion
with God by drawing human action further away from concurrent divine action, or
facilitates it by allowing for full coincident action between God and human beings. The
following chapters will explore the sorts of transformation occurring within the market
that chapter 1 uncovered in the survey of existing approaches to theology and economics,
evaluating the claims of these approaches in terms of the three dimensions of such
transformation: orthodoxy, orthopraxis, and orthopathy. The second half of this work is
not merely an evaluation and application of existing findings. I will also contribute my
own analysis, while reinterpreting the work of the existing approaches using the language
of norms, identity, and social imaginaries that make up the immanent terms for this
Triune divine action. All of this will allow me to center the discussion on the notion of
trinitarian action within the market and on human resistance to this action.
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CHAPTER 4 – IMAGINARIES, MARKETS, AND THE FATHER WHO REVEALS
The economy is not a natural fact, a phenomenon that we find; rather it is a reality that we
make, and how we conceptualize the economy will greatly shape how we make it.
- Charles M.A. Clark1

In 1998, two economists conducted a study in ten day-care centers in Israel to
determine the effectiveness of the practice of fining parents who were late in picking up
their children. After spending a month establishing a baseline measure of how many
parents were late to pick up their child, six of ten day-care centers studied implemented a
small fine for parents who were more than ten minutes late. The remaining four centers
instituted no fines and served as a control group. In the month following the institution of
the fine, occurrences of late child pickups at centers with the new fines steadily increased
before settling at a new level roughly twice as high as the level prior to instituting the fine
and relative to the control group, in which instances of late pickups remained unchanged.
What is particularly fascinating about the study is that the six day-care centers that
implemented a fine removed it after twelve weeks with no noticeable reduction in late
parents. It seems that the behavior of the parents was permanently changed.
When planning the study, Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini assumed the standard
economic position that implementing the fine would deter late pickups due to increased
costs for arriving late. When their predictions failed, they had to develop a new
explanation for the results, namely, that “the introduction of the fine changes the
perception of people regarding the environment in with they operate.”2 The authors

1

Charles M.A. Clark, foreword to Luigino Bruni, The Wound and the Blessing:
Economics, Relationships, and Happiness, trans. N. Michael Brennen (Hyde Park, NY: New City
Press, 2012), xi.
2
Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, “A Fine is a Price,” Journal of Legal Studies 29.1 (Jan
2000), 3.
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assume an implicit contract between parents and the day-care center prior to the
announcement of specific fines such that parents fear the imposition of a significant fine
or perhaps more significant consequences, such as the elimination of the child from the
day-care system. Once a fine is introduced, the expected (or feared) cost for parents
decreased, causing the cost of late pickups to be less than the benefits. On this theory, late
parents operate according to the standard models of rationality in economic theory, which
Gneezy and Rustichini are able to map using game theory and a model describing
equilibrium within this game.3 While they consider the standard equilibrium model
tenable, the authors do note that “a completely different interpretation” is also possible,
one based on social factors. Prior to implementing the fine, parents perceived any teacher
who remained late with children after regular hours as a “nice and generous person” who
should not be taken advantage of by parents who were late. After implementing the fine,
parents understood teachers who remained late due to parental tardiness to be operating
within the same market structure where childcare can be bought at the given price as
much as desired. In other words, using the terminology developed in chapter 3,
implementation of a fine results in a shift in social imaginary from an imaginary centered
on moral duty to an imaginary focusing on exchange by price mechanism, what we could
call a market social imaginary. After this shift, the market social imaginary remains
dominant, even after the elimination of a fine. As the authors note, “Once a commodity,
always a commodity.”4

3
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Ibid., 11-13.
Ibid., 14.
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Economics as Poesis: Designing Markets
Gneezy and Rustichini’s experiment with day cares is one of numerous examples
where economists constructed a market. So far, I have used the term “market”
ambiguously. Let me now be more precise in its definition. A market is an enduring,
constructed, and imagined space within which an exchange of goods and services at
agreed upon prices occurs. A market is enduring because it allows for repeated
transactions between various parties who exchange goods or services for a price, usually
stated in terms of some currency. While a market typically requires a basis in tangible,
physical reality (i.e. tents and tables at a farmer’s market, or computer screens, a “pit,”
and telephone and internet lines for a financial market), a market is fundamentally an
imagined reality. In the transition from a moral social imaginary, where parental duty
required parents to make their best effort to pick up their children on time, to a market
social imaginary, where late pickup was acceptable pending an exchange of a set price,
there was no significant change in physical reality.5 What changed was the way that each
parent imagined his or her relationship with the day-care center, and how he or she acted
accordingly. I will return to this point in due course. Finally, a market is constructed.
Markets do not naturally exist, and economists, business owners, and politicians often
expend significant effort to develop a new market. In the instance above, Gneezy and
Rustichini merely had to institute a new policy at several day-care centers to construct a
market. Other constructed markets require much more effort.

5

Each day care posted a sign announcing the new policy on an already existing bulletin
board. Fines were assessed through the normal billing procedure for day care tuition. Thus, no
significant new physical changes were needed to institute a market.
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Consider, for example, the emerging branch of economics known as “market
design.” Market design “does not take markets as given,” but rather
combines insights from economic and game theory together with common sense
and lessons learned from empirical work and experimental analysis to aid in the
design and implementation of actual markets.6

Economists have become increasingly involved in market design, implementing new
markets in previously unimaginable parts of society. So, for example, economist Alvin
Roth played a central role in designing the New England Program for Kidney Exchange,
a market designed to facilitate the exchange of kidneys between potential donors and
recipients. The market arose because many family members are willing to donate kidneys
to a sick family member who needs a transplant, but often such family members are not a
match and are therefore unable to donate their kidney. Economists therefore built a
market that could match pairs of patients and their willing family donors such that the
donor from one family could provide a kidney to the patient in another, and visa versa.7
The matching mechanism for such donations drew on several existing algorithms and a
model for equilibrium in a certain type of game in the housing market to construct a
donor matching system and to facilitate the exchange of kidneys on a market in New
England.8 The kidney exchange is one example of economists intentionally designing a
market based on an existing economic model toward the resolution of a specific problem.
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There are numerous other examples of designed markets in economic literature.
Economist Julian Simon convinced the (now defunct) Civil Aeronautics Board in the
United States to remove random bumping of passengers from overbooked flights and to
institute an auction-based market for vouchers for future airline seats, thereby creating a
market to resolve overbooked airline flights.9 Economists were also behind the
development of the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) that helps match
medical students with hospital residency programs.10 Economic arguments were decisive
in eliminating a military draft in the United States and instituting a voluntary military
force. Economists argued that opportunity costs for a voluntary military force are always
less than those for a conscripted force. Volunteers only enlist when it is their best option
to maximize earnings and/or utility.11 A market for the armed services was constructed
largely as a result of such arguments. Economists have designed auctions to help Ocean
Spray sell cranberry concentrate,12 strawberry markets in France,13 the algorithms that lie
behind job matching programs offered through LinkedIn and AfterCollege, Inc.,14 and
markets for tradable fishing permits.15 In each instance, we see an economic model or a
principle derived from a model deployed for the purpose of constructing a market.
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Admittedly, each of the examples considered so far pertains to the construction of
smaller markets, a fact that could lead to the mistaken conclusion that only such smaller
markets are designed, while the Market as a whole, by which I mean the imagined,
global, enduring and constructed space within which all economic exchanges occur, is in
fact natural and not constructed. One who reached this conclusion would be greatly
mistaken. In fact, as long as markets have existed they have been constructed, and the
Market is simply the aggregate of these smaller constructions. From the days of Adam
Smith (and even earlier!), politicians created markets. For example, in the Methuen treaty
of 1703, the British convinced the Portuguese to accept textiles shipments in return for
permission to export port wine to England at a tariff level no higher than that set for
French wines. This agreement immediately resulted in a new market emerging for
international trade, but it also helped to increase British bullion holdings (Portuguese
demand for imported textiles was much higher than British demand for imported wine).16
Here one could object that this is not an example of market construction, but of
“deregulation.” In point of fact, however, this is more fittingly an example of market
design. As Marc Landy and Martin Levin point out, “Market design initiatives, successful
or not, embody rules and regulations that are often at least as numerous and complicated
as those they displace.” It is therefore more proper to speak of regulation shifting from
anti- to pro-competition regulations.17 Such macroeconomic market design occurred in
greater scale after the recent fall of the communist bloc. Countries of the former Soviet
bloc like Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania have markets that were
16
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constructed in part by historical circumstance and in part under the guidance of Western
think tanks, consultancies, and academic researchers.18 The complex political process of
privatization unfolded within emerging political institutions and a number of national and
international interests.19 In these and other instances, even global markets must be
considered a construction, the byproduct of intentional human agency.20
Not all markets are intentionally constructed. Often, economic actions take on a
particular, enduring pattern through the unintentional consequences of economic
modeling. Donald Mackenzie has developed what is perhaps the most thorough case
study of the performativity thesis, a thesis which strongly supports the notion of
unintentional construction of specific market forms through the application of economic
models. Mackenzie’s definition of performativity deserves comment before we discuss
his example. He develops several degrees of performativity, the highest of which he calls
18
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“Barnesian performativity,” which is when “economic processes or their outcomes are
altered so that they better correspond to the model.”21 The model is the decisive financial
technology in Mackenzie’s analysis:
While beliefs about markets are clearly important, an aspect of economics that is
incorporated only into beliefs ‘in the heads’ of economic actors may have a
precarious status. A form of incorporation that is in some sense deeper is
incorporation into algorithms, procedures, routines, and material devices. An
economic model that is incorporated into these can have effects even if those
who use them are skeptical of the model’s virtues, unaware of its details, or even
ignorant of its very existence.22

In his study of the development of finance theory from the 1960s until the late 1990s,
Mackenzie uncovered one very convincing example23 of Barnesian performativity:
options theory. Options are “contracts that give the purchaser the option, or right, to buy
or sell the underlying financial instrument at a specified price… within a specified period
of time.”24 Before the 1970s, options were hardly traded in the United States, but by
December 2005, there were outstanding derivatives contracts (options are a form of
derivative) worldwide equal to $46,000 per person on earth.25 Before 1970, Fischer Black
and Myron Scholes developed a model (eventually called the Black-Scholes-Merton
model, the BSM) to explain what the equilibrium price of a stock option would be. Initial
testing by Black and Scholes against an “ad hoc New York options market” actually
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“found only an approximate fit.”26 In 1972 currency futures began to be traded at the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), and shortly thereafter stock options began to be
traded by the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).27 When these markets opened,
options were initially 30-40% overvalued relative to the model.28 Despite this
discrepancy, and through a variety of factors, the model began to be widely used
throughout the CBOE and CME. Simplifying to a degree, whenever options prices
differed from the “correct” price according to the model, arbitragers bought and sold
options to make a profit until the price converged on the model. By June-August 1983,
options’ prices only departed from the BSM by an average of 0.32%.29 Many interviewed
traders held the belief that “Black-Scholes was really what enabled the exchange to
thrive.”30 However, in 1987 a financial crash led to a loss of faith in the BSM model,
which is now permanently a poor fit as a result of what is known as the “volatility
skew.”31 The BSM would no longer fulfill its performative function of coordinating
agents within a market to act in a particular manner.
This history demonstrates the pattern of Barnesian performativity through the
application of a model: initially the model does not accurately describe reality, but
through its application the model causes reality to become more like the model itself. It
also suggests that models can be deployed to the result of constructing markets that
perform in a particular manner in accordance with predicted actions. While many models
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will not obviously function in a performative manner at the level of Barnesian
performativity, there is reason to believe that all models have some degree of influence in
shaping a social imaginary that results in actions more in line with those predicted by
most economic models in general. This brings us to the question of the function of
economic models.
Intuitively, it would seem that a model is designed to describe reality in a manner
that allows for accurate economic predictions. In reality, most economic models cannot
be easily tested. Macroeconomic models cannot hold all variables but one constant to
determine outcomes in a controlled environment, and historical circumstances will
always differ between analyzed times and places.32 Those models that are tested against
economic data generally have not yielded significant predictive success. At most, we
might agree with Alexander Rosenberg that models tend to offer “generic predictions,”
which is to say “predictions of the existence of a phenomenon, process or entity, as
opposed to specific predictions about its detailed character.”33 This is true even in the
most significant and broad claims of neoclassical theory, such as the principle that
increases in price result in decreases in demand. In chapter 1 I argued that this principle is
not purely positive insofar as it contains within it certain normative judgments about how
32
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economic agents should act. As it turns out, even a principle as central to economic
theory as supply and demand can be questioned on purportedly positive grounds: data
analysis often challenges the assumption that demand and price are correlated. For
example, Houthakker and Taylor analyzed eighty-three categories of consumer
expenditures from 1929-1963 to derive demand equations to explain fluctuations. Only
forty-five of eighty-three best-fit equations even appealed to price changes to explain
behavior, and price “only border[ed] on significant in many of these.”34 In other words, in
most of these categories, price changes seemed to have no impact on demand, which was
apparently determined by other factors.35 Similarly, the law of supply, namely that
decreases in price result in decreases in supply of a good or service, is often equally open
to challenges from empirical data. For example, studies in labor economics have
repeatedly shown that real labor supply curves do not actually fit standard economic
theory in terms of the law of supply.36 Though one of the strongest conclusions of
modern economic theory, even the laws of supply and demand may not be as strong as
they seem.
For half a century, a number of highly debated laboratory experiments have also
questioned the extent of the validity of standard demand theory. Early experimental
economic tests by Edward Chamberlain found classroom markets did not converge on
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equilibrium.37 When Vernon Smith later ran classroom experiments on the law of supply
and demand, he found the opposite results of Chamberlain. Smith was able to trade
imaginary goods in a classroom to reach the equilibrium point predicted by economic
models. Significantly, he concluded that the double oral auction mechanism he
established in his classroom market experiments was able to reach partial equilibrium
(where demand meets supply) more easily than equilibrium was met in other market
constructions.38 In other words, the law of demand needed a certain market construction
to have a high probability of obtaining. It is no surprise, therefore, that alternative
experiments with alternative parameters have been able to challenge the law of demand.
The most interesting challenge is found in the concept of anchoring. Dan Ariely describes
this strange psychological phenomenon well. “Initial prices are largely ‘arbitrary’” and
are often anchored to numbers unrelated to preference or utility (in one experiment initial
valuations of goods are even swayed by having subjects recall the last two digits of their
social security numbers!). However, “once those prices are established in our minds, they
shape not only what we are willing to pay for an item, but also how much we are willing
to pay for related products.”39 Ariely and colleagues were able to use the phenomenon of
anchoring to manipulate subjects’ willingness to pay for a good, suggesting that, contrary
to mainstream theory, demand may not always (or even often) be a reflection of rational
preferences responding to price fluctuations.40 In any event, recent mathematical
challenges to equilibrium theory suggest that major proofs for general equilibrium
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(simultaneous equilibrium in the markets for all goods), which claim to rely on the laws
of supply and demand, in fact either depend on different variables or contradict such
laws. Even if the law of demand stands up to empirical enquiry, the complex models used
to design markets that clear or to create policies that seek a certain macroeconomic
equilibrium would therefore at times be shown to contradict empirical evidence.41
Why are basic economic models such as demand curves that only offer generic
predictions and that rely upon a questionable empirical basis still standard content in both
introductory economics textbooks and in countless complex academic papers on
economics? Perhaps it is because, as Katarina Juselius argues, most economists follow a
“theory-first” approach, where models are treated as “the best way to describe and
understand our complex empirical reality.”42 In this approach, a researcher begins with a
model and then uses empirical data to slightly modify the model and to allow for
increasing degrees of statistical variance without attending to the circumstances
surrounding the data collected. This is certainly how supply and demand curves
developed. Initially they provided a basic idea for expected trends, but specific values
were only added later.43 Juselius argues that such an approach leads to a “low ability” to
41
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reject a model by allowing for high variance and an inability to choose between
competing models on empirical grounds.44 Akerlof and Kranton are even more clear: A
theory’s variables can be calibrated to so many different values that there are “literally
millions of possible specifications,” a situation that is “a nightmare for the logicalpositivist economist” seeking empirical confirmation of an existing model.45 The theoryfirst approach also establishes a model on the basis of untested assumptions, forcing
econometrics to “play the subordinate role of ‘quantifying’ theoretically meaningful
parameters assumed to be empirically relevant on a priori grounds.”46 Models thus
become, as Mary Morgan notes, “objects to enquire with.”47 Models are applied to data
sets as the basis for attempting to understand that data. This explains why economists like
Mark Blaug can argue that “a cursory glance at some leading textbooks in economics
suffices to establish the point that the law of demand is asserted as law because of the
“what price would rule any market” but simply helped “in conjecturing the… general character of
the affect which changes… will produce.” F.Y. Edgeworth, “On the Application of Mathematics
to Political Economy,” in Papers Relating to Political Economy, vol. II. (London: MacMillan and
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assessment of evidence” (a point I have challenged above), while simultaneously noting
that “it is striking how many textbooks devote pages and pages to… the theory of
consumer behavior, while hardly mentioning… the vast literature on the empirical
measurement of demand.”48 In most textbooks, theory is treated as the basis for
interpreting data, rather than data as the basis for establishing theory. This is not just a
problem in textbooks. When econometricians Keuzenkamp and Magnus published an
article challenging economists to name papers whose econometric results significantly
changed established theory, they received only sparse examples.49
While the above examples should not be taken to indicate that economics is
purely a rhetorical affair, they should make economists hesitant to argue that economics
is a purely objective science. As I argued in chapter 1, there can be no strong fact/value
distinction in economic theory. Insofar as the model as object of enquiry also functions as
the basis for the construction of markets, there will always be a dialectical relationship
between the correction of models to better represent data, and the correction of markets
such that future data better corresponds to models, and this relationship will necessarily
allow assumed values to shape markets in particular ways.50 Therefore I am inclined to
agree with Michel Callon:

48

Blaug, Methodology, 146, 147.
Roger E. Backhouse, The Puzzle of Modern Economics: Science or Ideology?
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 177.
50
For example, “Just as economists as policy advisors have tried and sometimes
succeeded in shaping things economic, so sudden and unexpected changes in economic behaviour
and events have equally shaped and prompted changes in economics. Feedback loops go in both
directions. It is well understood, for example, that the policy failures of the Great Depression and
success of managing demand in World War II were the main factors creating the economic
consensus around Keynesian theories of demand management in the immediate post-war period.
But then, governments acting under the guidance of the same Keynesian economics – this time
embodied in models – were blamed for the ‘stagflation’ that beset economies in the 1970s.”
Morgan, World, 401-2.
49

177	
  
Market laws are neither in the nature of humans and societies – waiting for the
scientist, like a prince charming, to wake and reveal them – nor are they
constructions or artefacts invented by social sciences in an effort to improvise
simple frameworks explaining an opaque and complex reality. They account for
regularities progressively enforced by the joint movement of the economy and
economics... These regularities perform behaviours and therefore have the
obduracy of the real; yet in turn they are performed by these behaviours and
therefore have the contingency of an artefact.51

I have just argued that many basic models and theorems in economics are not
strongly supported by empirical evidence, but does that not entail that the same models
are not particularly effective when deployed intentionally toward the end of market
construction, or when unintentionally constructive through Barnesian performativity?
The answer to this question is quite complicated. On the one hand, it must be admitted
that examples of strong Barnesian performativity are significantly less numerous than
examples of models showing no such performativity. It is also quite obvious that certain
economic models simply fail to depict the business world accurately. For example, an
economic model by Lucas and Rapping argues that workers choose layoffs over pay cuts,
which is why wages do not decrease in a time of recession. In point of fact, research
shows that employees facing a layoff are almost never given a choice between pay cuts
and layoffs.52 The model is simply wrong, as are any number of other models developed
by economists. The idea of performativity or of the construction of markets should not be
taken to mean that economists are omnipotent in constructing markets that perform
perfectly according to design.
Having granted these limitations to performativity, however, it is important that
too much is not taken away from my basic thesis. As Vernon Smith’s classroom
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experiments on demand show, markets can be constructed in a particular fashion to
ensure that certain models do come to more accurately reflect what happens in the real
world. Smith used a different market setup than Chamberlain, and he obtained different
data as a result. The possibility of designing the parameters of the object of study is
fundamental to the nature of the social sciences. As Ross Miller notes, “Physical
scientists must be content with discovering the rules that nature presents to them; social
scientists have the ability to make their own rules.”53 The fact that such rules are made,
and that, when made, these rules affect the outcome of market interactions necessitates a
rejection of a strong version of the positive/normative distinction, as I argued in chapter
1. The point is made more clearly in the work of Ian Hacking in a way that reveals what
is more deeply at stake here. The problem is not only that the rules of a market can be
designed by economists. It is even deeper. So Hacking notes that social sciences like
economics can create “conscious interactions” between subjects and theories. Economic
agents are conscious, and quarks are not. So when an economist describes the market,
this description is such that economic agents “can become aware of how they are
classified and modify their behavior accordingly.”54 When constructing markets, an
economist also contributes to the construction of a particular awareness by agents
operative within the market. What is at stake here is not simply a set of laws or
institutions, but more fundamentally the possibility of orthopathy. What sorts of social
imaginaries do typical economic models help to disseminate? And what peculiarities of
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economic models make such economic influence on a social imaginary possible? I will
answer these questions in reverse order.
Economic Models as Constructive Language
When economists first deployed mathematics in economics, they anticipated
sharp resistance.55 Indeed, a century after mathematics made substantial inroads into
economic methodology, J. M. Keynes still had significant reservations about the use of
mathematics in economics,56 reservations shared by key figures in the Austrian school.57
Nevertheless, use of mathematics in economics eventually became the dominant practice
in large part through the recognition by a number of significant economists like Stanley
Jevons, Alfred Marshall (to a lesser extent), and Paul Samuelson that math functioned as
a language, and that it could therefore be used to effectively describe the economy.58
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Indeed, Robert Litan is correct to claim that mathematics has become the “lingua franca
of academic economics.”59
The fact that mathematics is a language explains in part why mathematical models
can shape a social imaginary.60 Castoriadis recognized that the symbolic content of a
social imaginary was contained in both language and institutions,61 and so it is only
reasonable to expect that mathematical language will transmit some symbolic elements
and thereby shape a social imaginary. The social imaginary may then, in turn, influence
people to imagine the world in such a way that their actions more strongly align with the
predictions of economic theory. Fabrizio, Pfeffer, and Sutton put the matter nicely:
[Economic] theories can become self-fulfilling because they provide a language
for comprehending the world. Language affects what people see, how they see it,
and the social categories and descriptors they use to interpret their reality. It
shapes what people notice and ignore and what they believe is and is not
important.62

While the linguistic nature of mathematics may suggest that economic models can
shape a social imaginary, the nature of the object of most economic study provides even
more compelling reasons to expect such influence. Earlier I argued that a market is an
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enduring, constructed, and imagined space, but I have been somewhat equivocal to this
point in my argument insofar as markets are constructed in two senses. First, markets are
institutions guided by specific sets of policies and regulations, and economists frequently
design these institutions and policies. The market is constructed as these institutions and
policies are enacted. Second, and more significant for the question at hand, is the fact that
the markets that are constructed by an institution like the Federal Reserve Bank (as
guided by certain policies and regulations put forward by economists), just to cite note
one regulator, are themselves socially constructed along with the very regulators and
institutions themselves. By this I mean that an economic entity like the Fed regulates
money, but money only functions as money insofar as it is a collective representation
dependent upon the human imagination to function. Money, like countless other objects
of economic study, is, in the words of Philip Goodchild, merely “an expression of a
vision and awareness.”63
The concept of social constructionism is all too often used with a degree of
imprecision, so it is necessary to pause for a moment to consider what I mean by the term
in this context. My account here will largely follow that of John Searle, who prefers to
speak of “social facts,” a term applicable to any collective intentionality, and
“institutional facts,” or facts that depend upon a particular institution.64 For social facts,
the “attitude that we take toward the phenomenon is constitutive of the phenomenon.”65
As soon as we stop treating money as legal tender, that money ceases to exist as money
and is reduced to a curious piece of metal or paper. That this is the case leads Searle to
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conclude that institutional facts like money (and the same could be said of a large number
of other economic realities, including markets, stocks, patents, or property) are dependent
on the human institution of language.66 “Mental representations” are “partly constitutive”
of the institutional fact; we have to collectively recognize a piece of paper as money for it
to be so. Moreover, “the representations in question” are “language dependent.”67 Searle
reaches this conclusion based in part on his understanding of the form an institutional fact
takes: X counts as Y in C. So a piece of paper (X) counts as money (Y) in the context of a
financial transaction in a nation-state where the specific money is recognized as legal
tender (C). To assign a new Y role to an X term “is precisely to assign it a symbolizing or
linguistic status.”68 Only when a physical object receives such symbolic and linguistic
significance, being represented in a way that can be “publicly understood,” can it
function as an institutional fact.69 Interestingly, Searle notes that performative speech acts
are often, though not always, responsible for the creation of an institutional fact. One can
simply state “this meeting is adjourned” for that institutional fact to obtain.70 Perhaps this
connection between institutional facts and performative utterances helps explain the
notion of economic performativity discussed above. While models seek to describe
institutional facts, they are equally capable of creating new institutional facts by creating
new public understanding.
Recognizing that the objects of economic theory are institutional facts helps to
explain how economic models shape the social imaginary. Models attempt to describe
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institutional facts but in this act of description they also perpetuate a particular linguistic
or symbolic understanding constitutive of these facts. When models are used to construct
a market there can be a direct influence from the models to a social imaginary insofar as
the institutional facts constitutive of the market become recognized by the general public,
the members of which must then continuously complete shared acts of languagedependent recognition for the institutional facts to indeed be factual. In other words, the
very existence of the market depends upon a sustained and shared social imaginary
within which the particular institutional facts constitutive of the market are intelligible or
else these institutional facts themselves will cease to obtain and the market itself will
disappear. This is the strongest and most obvious connection between models and social
imaginaries, though the influence of an education in economics, of economic literature,
and of the interaction between economists and non-economists may also allow some
connection between models and the social imaginary. Searle helps us see clearly that
models are language about institutional facts, and so they must doubly convey imaginary
symbols: first, through the mathematical language that is the model, and second, through
the linguistic collective understanding that constitutes the institutional facts constructed
and regulated through the application of economic models.71
The conclusions that Searle reaches are in certain respects found in economic
literature as well, though in less philosophical form. Economists, psychologists, and
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sociologists have explicitly addressed the question of whether or not economic theory can
contribute to a shift in what I have called a social imaginary. Perhaps the most well
known example is a study by Ruth Ames and Gerald Marwell, who conducted eleven
experiments to test what is known in economic theory as the “free rider” problem.72
According to conventional theory, a public good is something that can be used by
numerous people simultaneously, but in a context where it is difficult to exclude anyone
from benefitting from this good. Persons who choose to benefit from these goods without
contributing toward their costs are called “free riders.”73 Marwell and Ames’s
experiments revealed that the free rider problem was generally much smaller than
anticipated, with one notable exception. An experiment conducted among economics
graduate students manifested the free rider problem much more significantly than any
other experiment. Furthermore, surveys conducted after the experiments found that the
economics students were “half as likely as other subjects to indicate that they were
‘concerned with fairness’ in their decisions during the experiment.74 Ames and Marwell
reached two widely discussed and debated conclusions about this anomaly: first,
economists tended to think differently than other subject groups, and second, this
measurable difference is either learned by students of economics or demonstrable of a
tendency among more selfish (perhaps economically “rational”?) individuals to select
economics as a major.
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Evidence is mixed as to the validity of Marwell and Ames’s conclusions. In a
noteworthy experiment, Carter and Irons performed tests using an ultimatum bargaining
experiment.75 In this standard economic experiment, one subject receives $10 that must
then be split with a fellow participant. The subject can offer any fraction of the $10 to her
partner, but if the partner turns down the offer, neither individual keeps any money.
According to standard game theory, the subject should offer a minimal amount to her
partner, which the partner should accept because any amount is better than no reward.
Carter and Irons found that economics students did act differently, offering less money
and also accepting less than peers majoring in a different discipline. Economists did think
differently. However, Carter and Irons detect no difference between first year economics
students and upperclassmen, and therefore concluded that differences in mindset are not
learned. On the other hand, Frank, Gilovich, and Regan performed a number of
experiments to reach the opposite conclusion of Carter and Irons.76 One test performed at
the beginning and end of a semester addressed whether or not students would perform
“dishonest” actions for a higher payout if there was no risk of repercussion. This test
showed that students at the end of a semester of economics training tended to be more
dishonest than those without economics instruction during the semester, especially in
courses with a high emphasis on game theory and utility-maximizing rationality. In
another study, Frank, Gilovich, and Regan found that economics students tended to fail
the prisoner’s dilemma (a form of game requiring cooperation for success) as predicted
by economic theory. Furthermore, they failed more often than non-economics students. In
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a sample of students from a variety of majors and years of study, successful completion
of the game through cooperation increased as students neared graduation, with one
exception: “this trend is conspicuously absent for economics majors.”77 It seems that the
formal study of economics may indeed influence behavior by changing the way that
subjects experience the world.
I am not only arguing that formal education in economics changes one’s social
imaginary. The study of models can shape an imaginary, but so too can participation in
institutions shaped by such models and intentionally constructed to influence human
behavior in a particular manner. These institutions retain a residual symbolic significance
derived from and perpetuated by the model, but a human subject can begin to inhabit a
different imaginary without needing to be aware of the models contributing either directly
or indirectly to a given imaginary. Institutions can therefore create practices that function
as “liturgies,” to use the terminology of James K. A. Smith.78 They can form human
desires and consciousness toward a particular imaginary through repeated actions. While
the dominant focus of this work is on how social imaginaries make certain actions
possible, this reverse influence cannot be forgotten: certain habitual actions can form an
imaginary. However, any routine practices resulting in formation are dependent upon a
prior formation by an imaginary that makes these routines intelligible and therefore
possible in the first place. It is this prior formation that is the focus of this chapter. The
very recognition of a market as a market will shape the imaginary of any market
participant.
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If you read economic literature closely, you will find economists admitting to
shifts in perception as a result of economic changes, though often such admissions are
brief and their significance is not considered. Returning to the example of the fines for
late parents at a child-care center introduced at the beginning of the chapter, we see
economists admitting that a shift in the perspective of parents who began to think of
picking up their children late in terms of a market transaction with a fixed price creates
different behaviors. Similarly, I noted above that economists were influential in the
creation of a volunteer military. Analyzing this history, economists Asch, Miller, and
Warner admit that the transition from a conscription to a volunteer army is in part
accompanied by a shift from a patriotic sense of obligation and a concern for moral
rightness to a more economic cost/benefit mindset.79 Similarly, economist John
MacMillan explores how different understandings of the labor market between Silicon
Valley in California and Route 128 in Boston allowed Silicon Valley to be more effective
in software design. No compete contracts were strongly enforced in Boston, but not in
Silicon Valley. As a result a “culture of sharing” and “job hopping” emerged in Silicon
Valley, where software engineers would openly share ideas from their firm with
competing firms collaboratively, partly because if they had a good reputation they might
get a better job at the competitor’s firm, partly because they may have once worked with
engineers in the competing firm. “The spreading of ideas through job-hopping is not in
the interest of the firm that does the innovating, for it dilutes the firm’s returns. But the
industry as a whole advances, on the strength of every firm’s ideas.”80 Here economic
success is attributable to a different imaginary that eschews competition between
79
80
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technology firms and encourages collaboration. Such examples in economic literature are
surprisingly common, but they remain peripheral to economic theory. We must therefore
now consider their often-ignored theological significance.
The Construction of Markets and the Creation that Reveals the Father
Mathematical economic models are a form of performative language capable of
conveying symbolic meanings that modify a social imaginary, especially when models
are deployed toward the end of constructing markets. The constructed and therefore
contingent nature of markets alone should give economists a reason to grant theologians
and ethicists a voice in economic affairs. Consider a recent constructed market for dating:
whatsyourprice.com, a website allowing men to bid for dates with women. If the offered
price is agreeable, both parties meet for a date that begins with a transfer of money from
the man (cheekily called the “generous” one) to his date (the “beautiful” one).81 Surely,
there is room here for theologians to question whether the construction of such a market
is moral and to explore how such a market may inform a particular imaginary by shifting
the symbolic significance of dating relationships embedded in the particular institution of
this market.82 While this example illustrates the point in the extreme, given that all
markets are contingent constructions and that each construction contributes to the
formation of a particular imaginary there is reason to believe theology can contribute to
analysis of markets that less obviously violate moral standards insofar as such markets
are also constructed and also perpetuate a certain form of social imaginary. The fact that
markets by virtue of their constructed nature sustain a certain imaginary explains why
81
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economics has what Robert Nelson would call an “economic theology,”83 or what John
Milbank would call “theodicy” and an ideology that results in “redefinition of Christian
virtue.”84 In their basic contours, both Radical Orthodoxy and the economics as religion
approach are correct that economics exceeds mere description and has an inescapable
theological dimension.
The constructed and imaginary nature of markets also provides guidance to
theologians concerning what sort of voice theology should have when addressing
economic questions. The various possible constructions of markets that exist both in
theory and in the real world resist easy blanket rejections or endorsements by theologians.
There is certainly a shortcoming here in much of theological discourse on economics,
given that many authors tend to debate the merits of “capitalism.” In point of fact,
capitalism simply refers to any economic system where factors of production are owned
predominantly by the private sector and exchanged primarily in some market context.85
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Rejections of capitalism tend to ignore the wide range of theoretical models and market
constructions that can be deployed within such a system and the range of social
imaginaries that can make sense of such exchanges. Here Daniel Bell serves as a fitting
dialogue partner, precisely because he is one of the most able theologians challenging
capitalism today. While Bell is someone who raises excellent criticisms, he does so
against a target that should be defined with more specificity. As noted in chapter 1, Bell
persuasively argues that the economy can shape desires, and he rightly identifies a form
of market economy dependent upon the homo economicus that does not understand basic
categories such as freedom, rationality, justice, and desire in a theologically acceptable
manner. However, Bell treats such a problematic view as endemic of “capitalism” in
general. Closer analysis of footnotes in relevant chapters reveals that Bells’ primary
dialogue partners, such as Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, and Michael Novak, are all
advocates of particular varieties of capitalist theory. In point of fact, what Bell has refuted
is not capitalism per se, but rather several specific forms of capitalism: Austrian or
Chicago school influenced models and market constructions guided by a particular public
policy platform.86 While Bell does at times offer greater specificity, condemning, for
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example, the “the neoliberal economic vision,” as a whole his work speaks of “capitalist
theology.”87 Given the wide range of possible market constructions and associated
imaginaries, it does not obviously follow from an accurate condemnation of the homo
economicus as advocated by the Chicago and Austrian schools that there is no
theologically acceptable form of capitalism. There may indeed be an acceptable form of
market where factors of production are privately held and traded through a market
structure. In fact, several of the perspectives explored in chapter 1, such as economic
personalism and the redistributionist approach, reject the homo economicus for similar
reasons as Bell,88 while affirming the basic capitalist emphases on market interactions
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and privately held factors of production.89 For example, while Edward O’Boyle’s
definition of capitalism is much more thorough than the one I have presented (it includes
twelve elements),90 he ultimately affirms that “the very real interaction between buyers
and sellers… is the formal cause of economic change,” but contrasts such an
understanding with “the impersonal operation of product markets” that is “the formal
cause of economic change according to mainstream economics.”91 In the end, market
structures are not what O’Boyle is challenging as much as a particular imaginary often
associated with markets that views them as impersonal and natural. In fact, while
personalist economics and the redistributionist approach often claim to be a “third way”
between capitalism and communism, they are technically speaking a deviant form of
capitalism seeking to modify the purpose of markets and to reconstruct markets
accordingly.
89

Gold argues that the Focolare movement’s Economy of Communion serves to
“highlight the existence of different perspectives on economic life within the global market and
reflect specific values and behaviors.” The need for a free market itself is largely unchallenged.
Gold, Horizons, 29. Médaille believes that real capitalism ended in 1929, but his defense of
distributism calls for a reduction in governmental policies that intervene in the market to privilege
a powerful few and for a re-localization of the market, not for centralized control. Factors of
production would remain in the hands of the private sector, where “workers own the capital they
create.” Thus, while he does not consider his system capitalism, it fits a technical definition.
Médaille, Truly Free Market, 135-6, 235-253. Bayer endorses a “share economy” but insists that
this economy is a “compelling nonstatist solution” where factors of production remain in the
private sector. Bayer claims to move beyond a “market system” but in fact describes the
construction of an alterative market with different profit sharing mechanisms, a rejection of a
“wage system” for a “share system.” However, there is no talk of labor, goods, or capital being
allocated through any system other than a market. The market is just guided by a different set of
rules and objectives. Bayer, Capitalism, 148-154, 167.
90
O’Boyle identifies capitalism as a system built around private property, private control
and decision making, markets, competition, freedom, consumer sovereignty, meritocracy,
allocation by price, creative destruction, private creation of credit, and the risk of unmet need, and
that the system faces the dilemma of instability due to inability to allocate resources to meet all
needs. O’Boyle, Personalist Economics, 66. Note the emphasis on private property and market
allocation. At other points, O’Boyle refers more precisely to “mainstream economics,”
“conventional economics,” or “contemporary mainstream economics.” For example, Ibid., 78-79.
It seems that the main conflict is with a particular variety of economic theory.
91
Ibid., 78-9.

193	
  
The legitimizing approach fares much less favorably than Bell in light of the fact
that markets are constructed, a reality many theologians in this approach miss.92 Even
those who do tend to see the market as constructed fail to acknowledge the full diversity
of possible constructions. Jay Richards rightly critiques Hayek’s claim that a market
emerges spontaneously93 and even endorses a theology comparable to the one developed
in chapter 2: “Christians should see [the market order] as God’s way of providentially
governing the actions of billions of free agents in a fallen world.”94 While it must be
granted that God providentially works through the market (just as God worked through
the Feudal system, mercantilism, and communism, for God works through all things –
Rom. 8:28), we must ask which market construction is most open to cooperation with the
divine plan of God, a question Richards largely neglects. Here his specific analysis
contrasts capitalism and communism rather than possible market constructions,
exploring, for example, how free markets allow for win-win exchanges while forced
markets in the Soviet Union result in poor quality commodities and services.95 Richards
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thus ignores the well known economic literature on how various market constructions
can, indeed, create losers in a free market.96 More importantly, Richards, like many in the
legitimizing approach, ignores any role that the market may have in the formation of an
economic agent. As noted in chapter 1, the legitimizing approach is at its strongest when
it considers various possible constructions of the market in a capitalist system and
discerns which constructions are legitimate. In other words, even if capitalism as an
economic system is demonstrably superior to other alternatives (on either theological or
economic grounds), questions still remain concerning what models should be used to
construct particular markets and how the resulting markets may shape underlying social
imaginaries. Asserting the validity of capitalism does next to nothing to establish how
markets should function and how markets shape human beings. It does not answer the
question, to cite Bell approvingly here, of what sort of work markets do.97 Even the more
discerning of theologians addressing the legitimacy of particular economic constructions,
like Daniel Finn, tend to underemphasize these questions.98
If endorsing or rejecting an entire economic system without addressing various
possible market constructions is an inadequate theological approach, so too is any
approach that assumes the objective fixity of markets and that is concerned primarily
with how theology can help improve predictive accuracy of economic models through a
more accurate representation of human beings as created in the image of God. Economic
96
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personalism often falls into this pattern of thought.99 Prediction cannot validate a
particular theologically informed set of economic models precisely because the object of
study is not autonomous from the models being assessed through empirical analysis. Nor
is it adequate to grant economic thought such independence that it can be taken as the
basis for theological analysis of human economic actions, a position thoroughly
articulated by Clodovis Boff and broadly influential among liberation theologians. Boff
argues, “any theological reading of any socio-historical phenomenon whatsoever will
include or imply a conscious or unconscious theory.”100 Boff rightly notes that “facts” are
constructed, much to the extent and in the fashion I have argued above with respect to
economic facts in the market, and he therefore rejects a dichotomy between theory and
praxis.101 To use the terminology discussed above, we might call these facts social facts.
However, he wrongly concludes that theology’s task is to “deliver religious
significations” and that such significations “can arise only from a point of departure in
the real as really known.”102 Boff concludes that social sciences therefore are related to
theology by a “relationship of constitution,” whereby the social sciences will “share in a
vital way” in the theology of which they are a part. “The political will be knowable by the
theologian only through the approach of the sciences of the social.”103 Such socioanalytic mediation is untenable when considered in terms of social imaginaries, wherein
concrete practices and theories are themselves the repositories of the symbolic such that
the “real” uncovered by the social sciences (a real consisting of social facts) is already
99
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and inevitably embedded in significations that are, according to Boff’s understanding of
theology, properly the object of theological scrutiny. As Castoriadis writes, a social
imaginary “is the unceasing and essentially undetermined (social-historical and
psychical) creation of figures/forms/images, on the basis of which alone there can ever be
a question of ‘something.’ What we call ‘reality’ and ‘rationality’ are its works.”104 There
is no reality accessible to us that is prior to or apart from the significations and images
that allow us to pursue the real. Therefore, theology is not related to the social sciences in
general or to economics in particular in a relationship of constitution, nor is the
relationship between the two disciplines best depicted in terms of a relationship of
dependence on the mediation of facts through social theory.105 Rather, theology must
approach economics (like any social science) as a repository of theological significance
capable of forming orthopathic or heteropathic imaginaries within the minds of particular
human subjects.
What then are the salient features of theological engagement with possible
economic social imaginaries? The efforts of personalists and the redistributionist
approach reveal the first step in a transformation of economic models toward orthopathy:
a redirection of the telos of much economic modeling. If the economy is constructed and
if it carries with it a particular contingent imaginary, it should not be taken as natural but
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must rather be recognized as problematizable.106 Bell is right to recognize that the
dominant economic schools of thought are theologically heterodox, directed toward an
improper telos. However, he is wrong to reject “capitalism” in toto precisely because
privately held factors of production can more easily be directed toward a new telos
without resorting to the use of statecraft or the superagency of the state to reach this
goal.107 Rather, individual firms and consumers can re-orient their actions toward a new
end in a way that shapes the significations associated with institutional facts, thereby
shifting a social imaginary.108 To give a rather simplistic example, money may be
understood not only as store of value and medium of exchange, but as a basis for helping
those in need. Such a shift may admittedly require certain regulatory and policy changes
such that markets can be constructed in alternate ways toward alternate ends, but there
need be no centralized control of these markets, and participation in markets directed
toward a moral end can be optional. While skeptics are sure to suggest that a firm not
seeking profit maximization is doomed to failure, successful ventures like the Mondragon
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corporation or the Economy of Communion, discussed in chapter 1, show that this need
not be the case, and further case studies will follow in chapter 5.109 Redirecting the telos
of markets is an important first step toward orthopathy that avoids the need to reject
capitalism as an economic system, but on its own it is quite inadequate in that it ignores
the formative nature of markets. Additional efforts must be made to shape economic
agents into the types of individuals who can successfully pursue an alternate telos.
The linguistic nature of economic models leads us to a second important role for
theology in the development of models. Models impact a social imaginary partially by
inscribing particular symbolic resonances in the very mathematical language used to
develop models, so part of the task of ensuring orthopathy is discerning whether the
mathematical language used is capable of speaking about theologically pertinent matters.
Theology can assess mathematical language in two respects. First, theologians can
challenge the variables deployed in models if they do not adequately address all pertinent
realities that should be considered. The introduction of new variables allows markets to
be evaluated and constructed in entirely new ways. New variables for use in
mathematical analysis are equivalent to new words introduced into a vocabulary.110
Economists have already successfully introduced various concepts like the gini
coefficient, which measures inequality, and the concept of gross national happiness.
These concepts allow economists to analyze and construct markets from a new reference
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point, and theologians could identify other theologically significant concepts that
economists could translate into their vernacular language.111 New variables and newly
constructed markets will undoubtedly contribute to different formations of the social
imaginary. Second, theologians can raise questions that the mathematical language used
in modeling is not currently exploring. John D. Mueller is an excellent example of a
theologically informed economist exploring new questions through mathematical models.
Arguing that the scholastic theologians who explored economics addressed the four
major concerns of utility, production, equilibrium, and final distribution, Mueller notes
that most contemporary economic models neglect final distribution as a concern.112
Posing the question of final distribution, Mueller is able to develop new mathematical
models that better address issues like homicide, spending, and parenting.113 One of the
main questions that most economists either neglect or relegate to the margins is the
question of how economic interactions can shape an economic agent in morally
significant ways. Theology must consistently pose this question to economics while
striving to expose how assumptions within models may result in maladaptive formations
as a central concern when pursuing orthopathy.
Many theologians have explored this formative capability intrinsic in the market,
and their conclusions were briefly addressed in chapter 1. For present purposes, it will
suffice to highlight several potentially problematic formations of a social imaginary
brought about by the market that may hinder our ability to have communion with God.
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This is the third and most important role that theology can fulfill in terms of orthopathy,
and it is perhaps best embodied by the sort of work being done by theologians in the reimagining approach, though I will highlight elements not discussed in the examples of
this approach explored in chapter 1. The two main problems that theologians must
challenge are, first, the de-personalizing nature of economic models, and, second, the
naturalizing or objectifying nature of economic models. The de-personalizing nature of
economic models is to a certain extent unavoidable whenever models are used insofar as
the variables used within models are intended to generalize humans into particular
common groups (laborers, investors, consumers, the unemployed, and so forth), while
humans as persons are unique and unrepeatable.114 Proper orthopathy must recognize the
unique identity, struggles, and experiences of each person insofar as each person uniquely
bears the image of God. Here the spirituality of liberation theology is helpful in pointing
to our need to listen to and learn from the unique experiences of the poor rather than
reducing them to a statistical label, even if reducing such experiences to a socially
constructed class called “the poor” still undermines such uniqueness to a degree.115
Reducing a human being to a common attribute represented by a variable is a necessary
practice in any mathematical economics, but it also bears the risk of depersonalizing the
human beings described by such practices if that mathematical system dominates a social
114
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imaginary so that persons are primarily understood in terms of that common attribute.
Therefore, theology must always clearly strive to re-personalize a social imaginary
through proclamation of the gospel. This task is given to the bearers of special grace who
make up the Church and who bear witness to the world, and so this role will not be a
major focus of this work on common grace.116
The naturalizing tendency in certain modern social imaginaries sees the economy
as a naturally emerging reality operating according to necessary principles that are central
to any understanding of what society actually is in itself.117 As a natural description of
human society, the notion of an economy can flatten the created order so that it is no
longer oriented toward redemption or the transcendent work of God, instead throwing off
the idea of a telos and seeing in the economy itself an order which is, in the words of
Charles Taylor, “a sphere of co-existence which could in principle suffice to itself.”118 On
this understanding the economy is not the aggregate of interactions between human
beings created in the image of God. If humanity is interpreted in terms of the image of
God, then understanding what the economy is will require attention to the transcendent
Being whose image humanity bears. For an economy to obtain its goal, human beings
would need to fully manifest that image in their economic interactions, and this may
indeed require a transformation seen as completing, perfecting, even surpassing the
natural.119 On the other hand, if the economy is viewed as an entirely natural realm, it
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becomes all too easy to justify capitalism as the naturally occurring spontaneous space
that is least damaged by sin due to the fact that natural order emerges as a result of these
very sinful actions. Sin becomes determinative rather than the transcendental object of
the economy as one manifestation of the order of creation.120 Sin cannot serve as the
justification of capitalism without jeopardizing orthopathy, because making sin
determinative of reality rather than parasitic upon it undermines the primacy of the
goodness of creation as discussed in Genesis 1 before the emergence of sin in Genesis 3.
Instead, capitalism must be viewed as a constructed and therefore contingent reality that,
due to its contingency and malleability, can be oriented toward various possible goals,
including the transcendent goal of communion with God. It is far better, therefore, to
partially justify certain manifestations of capitalism – for no historical economic system
is exclusively and clearly the Christian option – as the system which best allows
individual agents to concurrently act with God apart from external coercion by the state
in a manner that, through common grace, participates in and is oriented toward the divine
work of redeeming the Church.121 Agents in the economy will not and cannot fully
understand the redemptively significant formation that an economy saturated by grace
brings to pass until such a time as special grace opens their eyes to God’s work, but this
does not mean that a capitalism open to working toward the production of virtue cannot
they must at least do no harm and, at best, they should be ordered by a theological rationality –
implicit or explicit.” Long and Fox, Calculated, 127.
120
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produce a social imaginary that better prepares one to see special grace, as one who has
eyes to see and ears to hear as gifts of the Lord (Prov. 20:12). Nor does it mean that a
market ignoring such a possibility and treating sin as determinative and markets as
natural and free from moral responsibility122 cannot produce an imaginary that results in
people who having eyes do not see, and having ears do not hear (Mark 8:18).
Despite the need to connect a social imaginary with God’s gracious work in
history, few theological accounts adequately recognize that any positive formation
toward orthopathy through the market must be attributed to the work of God. This
recognition is a necessary component of any orthopathic understanding of the economy
insofar as (a) all human actions, including those that construct a market, are radically
dependent upon concurrent divine action, and (b) any human action that seemingly
contributes to an increased capability for communion with God must in point of fact be
understood as properly and primarily a work of God’s grace and only secondarily a
concurrent human work that is radically dependent upon this grace. Sola gratia must here
be preserved. Moreover, insofar as God is triune, any divine act ad extra, including any
supervenient divine action in the market contributing to orthopathy, can be properly
appropriated to one divine person. When analyzing a social imaginary, we must speak of
economic models and particular formations of the market as either participating in or
obscuring the Father’s general self-revelation. A social imaginary serves as the created
term for the possible reception of special revelation by providing an experiential basis
within which that revelation and a response in faith are both intelligible. A social
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imaginary is thus the immanent term through which one dimension of redemptivelysignificant transformation is brought to pass: orthopathy.
If the construction of a particular social imaginary through markets can be seen as
part of the divine work of general revelation, this act must be appropriated to the Father.
This is the case for three reasons. First, on exegetical grounds we see a scriptural basis for
the appropriation insofar as the Old and New Testaments speak repeatedly of God
revealing himself through creation (i.e. Ps. 19:1-2, Acts 14:17, Rom. 1:19-20).123
Second, from a philosophical standpoint, insofar as the social imaginary that is here
understood as general revelation is the fount from which various identities and
trajectories of action may arise, it properly corresponds to the eternal hypostatic property
of the Father as fons divinatis. Third, taking a page from Barth, we can assert that there is
one Revealer, the Father, and one Revelation, the Son. Therefore, any talk of general
revelation occurring through the market must be rooted in the Father as Revealer insofar
as all general revelation is preparatory of and oriented toward the Revelation, the One in
whom God is made known (John 1:18, 14:9).
Much as was the case in chapter 2’s discussion of common and special grace,
general and special revelation must not be seen as a contrastive dichotomy between
noetic and salvific knowledge.124 Rather, general revelation must be seen as preparatory
for special revelation such that the divine work of creation (again properly appropriated
to the Father)125 is oriented toward the divine work of redemption accomplished through
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the Son.126 Clarity on this point is decisive: with Barth I affirm that there must be a
readiness of humanity toward the revelation of God, and that only in the man Jesus Christ
does this readiness perfectly result in such knowledge, so that our knowledge is
dependent upon our receiving this readiness by grace while yet unready.127 The fullness
of general revelation is only available through Christ because Christ is the culmination of
creation. Yet, Barth goes too far in rejecting general revelation as a viable theological
category, particularly as evident in his debate with Emil Brunner. Brunner recognized, as
did Barth, that “only the Christian, i.e. the man [sic] who stands within the revelation in
Christ, has the true natural knowledge of God.”128 When Barth challenges Brunner to
affirm natural revelation and sola gratia simultaneously he does well,129 but he is
mistaken in excluding grace from creation. Grace is operative in creation, and so
revelation (a particular manifestation of grace oriented toward knowledge of God) must
be present in creation in a general manner. As with grace, all revelation is ordered toward
communion with God, though general revelation, like common grace, only serves this
end in a preparatory manner.
Surely an economist reading this could (understandably) be puzzled at the shift
this chapter has taken. Even granting a rejection of a sharp positive/normative distinction,
it may not obviously follow that we can therefore introduce theological talk about the
126
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Father’s work in the economy as acceptable when discussing economic models.
However, returning again to the fact that the objects of economic models are institutional
facts, it becomes clear that the shape these objects take is not in the least an empirical
matter. Consider again the example of money: “When the Treasury says it is legal tender,
they are declaring it to be legal tender, not announcing an empirical fact that it is already
legal tender,” notes Searle.130 We cannot disallow any specific variety of description on
empirical grounds precisely because our very descriptions of institutional facts are
constructive of these facts.131 Furthermore, insofar as models provide us with idealized
representations that an economy strives toward through successive efforts at construction,
these models always remain out of reach, establishing a set of possible trajectories
according to the possibilities latent in the symbolic/linguistic nature of the model. The
question of which sets of trajectories are permissible is again not empirically
determinable.132 To put things another way, we can say that a social imaginary is “both
factual and normative.”133 There simply is no logical reason why theological language
should be excluded in this context, and orthopathy in fact depends upon a particular
articulation of God’s role in the economy.
It is precisely the fact that all the divine works are oriented toward communion
with God that necessitates speaking of divine action in the market. Unless the specific
formative elements of the economy are connected with divine action, the God who acts in
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the economy remains hidden behind talk of “liturgies,”134 or “countering the
commodification of religion,”135 or resistance to “produced desire.”136 Speaking of triune
divine action in the market is therefore part and parcel with a social imaginary obtaining
the end for which it was intended: to reveal Father, Son, and Spirit as distinctively
working in history toward redemption to the glory of God. Without such language, our
awareness of God is diminished and communion is hindered.
At the same time and equally important, theology must make clear what forms of
the market are incommensurate with common grace and therefore incompatible with
communion between God and humanity. It will not do to simply recognize markets in
general as guided by providence without attending to the very real possibility that human
sin may prevent participation in the grace on offer through the economy, undermining
sanctification and hindering communion. Theologies that fail to attend to the ways that a
market can interfere with redemptively significant formation because they identify God
working uniformly and identically in all market constructions eventually serve to
legitimate systems that corrupt the image of God in human beings and to facilitate
oppression, injustice, corruption, and violence. Because God’s work in the economy must
be seen as (common) grace, it can never be treated as guaranteed. Here again we must
remember the central importance of communion as the goal of redemption history,
actively and prayerfully seeking God in the economy with a willingness to repent where
such communion requires it. At its core, orthopathy depends on our ability to respond to
the Lord’s offer of grace:
Seek the Lord while he may be found;
134

Smith, Desiring.
Vincent Miller, Consuming, 194.
136
Rieger, Rising Tide, 101-116.
135

208	
  
call upon him while he is near;
Let the wicked forsake his way,
and the unrighteous man his thoughts;
Let him return to the Lord, that he may have compassion on him,
and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon.137
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CHAPTER 5 – IDENTITY IN CHRIST AND MARKET
Like all social arrangements that organize consumption and production, market economics
has an identity-moulding function. Any economic system can potentially provide us with the
table, chairs, and coffee to be with our friends. But it will also influence how we think and
talk about ourselves – our identity – when we are with our friends.
- Gordon Menzies1

In standard neoclassical economic theory labor markets operate according to
marginalist logic. Consider how this is expressed in Samuelson and Nordhaus’s classic
textbook. Marginal product of labor “is the extra product or output added by one extra
unit of [labor].”2 Marginal revenue product of labor refers to the additional revenue a
firm gets through the marginal product obtained by hiring an additional worker.
Samuelson and Nordhaus are clear: Firms want to maximize profit, and “profitmaximizing equilibrium comes when the wage equals the marginal-revenue-product of
[labor].”3 In other words, all employees fulfilling the same role are paid a wage that
equals the additional revenue the firm received when hiring the last employee.
In neoclassical theory wages are indexed to the productivity of labor and to the
revenue resulting from such productivity. This fact has several implications. First, if
prices for the goods produced drop, then we would expect to see wages drop or layoffs.
Second, if demand for a good drops (decreasing revenue and the need for production) we
would expect to see wages drop or layoffs. Third, we should expect factors unrelated to
productivity to have no significant role in determining wages. As I will shortly
demonstrate, such assumptions are frequently the basis of economic policy debates, and
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to varying degrees the United States economy fits the assumption that labor, wages, and
productivity are all fundamentally connected.
The Japanese economy deviates from the prevalent marginalist logic and
outcomes in the United States in several fascinating and distinctive ways. For example,
employers tend to follow a nenko-joretsu system, where wages are indexed in part to the
age of the employee regardless of performance and experience. While some economists
think this system may be declining, historical wage analysis is conclusive that this
practice was at least historically a prominent factor in determining wage in Japan.
Though Japanese economists argue that the nenko system is defensible on economic
grounds, it is not defensible on marginalist grounds,4 as wage increases by age often are
not proportionate to productivity increases. To point to another deviation from
marginalist expectations, when costs exceed marginal product during times of recession
or during changes in consumer preferences, Japanese cultural tendencies to see
employment or subcontracting agreements as obligations which goodwill compels firms
to sustain result in increased diversification by redirecting employees to new projects and
divisions rather than in layoffs.5 Here again, the actions of Japanese firms do not
correspond to the neoclassical model in a manner that causes Japanese firms to stand out
significantly from many of their European and North American counterparts.
How is it that Japan does not conform in significant ways to models that are the
basis of economic knowledge of the labor market in other nations? And how does Japan’s
nonconformity relate to the question of how theology can contribute to counter-
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formations of the market that may better cooperate with the work of God in the
economy? These questions will serve as the starting point for this chapter’s analysis of
identity. If a social imaginary can shape an economic agent’s experience of the world in
ways that may more or less conform with the Father’s work in general revelation, then
the identity of economic agents can establish which roles within the world so experienced
are possible for the agent, and certain identities will conform to our received identity in
Christ better than others. To begin to explain how this is the case, I must first attend to
the example of marginalist theory and labor markets in Japan in greater depth.
Marginalist Analysis in Labor Markets: A Case Study
American economist John Bates Clark is responsible for introducing the
marginalist revolution into economic analysis of the firm.6 Classical economics derived
the value of goods from the quantity of labor required to produce such goods,7 but the
marginalist revolution simultaneously instituted by Léon Walras, William Stanley
Jevons, and Carl Menger proposed a new explanation for how values were determined.
According to marginalist models, each incremental purchase of a good has a
corresponding reduction in marginal utility, the utility gained by consuming this
additional unit. At a certain level the marginal utility for additional consumption will not
be worth the marginal cost of purchasing another unit, and the buyer will purchase no
more of the specific good. The insight was originally applied to supply and demand of
goods in an attempt to explain how markets clear (where marginal utility meets marginal
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cost at an equilibrium price point). Clark’s contribution was to apply the same marginalist
logic to different variables in labor markets to propose how equilibrium is met.
Clark’s stated purpose in applying marginalism to questions of wealth distribution
in a firm was to “show that the distribution of the income of society is controlled by a
natural law.”8 Clark believes that economic natural laws depend upon “voluntary action
of men [sic]” but that it is possible to “predict” certain actions “under given
circumstances.”9 Such predictions, based on what he sees as an accurate anthropological
understanding, allow the scientific economist to understand how an economy functions
and to identify when markets are rightly operating according to these natural laws and
when they are impeded by a certain friction that an economist can then seek to minimize.
The laws themselves are “static,” “universal,” “deep acting” and “beyond control.”10
In this specific instance, Clark identifies a set of laws that allow him to apply
marginalist insights to the firm. First, marginal units of capital “grow less and less
productive.”11 If a business purchases its first computer, for example, it may grow much
more productive. A second computer will allow two employees to work online at once,
again increasing productivity but less than was the case with the first computer. By the
time a small firm with ten employees adds an eleventh computer, increases in
productivity will likely be quite small. Similarly, Clark posits that there is “diminishing
productivity of labor,” where each new employee increases the output of a business in
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decreasing degrees.12 When perfect competition is assumed, “wages conform to the
product that is attributable to marginal labor”13 where marginal product is established by
appeal to a “zone of indifference” where marginal laborers add little to production
capabilities to justify their hiring.14
Like the models discussed in chapter 4, this model faces theoretical and empirical
difficulties that question its status as fact. On a theoretical level, Clark assumes that
perfect competition eliminates profits for the entrepreneurs that coordinate capital and
labor to establish the proper marginal quantity.15 This means that distribution of revenue
can be perfectly divided between wages, rent, and investment without the need to
consider the question of distribution of revenue between profits and wages. In the real
economy entrepreneurs are driven by profit, undermining this assumption and raising the
new ethical question of what proportion of earnings should go to entrepreneurs and what
proportion to labor. A much larger problem is found in the fact that neoclassical
economic theory has never been able to successfully show how markets clear, so major
components of Clark’s theory cannot, strictly speaking, be related to equilibrium in labor
markets.16 Even worse on a theoretical level is the fact that Clark tries to identify
marginal product of labor and capital independently, but as John Médaille notes “neither
capital nor labor produces anything without the other.”17 A machine without a laborer
produces no cars, just as laborers without machines could not produce many of the
products fundamental to a modern economy. Even if the marginal products of labor and
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capital could be clearly and independently determined, capital and labor may not be
substitutable such that marginal costs and demand curves may not explain existing wage
rates.18 Empirically, Clark’s theory is also contestable. Labor productivity has grown over
the last half century, but real wages for labor have remained stagnant, suggesting that
wages are not linked to marginal product.19 Clark’s “natural law” of wages simply is not
a fact, nor is it the result of a purely positive economics.
Despite its theoretical and empirical weaknesses, Clark’s position became
standard in neoclassical economics, the basic model that guided the construction of labor
markets for most of the twentieth century and that reinforced a particular social
imaginary. For example, Clark’s marginalist theory has played a significant normative
role in economic policy debates over minimum wage legislation. Economists often use
marginalist logic to argue as Thomas Sowell does that “making it illegal to pay less than
a given amount does not make a worker’s productivity worth that amount – and, if it is
not, that worker is unlikely to be employed.”20 Christian economists, theologians, and
philosophers frequently point to neoclassical marginalist theory to argue that increasing a
minimum wage would by economic laws result in layoffs as wage rates would surpass
marginal product of labor.21 Such arguments depend upon a certain social imaginary that
18
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envisions the economy as a rigid and inviolable set of laws not susceptible to ethical
analysis,22 that legitimizes jobs that do not supply a living wage on the grounds that such
jobs are entry level jobs intended for teens, students, and part time labor,23 and that
assumes executive officers are worth exorbitant salaries that should not and cannot be
reduced in the event that living wage legislation raises total labor costs for a firm.24 On a
policy level, at least, Clark’s model is performative: what he claims as fact contains a
normative core that shapes the construction of markets.
Though performative, Clark’s economic model is not an example of what
MacKenzie would call Barnesian performativity (as discussed in chapter 4) due to the
fact that some economists do not find that small increases in minimum wage legislation
result in a corresponding rise in unemployment.25 The market has not fully conformed to
Clark’s predictions. Insofar as Clark’s theory does still depend upon certain contingent
circumstances that lead an economy to converge on his economic predictions, Barnesian
performativity can be resisted in a certain fashion, as is evident in the above example of
costs. Here again, the economic principle is treated as the inevitable outcome of all possible
pieces of legislation, a scientific fact that constrains or negates moral obligation. Victor V. Claar
and Robin J. Klay, Economics in Christian Perspective (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic,
2007), 175. cf. Richards, Money, Greed, and God, 38-9.
22
The point is often explicitly made. See Woods, The Church and the Market, 213;
Brand and Pratt, Seeking, 837.
23
Richards notes, minimum wage laws are “entry level jobs,” so “few people stay in
these jobs forever.” Therefore, claims Richards, the low wage should not be treated as seriously
problematic. Richards, Money, Greed, and God, 38-9. What Richards does not offer, and this is
significant, is any moral, theological or philosophical justification for allowing a family to fail to
make a living wage today simply because they will likely make such a wage in five years.
Richards assumes that this tradeoff is acceptable without argumentation, assuming a view of
history as progress toward a better future, a vision of a world where the poor will gradually
improve their lot through the natural development of the economy and their place in it. Hope is
rooted in the economic development itself, which negates any moral action we may feel
compelled to take today precisely because such action risks the growth of the economy in the
future.
24
See Sirico, Defending the Free Market, 104.
25
For example, David Card and Alan B. Krueger, Myth and Measurement (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1995).

216	
  
Japan. Statistical data quite clearly shows that Japan is more prone to “labor hoarding,”
where laborers are retained despite their productivity not warranting their wages. In such
circumstances, economists are prone to speak in terms of “underutilized units of labor”
that are retained by “risk averse” firms that fear the costs of retraining staff in the event
that temporary declines in demand end and more labor is needed.26 While this is certainly
a possible explanation grounded in the best neoclassical theory, it is an explanation that
does not consider the concrete manifestation of Japanese cultural values in the
marketplace.
How is Japan really able to resist the sort of social imaginary linked with
marginalist labor theory that has been a controlling factor of Western policy debates?
Arguably, the decisive factor is found in Japanese conceptions of identity. As D. Stephen
Long notes, marginalism only works by “abstracting” labor and capital into
“equivalences” divorced from “the social and political conditions that make [economic
exchanges] possible.”27 In accordance with a de-personalizing social imaginary, the
laborers analyzed in minimum wage debates are dissociated and abstracted from any
particular identity markers and are treated as interchangeable contributors to a marginal
product that can then be compared to a firm’s revenue in making hiring and wage
decisions. In other words, a certain social imaginary results in certain forms of abstract
logic possible. In Japan, identity markers are much more integral to the labor market. In
the nenko system the identity of certain workers – specifically their ages – results in a
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higher salary determined independently from marginal productivity. Here respect for
certain identities resists a social imaginary that views labor as abstracted and equivalent.
Japanese firms’ tendency to diversify and move labor from one unit to another
rather than resort to layoffs is also rooted in part in ideas of identity. Anthropologist Chie
Nakane argues that in much of Europe and North America, workers are likely to sense
themselves connected with other workers at an equivalent level in competing businesses,
emphasizing classes of blue and white collar workers or labor and management, for
example. In Japan, workers are more likely to identify themselves as parts of corporate
groupings. Thus, a factory worker in Japan will feel more solidarity with the manager of
her company than with fellow factory workers at a different company.28 Similarly, in
Japan unions are traditionally company based, rather than based on workers at the same
job level in the same industry at various firms.29 Through unions, members of a company
at all levels of the corporate hierarchy are united in seeking optimal outcomes for all
levels. Whereas the American cultural understanding may encourage management to
view laborers as part of an out-group distinct from the managers, the Japanese cultural
understanding equips management to view laborers as part of an in-group including both
managers and laborers. In other words, there is a sort of “we consciousness” between
management and labor in Japan. When management associates laborers with a shared
identity, they are less likely to disregard the particular identities of workers and treat
them as substitutable and abstract objects that can be eliminated to balance marginal costs
28
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and marginal product of labor, and more likely to pursue creative strategies including
restructuring to avoid the need to resort to layoffs.
Another interesting fact illuminating the Japanese ability to resist marginalist
logic is found in the fact that many Japanese managers understand themselves to have a
responsibility to improve their workers. This is part of what it means to be a manager. For
example, Hiroshi Tanaka describes how Kihachiro Onitsuka, the founder and CEO of the
Onitsuka Corporation, emphasized the development of his employees’ abilities. Onitsuka
saw these employees as “unpolished stones” who could become “gems,” or “Onitsuka
men.”30 Here again, we see identity coming into play. Onitsuka’s self-understading of the
role of CEO led to particular investments in employees resulting in a common identity of
“Onitsuka men,” an identity which would resist the typical abstracting and instrumental
logic of marginalism.
The Japanese tendency to defy marginalist expectations thus points toward the
next important feature that is central to the development of a theological approach to
economics: Identity. I have argued that economic models help to construct particular
markets that are necessarily value-laden, and that participation in these markets inevitably
shapes the social imaginary of an economic agent in ways that may undermine
orthopathy by impeding that agent’s ability to have communion with God. Insofar as such
imaginaries are social, which is to say that one’s imaginary is shared in significant ways
with other people with whom that individual interacts, a social imaginary that undermines
orthopathy ceases to conform to God’s common grace. In such a situation the market as a
whole is not contributing toward the formation of the elect for the reception of special
30
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grace. Instead, the market is constructed such that special grace counteracts the formative
influence of the market and nature is not properly oriented toward grace but stands in
conflict with it.
In this chapter, I propose that the concept of identity is the created term through
which orthodoxy, the second dimension of redemptively significant transformation, is
either enabled or hindered. In other words, God works through the mental acts whereby a
human being maintains self-understanding to bring about a transformation toward right
knowledge. Identity allows an individual to select from numerous possible roles that can
be played within a social imaginary, perhaps even identifying a role that rightly results in
orthopraxic action. In order to explain how identity functions in such a manner, I must
first explain in greater detail the role of a social imaginary in the formation of the self.
Once the connection between a social imaginary and self-formation is clear, two
problems must be addressed. First, I must identify a proper theological locus that
correlates identity formation to an appropriated work of the Son. I will argue that the
doctrine of justification serves as such a proper locus, but in so doing I will need to
briefly address recent objections arising from the study of the New Testament. Second, I
must explain how to connect identity as determined by justification with particular
discussions among economists. In this instance, the problem will be particularly
challenging given the shortcoming of most economic approaches to identity. I will
therefore need to address this shortcoming and possible resolutions before I move to the
final substantive component of the chapter – an analysis of how the dominant social
imaginary associated with the most prevalent economic theories undermines elements of
common grace oriented toward justification and communion with God. In short, in
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various ways most markets are not sources of concurrent divine action toward
communion with God because they tend toward depersonalization and abstraction rather
than toward the sort of personalizing tendencies that allow human beings created in the
image of God to commune with the God whose image they bear. But I am getting ahead
of myself. Let us begin with the formative nature of social imaginaries.
Imaginaries and the Selves They Engender
In chapter 4 I argued that markets are socially constructed insofar as a market is
irreducible to a material reality. Instead, a market is an institutional fact, a peculiar form
of fact that depends on a particular institution. In this instance, specific linguistic mental
representations partially constitute the market as do the material realities that serve as the
signs of these linguistic meanings. So, for example, a stock market consists of material
realities such as a trading floor, traders, stock certificates, and various computers and
other technologies. However, these realities only function as a stock market when stock
certificates are collectively understood to count as partial shares of a corporation (itself
an institutional fact) that can legitimately be exchanged among traders who have the
specific role of facilitating such transactions in a trading floor recognized as a valid space
within wich such transactions occur. Because markets are institutional facts partly
constituted by linguistic signifiers, I suggested that markets and the models that are used
to design them can be particularly influential in transmitting or shaping a social
imaginary.
The picture up to this point is accurate, but it is also incomplete and must be
augmented by a more thorough account of how social imaginaries function. Searle argues
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that social realities “are in fact just placeholders for patterns of activities.”31 To return to
the example of money, money is a social reality that serves as a placeholder for several
patterns of activities such as exchanging goods or storing valuables. As a medium of
exchange money provides us with the continued possibility of exchanging with others
without need of direct barter, but on some level the money is itself a placeholder for such
barter, an equivalent and substitute for such actions. Specific actions that social realities
serve as a placeholder for are possible partly because of constitutive rules determinative
of the social fact,32 and partly as a result of what Searle terms “the Background”, or “the
set of nonintentional or preintentional capacities that enable institutional states of
function.”33 Money can partly serve as a medium of exchange because it is collectively
recognized to function as such under certain specified conditions, but also partly because
human beings have the preintentional capacities needed for such functions to arise. Searle
suggests that such capacities include, among other things, the ability to perceive
something as a certain category of thing, the ability to form experiences into a certain
narrative with “dramatic shape” complete with its own set of desires and expectations, the
tendency to pursue specific actions according to certain motivations, and the disposition
toward certain behaviors in certain contexts.34 In short, we might say that the Background
allows a person to relate to the world in a certain way. To return to the example of
money, Searle argues that persons who use money “have developed a set of dispositions
that are sensitive and responsive to the specific content of those rules” that are
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constitutive of an institutional fact like money.35 A certain Background develops within a
subject that enables money to be used without need of intentional reflection.36 What I
want to suggest (for Searle is not as clear on the matter) is that in the development of a
certain set of dispositions, a certain Background, a person is not only enabled to relate to
the world in a certain sort of way, but more importantly as a certain sort of person.37
Moreover, a person’s development as a certain sort of person is in many respects
determined by the identity that person possesses within a given imaginary.
Three propositions about the relationship between Background capacities and
social reality allow us to recognize the theological significance of a social imaginary as
related to identity. First, there are various different Background capacities that social
facts can depend upon. Money requires Background capacities that allow consumers to
determine the value of goods in equivalent increments and to recognize a socially
constructed reality as capable of holding value that can be used in the exchange of said
goods. Such capacities are entirely unnecessary to sustain an unrelated institutional fact,
such as recognition of the social fact that a particular individual counts as president of the
United States of America. Second, Background capacities are variable in nature and can
therefore be developed. This follows from the fact that recognition of an institutional fact
is a learned skill. Consider again the example of money. A child does not automatically
understand that a particular piece of paper counts as money; such knowledge must be
35
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learned. However, having learned this knowledge, the capacity to evaluate goods by
assigning a price expressed in terms of money based on such learned knowledge is
something that can develop with practice. A child cannot initially estimate the value of a
good with any accuracy and is unlikely to consider a good in terms of price. By the time
that child is an adult, she will be able to almost instantly estimate the price of a wide
range of goods with increasing accuracy. This depends upon the development of a
particular Background capacity. Third, when an enduring social fact depends upon a
certain set of Background capacities, those capacities are the ones that will develop. The
theological implications of these three propositions are staggering: the particular
institutional facts that partly constitute our social imaginary by determining the ways that
we understand the social world, the interactions that occur within that social world, and
the institutional symbols that undergird such a social world have a fundamental and
formative influence on the human subject.38 Our development as persons is directed
partly by the imaginaries we inhabit.
While markets can allow for a number of varieties of personal development, much
of the contemporary economy is more inclined to hinder personal development in any
form. “Conventional economics tends to reduce the human being from person to object,”
argues Edward O’Boyle, presenting the most important of the common themes explored
in personalist economics. For O’Boyle, this claim derives from the fact that many
economic theories treat workers as mere “inputs.”39 Though this insight does gesture
toward the formative nature of economic models, O’Boyle still focuses on the
macroeconomic question of which economic system is valid, suggesting that the main
38
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problem with “unrestrained capitalism” is continual risk of “economic anarchy” arising
from a “dysfunctioning market.”40 Personalist concerns rightly identify a major problem
in contemporary markets, but the typical personalist explanation lacks adequate scope.
The full truth of O’Boyle’s claim is only clear when we consider the ramifications of the
formative role of social imaginaries discussed above, and for this we need an even more
theologically nuanced account than personalists offer.
Luigino Bruni is particularly helpful in connecting the potentially depersonalizing
nature of markets to our current discussion of the social imaginary. Bruni begins with the
claim that social life and interaction is fundamentally a blessing that more than
compensates for the wounds often received in interpersonal interaction. Here Bruni
illustrates with the example of Jacob, who received the blessing of becoming Israel only
by wrestling with a figure who wounded his hip (Gen. 32:22-32).41 Bruni elaborates on
his understanding of the fullness of humanity by considering three kinds of love: eros,
philia, and agape.42 Eros is fundamentally self-oriented: “The center of the erotic
relationship is I, not Thou.”43 Philia, on the other hand, does consider the other, but often
in the general sense of the “common good.” Here the other is not particular, but rather
abstract.44 Only agape is a love that is so oriented toward a concrete other that its
fulfillment depends upon the other. Agape therefore necessarily opens us up to the
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possibility of being wounded by the other through rejection. As a result, “Gratuitousness
is perhaps the word that best expresses the ambivalent nature of human relationships.”45
Trinitarian theology clearly supports Bruni’s understanding of personhood. The
inherently gifted nature of personal existence is evident in the eternal life of the Trinity,
where the eternal existence of the Son and the Spirit is in the form of an eternally
communicated gift from the Father. While it is helpful to note this similarity, we ought
not to place too much emphasis on the immanent Trinity as an illustration of the nature of
personal existence for reasons outlined in chapter 2. The distinction between Creator and
creature prohibits the immanent Trinity from functioning in any strong way as an
exemplar of ideal human society – and included in the notion of the ideal society is an
ideal representation of person in interpersonal relations. An analysis of the economic
Trinity, on the other hand, yields ample material for revealing the fundamentally otheroriented and gifted nature of human personhood. This is particularly evident in the case
of justification, where the identity received by Christians in justification finds its ground
in and is oriented toward Christ the Other who in his perfect humanity gratuitously gave
himself for the Church and who the Church is called to imitate in gratuitous self-giving
toward the other. As illustrated so clearly in 1 John, if we keep the commandment of
Christ, which is to love others, “walking in the same way which he walked,” then truly in
us “the love of God is perfected” (2:5-6). This love that is perfected in us is the love
perfectly embodied in the gratuitously accepted wound of Christ’s death for others (3:16).
The love perfected in us is also the love by which we abide in God and God in us (3:24)
as secured by the gift of the Holy Spirit (4:13). Such love should itself be seen as a love
from God (4:10), the blessing by which we receive the identity that gives us “confidence
45
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for the day of judgment” (4:17) and eternal life in Christ (5:11). Truly, in what God has
done for us in Christ, and in what we become through the Spirit in response to Christ’s
work, we see the fullness of personhood as the gratuitous and other-oriented life of love
that is grounded in the wounds which Christ’s resurrected body bears to this day.
Bruni believes that in the modern era thinkers like Thomas Hobbes and Adam
Smith misguidedly sought to insulate the individual from the possibility of such wounds,
establishing the Leviathan and the Market as mediators eliminating “direct
intersubjectivity” and substituting “a mediated and anonymous relationality.”46 “Abstract
systems,” to borrow a term from Anthony Giddens, have therefore transformed personal
relationships grounded in trust to impersonal connections.47 Bruni does not believe that
markets are therefore fundamentally flawed. Smith’s move was primarily motivated by a
desire to avoid wounds inflicted by hierarchical relationships in society that were and are
problematic.48 The problem was that Smith supplemented this positive impulse with a
desire to
emphasize the independence from the ‘benevolence of our fellow citizens’ as a
positive virtue to the new form of sociality introduced by the market. Market
relationships allow us to satisfy our needs without having to depend on others’
love; by all depending impersonally and anonymously on the ‘Invisible Hand’ of
the Market (with a capital ‘M’), we do not personally depend on anyone else, nor
do we have to encounter anyone personally (and potentially painfully).49

Bruni suggests that this problematic move away from agape was reinforced by a move
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whom a relationship can result in wound or blessing. Instead the other is merely a means
to the end of benefiting the self.50 This is the “logic of prices and costs applied to human
relationships,”51 and I would argue that the mathematical nature of models in postSmithian economic theory has only exacerbated the problem by abstracting persons from
their unique historical context by representing them through intersubstitutable variables
and by instrumentalizing them in deploying these variables in models oriented toward
ends other than human interpersonal communion. To reiterate the claims of personalist
economists, the person has become the individual,52 defined not by relation but by
isolation, not by an unmediated and gratuitous I-Thou relationship, but by I-It
instrumental logic devoid of personal presence.53
Bruni’s analysis of modern economic depersonalization is precisely what we see
in the marginalist approach to wages discussed above. Especially in larger corporations,
marginalist analysis abstracts labor from concrete intersubjective relations, considering
labor in terms of the impersonal concept of marginal product of labor that treats all labor
as intersubstitutable. The result of a social imaginary controlled by such symbols is a
conceptuality dominated by distinctive economic classes: laborers are intersubstitutable
but an elite class (Clark’s “entrepreneurs”) have the technical skills needed to direct the
50
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corporation and are not intersubstitutable.54 A social imaginary influenced by marginalist
wage theory has also allowed the purported natural laws of the market to serve as a
mediator between management and employees, weakening interpersonal obligations so
that economic downturns or reduction in profits results in layoffs for intersubstitutable
laborers with increasing frequency vis-à-vis reductions in wage across the board, profit
cuts, or restructuring corporate divisions.55
This phenomenon is not only evident in the labor market, but more generally in
neoclassical economic theory.56 As economist Harold Demsetz notes, the much-maligned
notion of the homo economicus was designed to respond to the “puzzle” of the
“spontaneous” nature of the market.57 In other words, the homo economicus is already
embedded in a social imaginary that sees the market as a natural reality that is discovered,
not an artificial reality that is constructed. Demsetz notes that homo economicus is
54
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thought to describe agents who participate in “exchanges between persons who are
essentially unknown to each other” as contrasted with relations in the home where
“personalized interactions” are “borne of durable associations.”58 Admitting that markets
result in different “codes of behavior in dealings with people,” particularly in the logic of
“business is business,” Demsetz reveals how a particular imaginary results in particular
set of actions guided by a particular set of norms, though he does not use the terminology
I have deployed.59 He is also clear that the social imaginary and associated norms of
action deriving from the homo economicus requires that,
Institutional mechanisms are put into place to make people comfortable dealing
with strangers. It is true that these mechanisms distinguish people, particularly by
separating those who do qualify to trade from those who do not. A degree of
personalization, then, is present in exchange activities, but it is not a great deal of
personalization, nor is it of a sort that creates charitable or angry feelings
between those on the opposite side of an exchange.60

In short, “institutional mechanisms” like stock market membership requirements as a
prerequisite to trading61 are one aspect of market construction, and a particular social
imaginary and a particular understanding of the human being facilitating a particular set
of norms are reinforced by any such “institutional mechanisms.”
How, then, do we explain the example of the Japanese labor system that violates
marginalist expectations? In large part, Japan was historically able to resist
depersonalization through a robust notion of identity that helps to orient economic
58
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interactions toward a different telos. As suggested in chapter 3, identity can be a powerful
means of resisting cross pressures between a social imaginary and certain societal norms
that may contradict. A social imaginary allows for a certain set of actions to be possible.
This is evident in the way that institutional facts serve as placeholders for particular
forms of action, though such institutional facts certainly do not exhaustively describe the
role of a social imaginary in establishing particular trajectories of actions. In the case of
Japan, a social imaginary influenced by certain economic understandings of labor, the
market, homo economicus, and wages as determined by marginal product conflicted with
an older culturally influenced social imaginary that envisioned labor, human beings,
wages, and the market in a different fashion. In the context of two conflicting
imaginaries, two contradictory symbolic thought worlds, particular identity markers in
Japan allowed the Japanese labor market to resist the marginalist influenced imaginary.
Notions of competing classes of workers and management were resisted by identities
grounded in the corporations that employed both workers and management, resisting
trends in management to view labor as outsiders. Identity markers such as age in the
nenko-joretsu system were seen to create obligations that prevented managers from
seeing labor as abstract and depersonalized. Japanese managers also had a selfunderstanding of their role in management as rooted in obligation toward their
employees, such that employees could not simply be laid off during a downturn but
should be creatively retained through corporate restructuring. In each of these instances,
identity played a major role in resisting one of several available social imaginaries.
It would be helpful to clarify what I mean in using the word “identity.” Identity is
grounded in being, meaning that identity cannot be completely detached from the ontic
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core of the individual.62 One cannot simply self-identify as a toaster without a degree of
cognitive dissonance with reality that renders successful interaction with the world
impossible. However identity is also constructed in part through interlocution with others.
As Taylor notes, “A self exists only within… ‘webs of interlocution.’”63 Simply put,
identity is self-understanding rooted in an ontic core and developed partially through
interpersonal interlocution. To fully understand identity, we also need to understand how
identity functions. A social imaginary that provides a set of possible trajectories of action
also allows for a set of possible commitments which may render certain actions
acceptable or inacceptable. Identity is the set of particular “commitments” from which a
person determines her “particular standpoint” from which she “can try to determine from
case to case what is good, or valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or
oppose.”64 A full understanding of identity, then, can be summarized as follows: Identity
is self-understanding rooted in an ontic core and developed partially through
interpersonal interlocution that allows a person to assume a particular standpoint from
which certain trajectories of action and certain moral evaluations become possible.65
If identity serves as a basis for determining which courses of action and which
moral evaluations are possible, then identity is critical to the coherent being-in-the-world.
However, as noted in chapter 3, in late modernity there is a widespread loss of identity as
a means of navigating being-in-the-world; identity insufficiently functions to anchor
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one’s relationship to the frameworks of reality as interpreted through a social imaginary
and manifest in relationships with other persons in a particular standpoint. Instead, late
modernity is characterized by what Rommen calls “expeditious associations,” which are
“transitory commitments in which what is important is some semblance of utility within a
given arena of action.”66 These associations are partly a result of the shifts in economics
discussed by Bruni, where the market serves as a mediator that eliminates the
interpersonal interaction that would be rooted in identity – a mediation Rommen would
call a reliance on “abstract systems” where identification of self and others is
trivialized.67 I have argued that markets constructed according to certain models that
eliminate identity as a significant factor in economic interactions have contributed to this
trivialization of identity, and the duration of this chapter will focus on this problem and
on theological resources for a solution. However, it should be noted that a number of
other factors have contributed to this destabilization of identity. Fluid labor markets
facilitating changes in jobs, place of residence, and so forth hinder the development of
stable identity markers, a problem enhanced by increasingly prevalent corporate mergers
and restructurings.68 In a world where job stability is on the decline,69 vocation no longer
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serves as a stable identity marker. In the face of a decline in traditional identity markers,
advertising uses what Vincent Miller calls “misdirection” to associate certain goods and
services with certain identities, but such an understanding shifts the ontic base of identity
from the imago Dei to external material goods, creating a certain artificiality to identity,
particularly as certain goods over time cease to convey the status that they once did.70
One could easily also point to the influence of technology, a decline in certain civic
institutions, and the manner in which globalization undermines local markets, but all such
factors are outside of the scope of the present study.
A destabilization or trivialization of identity is particularly problematic given that
identity orients a person toward certain trajectories of agency which are only intelligible
within a social imaginary and which are also are dependent upon certain Background
capacities.71 Each identity results in a particular standpoint or set of commitments that
ensure that certain Background capacities are developed, while others are not. A decentering of identity therefore may undermine any consistent development of associated
Background capacities. This may mean that sets of capacities develop which are not
reconcilable into a coherent identity, in which case fragmentation of identity occurs and
an agent can act according to certain commitments in one setting, like the workplace, and
another set of commitments in a different context, like the home, without any coherence
between the two identities or roles. A complete lack of development of pertinent
Background capacities can result in what may be called a “loss of self,” the inability to

States,” in Labor in the New Economy, eds. Katharine G. Abraham, James R. Spletzer, and
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function adequately in any social setting, often accompanied by extreme anxiety.72 More
significant than either of these problems is the fact that both fragmentation of identity and
loss of identity can undermine development in theological virtue by dismantling the
immanent term of God’s concurrent gracious work in sanctification. To fully understand
why this is the case, we must turn to the doctrine of justification, a necessary prerequisite
for sanctification.
Justification in Christ, Identity of Christ
Daniel Bell argues that “the capitalist economy of desire is a manifestation of sin
because it both corrupts desire and obstructs communion.”73 Bell’s charge of the
corruption of desire relates to chapter 4 – certain capitalist social imaginaries can orient
our desires in directions that do not allow us to see a world in which desire is only
perfectly fulfilled through communion with God. However, to fully assess Bell’s claim
we must consider identity and the question of justification, for justification is that which
restores communion with God. An analysis of the doctrine of justification will lead to the
conclusion that Bell rightly identifies a problem, though he fails to explore whether
markets can be constructed so that they may overcome this problem. In a market
economy where identity can play a central role in economic exchanges, the identity
received in justification may allow for theologically acceptable market interactions,
provided that the right sorts of markets are constructed.
Paul’s understanding of justification has been the topic of heated debate in recent
Pauline scholarship, where advocates of a “new perspective” – perhaps we might more
properly speak of new perspectives given the disagreements among scholars writing from
72
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this standpoint – tend to restructure the relationship between justification, Judaism, and
the law from the way these topics are typically related by the so called “old perspective”
or “Lutheran perspective.”74 Certainly there are significant disagreements among scholars
concerning the extent to which Paul retained certain Jewish understandings of the
covenant, the relationship between union with Christ and justification in Paul, and the
individual or corporate nature of justification. Though these disagreements are
significant, I intend to appeal to aspects of the doctrine of justification grounded in a
claim where there is surprising consensus: the justification made possible through Christ
is one that provides the believer with an entirely new identity.75
Justification as a basis of new identity is evident throughout the writings of Paul.
A brief survey of Galatians will make the point evident, and my subsequent systematic
development of certain Pauline themes will clarify the matter even further. Paul writes his
letter to the Galatians because he is concerned that they are accepting another gospel
(1:6-7). He focuses on his relationship with Peter, emphasizing that Peter had endorsed
his ministry and his understanding of the gospel (2:6-10). Peter, however, failed to
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recognize the full ramifications of the gospel, withdrawing from the Gentiles he had eaten
with in Antioch when a group came from James to visit the community. Paul rebuked
Peter for failing to recognize the full ramifications of the gospel – “a person is not
justified by works of the law, but through faith in Jesus Christ” (2:16). As N. T. Wright
puts the matter, “Something has happened to Peter – something so profound that he now
has a new identity, which affects key behavior patterns and taboos about that very central
human activity, sitting down to a meal.”76 James D.G. Dunn reaches similar conclusions:
“faith in Jesus Christ becomes the primary identity marker which renders the others
superfluous.”77 But Peter has failed to recognize the new identity he has received through
justification, a claim Paul builds upon to make one of his strongest claims about the new
identity found in Christ. So he writes in Galatians 2:20, “I have been crucified with
Christ. It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me.” Grant Macaskill notes that
this is “an absolute transformation of identity: Paul sees his own life as now constituted
by the presence of Christ within him.”78 Justification is inseparably linked with such a
transformation grounded in the reception of a new identity, though justification is not
exhausted by the notion of transformation.79 The ultimate outcome of this new identity is
76
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clear: “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is no male and
female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus” (3:19). Instead, believers have been “clothed”
with Christ (3:27).80 For this reason, Paul challenges Peter and disagrees with the
Galatians’ reinterpretation of the gospel. Jesus alone is the basis of justification, and that
justification entails a new identity that overcomes the old covenant-based distinction
between Jew and Gentile.
I suggested above that identity is self-understanding rooted in an ontic core and
developed partially through interpersonal interlocution that allows a person to assume a
particular standpoint from which certain trajectories of action and certain moral
evaluations become possible. Scripturally, we see these basic elements of identity in the
doctrine of justification. The ontic core of identity is partly derived from the doctrine of
creation: all human beings bear the image and likeness of God (Gen. 1:26-27), and part of
justification involves “having clothed [ourselves] with the new self, which is being
lives in me’, verse 20).” Wright, Paul, 971. Compare Wright’s “new perspective” with the
“Lutheran” approach of Westerholm, who contrasts a life in which “Christ, in whose crucifixion
they have shared, is now the effective force in their lives,” and here he cites Gal. 2:20, and the
“old, untransformed life.” Stephen Westerholm, Perspectives Old and New on Paul: The
‘Lutheran’ Paul and His critics (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2004), 374. Another
advocate of the Lutheran perspective, Thomas Schreiner, objects to the notion of transformation
because it does not fit with the basic forensic metaphor behind much scriptural talk about
justification. “Righteous judges, for example, don’t make persons guilty or innocent” (160).
Interestingly, Schreiner objects when N. T. Wright makes a similar argument that judges do not
impute their righteousness to a defendant. Schreiner argues, “Wright falls into the mistake of
limiting what Paul teaches because of the analogy he has used. Wright is correct in saying that
judges don’t grant their righteousness to defendants. But Paul’s point is that the divine courtroom
is radically different in some respects from a human courtroom!” (189). Schreiner is perfectly
right, which invalidates his objection to the transformative nature of the forensic declaration of
justification. In this regard, the divine courtroom is simply different than the human courtroom
and does result in transformation. Thomas Schreiner, Faith Alone: The Doctrine of Justification
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2015).
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renewed in knowledge according to the image of its creator” (Col. 3:10). In fact, the
prevalent Biblical motif of the believer being “in Christ” partly points to unity with the
one who is “the image of the invisible God” (Col. 1:15). One significant point should be
clarified in terms of this ontic core. The new identity imputed to us in justification is not
given ex justitia propter relationem naturalem – “on the account of a natural relation”
such as the image of God. It is not by virtue of a human nature bearing the image of God
that we receive the righteousness of Christ. Our justification is purely ex mera gratia –
“of mere grace.”81 Our righteousness is not one of our own, but one that comes from God
(Phil. 3:9). However, the image of God does serve as an ontological basis for the
possibility of our receiving the imputed righteousness of Christ because it is the
ontological basis for God becoming human and completing the act of atonement that is
the necessary condition of justification such that Jesus can be the “last Adam” (1 Cor.
15:45), the federal head of a new covenant.
The formative influence that a social fact can have on Background capacities
correlates in some respects to what theologians speak of in discussing the renewal of the
image of God, so we must pause briefly to further clarify the ontic core of the identity
received in justification. Simply put, the image of God is that mode of existence in which
human beings manifest God in the world. This mode of existence whereby human beings
manifest God in the world is a supernatural analogue for what happens in the
development of Background capacities in the market in relation to model-influenced
social facts. It is important to recall that economic models are a significant means by
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which a social world and social facts are established and maintained. As I have argued
more extensively elsewhere, the theological doctrine of the image of God functions
similarly within theology as economic models do within much of economic theory. Both
serve to (a) represent an ideal reality, in part by (b) gesturing to correct relations between
actors. Both notions (c) allow for and track change and variation through time, and (d)
substantial reflection on both can result in changes to social reality.82 This underlying
functional similarity between the image of God and economic models already warrants
some consideration of the image in this context. If models can impact the development of
subjectivity, then it may be that this development impacts renewal in the image of God
through sanctification.
Further warrant for a connection between renewal in the image of God and the
development of Background capabilities is provided by the fact that the way the
Background is developed through model-influenced social reality correlates to traditional
and contemporary theological accounts of the image of God. There is some consensus
among Biblical scholars on several aspects of renewal in the image of God. The imago
Dei refers in part to the way in which human beings “reflect” God into the world, as if an
icon. This reflection is oriented toward a telos, meaning it is progressively developing
toward a particular end.83 This reflective and progressively developmental character
connects the image of God with Background capacities, insofar as these capacities are in
some sense constitutive of the human person (much like the divine image), and insofar as
82
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these capacities are also variable and capable of development in the context of particular
social facts toward distinctive ends. In the New Testament the image is clearly
Christological in nature. To grow in the image of God is also to be conformed to the
image of Christ (Rom. 8:29), and conformity to Christ is always a social process
completed within the entire body of Christ. Thus, the image of God is decidedly social,
and therefore in some sense akin to Background capacities that develop through social
facts and realities. These concepts do not exhaust the notion of the image of God, but
they do adequately point to the connection between the development of the image of God
and the development of Background capacities, though the former should never be
collapsed into the later.
The basic exegetical elements of the image of God can be interpreted in
philosophical terms, and here the thought of Christos Yannaras is quite helpful. Yannaras
points to the “relative existential freedom” of human beings as opening up the possibility
of relating to God and others or turning inward.84 A turn toward relation “indicates a
given goal setting, and consequently a definitive mode of existence.”85 The goals one sets
determine the mode of existence one’s life will take. To translate this into the
terminology developed by Searle above, social facts are placeholders for certain patterns
of activities. When someone relates to these facts, he develops the Background capacities
needed in order to live an existence in which these activities are habitual. What Yannaras
adds to the language deployed above is a recognition that this “goal setting” in relations
depends upon another for fulfillment.86 In the case of the image of God, in which a

84

Christos Yannaras, Relational Ontology, trans. Norman Russell (Brookline, MA: Holy
Cross Orthodox Press, 2011), 15.
85
Ibid., 48. The emphasis is Yannaras’s.
86
Ibid., 19-20.

241	
  
human being’s mode of existence reflects God, this relation is a relation toward God.
This relation is what I have called communion, and fulfillment of this relation is
accompanied by development of a particular mode of existence, a Christoform
representation of God in the world. Theologically, we can say that such conformity to
Christ is made possible through justification and union with Christ, and in this conformity
one becomes fully a person. The problem, however, is that strong depersonalizing forces
in certain market constructions undermine this personalization through justification.
Returning to justification proper, it is clear that the state of being “in Christ” is the
particular standpoint within which the identity given in justification is rooted.87 This
standpoint established through justification includes new identity markers with their
related “filial rights,”88 such as “the right to become children of God” (John 1:12), or
adoption, and the right to be “heirs of God and fellow heirs with Christ” (Rom. 8:17), or
the future glorification. Our being “in Christ” also entails living according to certain
moral commitments and acting in a certain manner as enabled by the Holy Spirit.89 If we
are in Christ, and the Spirit is in us, then we are not to walk according to the sin nature
but live according to the Spirit (Rom. 8:1-17). In our new identity as children of God, we
should no longer be “conformed to the passions of [our] former ignorance” (1 Pet. 1:14).
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It is also clear that the believer’s identity in Christ is established through
interlocution, as is most evident in Christ’s appearance to Saul on the road to Damascus
(Acts 9). This encounter is paradigmatic of the experience of any Christian, for whom a
particular kind of relationship, namely faith in Jesus, is the instrument by which
justification occurs.90 Alister McGrath puts the matter nicely: “Justification is about the
transformation and fulfillment of our persons through an encounter with the Person who
underlies personality itself.”91 Henri de Lubac makes a similar point, using language that
emphasizes our unity with Christ: “we are fully persons only within the Person of the
Son, by whom and with whom we share in the circumincession of the Trinity.”92 In
evangelical and Reformed terms, this interlocutionary aspect of justification is explored
with the distinct concept of conversion, in both active and passive form. Louis Berkhof
defines these two aspects of conversion as follows:
Active conversion is that act of God whereby He causes the regenerated sinner,
in His conscious life, to turn to Him in repentance and faith. Passive conversion
is the resulting conscious act of the regenerated sinner whereby he, through the
grace of God, turns to God in repentance and faith.93

Recall from chapter 2 that communion flows from the union of the believer with Christ
and consists of distinctive, conscious, personal relationships with Father, Son, and Spirit.
Conversion is simply the conscious starting point of communion with God because
conversion unto faith is instrumental in God imputing the alien righteousness of Christ
that is the forensic basis for the restoration of such personal relationships.
90
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The issue of union with Christ has arisen in passing several times in discussing
justification as the reception of a new imputed identity, and here it has also arisen as the
basis for communion with the Triune God. It would be helpful at this point to clarify the
relationship between union, sanctification and justification, three realities that are closely
related in Reformed theology in differing ways throughout history. Early in the
Reformation era, Martin Bucer’s doctrine of a double justification consisting of a primary
justification of imputation followed by a secondary justification distinguished between an
initial imputation and a subsequent transformation. Bucer’s proposal is marked by a lack
in terminological clarity, and perhaps by moralistic overtones, something that Calvin
corrected by distinguishing between justification and sanctification and rooting both in
mystical union with Christ.94 J. Todd Billings notes that for Calvin, justification and
sanctification are a duplex gratia, “inseparable but distinguishable” realities.95 Billings
demonstrates that the more forensic language of justification is often accompanied by the
participatory language of union and is never divided from the transformative gift of
sanctification. In fact, there is broad consensus among the Reformed that union is the
basis for justification.96 So John Owen insists, in a manner representative of much of the
94
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Reformed tradition, “The foundation of the imputation asserted is union.”97 We also see
a clear distinction and yet indivisible unity between justification and sanctification. For
example, William Ames claims the relational change between God and humans in
salvation includes a relative and an absolute aspect. “The change, of course, has no
degrees and is completed at one moment and in only one act. Yet in manifestation,
consciousness, and effects, it has many degrees; therein lie justification and
sanctification.”98 As in Calvin, the forensic declaration of justification and the
transformative outcome of sanctification cannot be divided, but are different aspects of
the same reality of the imputed righteousness of Christ. And in all of the stages of the
Reformed ordo salutis, the final goal is the possibility of communion with the Father
through the Son by the power of the Spirit.99
Drawing on the historical Reformed claim that participatory union, imputation in
justification, and transformation through sanctification are inseparable from one another
yet irreducible to one another, I can now finish connecting the philosophical account of
identity developed in this chapter with traditional Reformed theologies of justification.
The “theological schematization” of the ordo salutis, to use Berkouwer’s terms, “has no
significance by itself. The order is relevant only in that it aids us to appreciate the fullness
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of divine salvation.”100 The divine act of salvation applied to the believer through the
work of Father, Son, and Spirit cannot be divided by a real distinction because the opera
dei ad extra indivisa sunt. Therefore, we ought not be too worried about smaller
differences in the ordo salutis among Reformed theologians. Instead, it is helpful to
explore how the conceptual distinction between sanctification, union, and justification
provides a theological precision that helps avoid a number of problematic theological
positions. Reformed theologians distinguish between justification and sanctification and
emphasize the priority of justification to emphasize sola gratia and sola fides. When
sanctification is collapsed into justification, it is too easy to consider works constitutive
of justification.101 However, sanctification cannot be separated from justification without
resulting in antinomianism.102 Justification stands as the starting point of our
transformation, and as transformation increases, so too does our union with Christ.103
Here sanctification and union should be distinguished as a result of the distinctive
missions of Son and Spirit. The Spirit is given to the Church to bring the transformative
act of redemption to completion, while the Son became incarnate to accomplish what was
necessary for redemption as the exemplary human sacrificed to atone for sin. As the
exemplary perfect human, the Son gives concrete shape to the form that redemption when
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accomplished will take though union with him. However, justification should not be set
in contrast with union, but must always be seen as complementary to it.104
Perhaps it would be best to conclude that the declaration that is justification is a
performative declaration.105 It conveys a status or identity, and that status or identity
results in a transformation of the Christian through sanctification that results in evergreater union with Christ, a union that itself is both the logical ground of justification and
the means whereby a Christian more fully bears the image of God by more fully making
God manifest in the world. This pattern fits with the account of the development of
capacities arising from a particular identity that I developed above. Like any identity, the
imputed righteousness of Christ conveys a status that is the basis of certain relationships
– in this case a restored relationship with God – that results in a standpoint from which
certain commitments and certain possible trajectories of action are possible, the execution
of which can result in the development of certain Background capacities (the further
104
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transformation made possible through social norms will be considered next chapter). The
main difference between Christian theology and the account developed above is that there
is a pattern toward which Christians are being conformed and in whom they participate,
expressed in the doctrine of union with Christ.
I must make three concluding comments regarding, first, common grace, second,
Trinitarian appropriations, and, third, theological orthodoxy. I have argued that the goal
of God’s working in grace does not pit the work of redemption against the work of
creation, so it is incumbent upon me to explain how the redemptive work addressed
above relates to the work of God in the created order. Simply put, justification builds
upon the created relationship between God and human beings expressed in the notion of
the image of God, which I have suggested is the ontic core which makes justification
possible. Scriptural terms like “reconciliation” (katallassō in 2 Cor. 5:18f and Rom. 5:10
and apokatallasō in Eph. 2:16 and Col. 1:20) imply a prior relationship that was damaged
and is now restored – and in this case improved.106 This prior relationship, rooted in the
ontic core of the image of God, is of the order of creation, but the relationship is restored
through justification and strengthened and nurtured through sanctification in the order of
redemption. This transformation is by grace, but grace can be operative in two directions.
106
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reconciled to him, returning and restoring the broken relationship.
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First, as operative directly on the individual through the Holy Spirit in sanctification,
special grace conforms the believer to his new identity in Christ in the order of
redemption by uniting the believer to Christ, bringing about new possibilities that were
not latent within creation through the direct interlocution of communion with God. This
point must be very clearly made: there is nothing within the created order that could
obtain the restoration made possible through justification, something that any application
of the idea of identity to a theology of economics must make quite clear. There is simply
no identity that can arise within the created order that would result in a transformation
mirroring sanctification. The transformation brought about through sanctification
infinitely exceeds the normal transformation arising from the development of capacities
within a particular identity, even if this transformation may serve as a created basis or
analogue for such transformation. Second, as operative indirectly on the individual as
grace mediated through the created order, common grace conforms the believer to her
new identity in Christ in the order of creation, by restoring the imago dei as the ontic core
of the transformed and renewed life through the interlocutions of society, economy,
polity, and family. Again, it must be clear that secular or natural history cannot of itself
reach the telos of humanity, but it must also be clear that the telos of humanity is a
fulfillment of the created order, justification and adoption a fulfillment of the imago dei,
and re-creation through sanctification and union with Christ a fulfillment of the first act
of creation. Salvation does not abrogate creation, and the created order can be more or
less in harmony with the order of redemption. The task of a theological economics is to
identify the ways in which identities received in society or the economy may resist the
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transformation wrought through the performative imputation of the identity and
righteousness of the Son to the believer unto sanctification.
In all aspects of the divine oikonomia, we must remember that God is the one who
undividedly works to bring about redemption, but since it is the triune God who acts, we
must interpret the oikonomia in terms that allow us to distinctively relate to Father, Son,
and Spirit. In the case of justification, this means we must appropriate the undivided
divine action to the Son, insofar as the Son’s unique hypostasis is most clearly revealed in
justification according to the Scriptures. While the Father and the Spirit have a role in
justification,107 this justification is made possible by the atoning work of Christ, grounded
in the believer’s union with Christ, oriented toward the sanctification that conforms one
to Christ, and applied when a Christian comes to faith in Christ as the one through whom
justification is made possible. In short, justification is solus Christus, and through such
justification the Christian especially has communion with the Son. If God’s redemptive
act issues from the Father’s act of revelation that allows for the possibility of creaturely
communion with God, the identity received in Christ through justification actualizes such
personal relationships with Father, Son, and Spirit. This sets the Father’s act of revelation
in relationship to the justification in the Son in a relationship of efficient to formal
cause.108
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Calvin rightly teaches that orthodoxy concerns both right knowledge of humanity
and right knowledge of God,109 so the doctrine of justification must be the center of
orthodox theology insofar as in this doctrine of justification by grace alone through faith
alone in Christ alone the true nature of humanity and of God are revealed.110 Human
beings are sinners reconciled to God through unity with Christ. They are creatures whose
telos is Christoformity. God is the gracious God who meets the sinner precisely in this
merciful declaration of pardon, adoption, and reconciliation. Therefore, identity as the
correlate in the order of creation to the performative declaration of justification in the
order of redemption becomes the basis for our enquiry as to whether the economy is a
common grace-enabled source of concurrent action of God and economic agents toward
the formation in orthodoxy that enables communion with God, or whether such formation
undermines common grace and turns the economy toward sin through the destruction of a
right understanding of human beings.
I should now briefly clarify what will be covered in greater depth in chapter 6 to
avoid misunderstanding: justification as the gift of God is both irrevocable and
immediately complete, so any failure by a Christian to live out the identity of Christ in
the economy does not jeopardize that person’s eternal status before God. However,
justification is necessarily connected with sanctification, something that can progress at
varying degrees throughout the life of a believer. As I will explain more fully in chapter
6, when a Christian does not live in conformity to Christ in the economy, or when the
economy is not oriented toward such a life, it is sanctification that is jeopardized.
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Sanctification within the economy unfolds from the identity received in Christ such that
when economic actions rooted in identity are undermined through instrumental logic and
depersonalization, a Christian cannot easily live according to the identity received in
justification and thereby develop in sanctification. When this occurs, common grace is no
longer operative within the economy toward sanctification. With this connection now
clear, we can return again to the question of identity in the economy.
Economic Models, Depersonalization, and Failure to Engage Identity
In his first epistle, Peter writes, “Each one should use whatever gift he has
received to serve others, faithfully administering God’s grace in its various forms” (1 Pet.
4:10). Christian identity includes within it certain moral commitments and possible
trajectories of action within the economic sphere: “unreciprocated giving, almsgiving,
land restoration, debt remission, slave release, and in the extensive positive obligations of
the gospels,” as Albino Barrera summarizes them.111 In the context of a social imaginary
that would prevent someone from participating in the Father’s work in creation that is
ordered toward redemption, a theology that emphasizes the economic ramifications of the
Christian identity received in justification could work powerfully to counteract certain
sinful or unjust market constructions arising from this fundamental misperception of the
world. Similarly, an economic theory that allowed for the construction of markets with an
eye toward creating structures that encouraged economic agents to act in accordance with
their identities could allow economic interactions to take the form of more closely
concurrent work with the divine acts of common grace in the economy. Unfortunately, a
major problem facing the advancement of theological economics is the fact that identity
111
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has a very small place in much of modern economic theory, to the end of the
depersonalization discussed earlier in the chapter.
The work of John Davis helps to clearly describe the curious absence of identity
in economic theory. Davis suggests that there are two basic components in any attempt to
coherently describe individuals and identity. (Note that Davis does not use the term
“individual” in contradistinction to “person” as I have throughout much of this work.112
More on this momentarily.) Davis calls the first the “individuation criterion,” which
suggests that an adequate conception of the individual must represent that individual as
“distinct and independent beings.” In essence, Davis is here expressing what I have
discussed above as the uniqueness of the person. Without such uniqueness, a concept
fails to allow for individuation. The second principle put forward by Davis is the
“reidentification criterion.”
This criterion requires that individuals that have already been shown to be
distinct and independent in some conception of them can be reidentified as
113
distinct and independent in those same terms across some process of change.

Such reidentification would be a necessary requirement for assessing or even discussing
any formative influence of market interactions on an economic agent over time, such as
the sort of formation in the image of God by which one becomes most fully a person, as
discussed earlier in the chapter. Without these two aspects, an economic model lacks an
112
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adequate theory of identity and of personhood (I will henceforward drop Davis’s
preference for the term “individual” so as to better fit with the terminology deployed
elsewhere in the chapter).
Interestingly, Davis considers neoclassical economic models and concludes that
these models lack an adequate basis for either individuation or reidentification. Standard
neoclassical models represent economic agents through a utility function, which serves as
the basis of a number of microeconomic models of exchange. Davis demonstrates that
such utility functions cannot allow for individuation because of a problem he describes as
the challenge of “multiple selves.” There is no obvious reason why a single economic
agent cannot have multiple utility functions that are manifest at various times in the
multiple roles that the agent may fulfill in daily life. In such circumstances, a utility
function alone cannot fully individuate an economic agent.114 This problem is amplified
in numerous economic models that focus on “collective individuals” like firms or
households, “subsuming the human individuals who make them up.”115 Earlier in this
chapter we discussed the example of “labor” treated as abstract and intersubstitutable,
another example of what Davis calls “collective individuals.” Such prevalent collective
individuality in models coupled with the problem of multiple selves reveals that most
models lack the ability to speak of what I have called the human person.
Davis also shows how standard neoclassical economic models are inadequate in
reference to the reidentification criterion. Utility functions typically express a set of
ordered preferences, but to unify these discrete preferences we must posit some single
reality to which all of these preferences belong. Utility functions – and thus standard
114
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neoclassical economics – do not describe what this single reality is. “Preferences are only
a form of experience, and, when we inspect our preferences, we do not detect among
them any substantial self or individual.”116 Preferences cannot even serve as a basis of
identification, much less reidentification. Davis notes that the more recent theory of
human capital overcomes the problem facing preference theories, but a new set of
problems emerges, the most substantial of which is the problem of the social nature of
human capital. If human capital is socially determined, it no longer can serve as a basis of
reidentifying a single economic agent precisely because “these embodiments could not be
strictly identified with the individual alone.”117 Many standard economic models
therefore lack the basic capacity to reidentify distinct economic agents. Lacking an
adequate expression of identity and personhood, it is not surprising that most economic
models and theories do not even substantively treat these topics.
Admittedly, some economists have recognized the significance of identity in the
market and have sought to understand how differences in identity have economic
consequences. For example, a study by Hoff and Pandey found that students in India
from low-caste groups would perform far more poorly in solving puzzles when their
identities were made public in a multi-caste context. The authors suggest that varying
identities can result in different economic outcomes, but they were also able to modify
the experiments so that bringing attention to identity in this manner did not result in so
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drastic of a shift.118 Similarly, Akerlof and Kranton have applied the concept of identity
to explain why certain industries are dominated by a particular gender, and to explore
how racial identities may contribute to poverty and unequal economic opportunities.119
Though these studies still remain problematic in terms of individuation and
reidentification, as I will show below, at the very least studies such as these should
demonstrate to economists that disciplines like theology that consider the formation of
human persons in terms of identity can have something to say in economic discussion.
Indeed, from a Christian standpoint where God’s disclosure of the true nature and end of
the human person is best described in theological terms of the imago Dei, theology must
have a voice to ensure economic models compatible with and leading to orthodoxy.
Though some economists are quite aware of the influence that identity can have
on the development of an economy, their modeling of identity generally remains
problematic. For example, Kranton and Akerlof assume that individuals choose their own
identity, but in reality identity is often received, or else it is partly chosen and partly
received.120 Their depiction is therefore both implausible and theologically unacceptable
from a Reformed perspective, given that Christian identity is given by grace through
justification and not by choice. Beyond this implausible and theologically unacceptable
assumption, Akerlof and Kranton’s theory faces a problem insofar as identity is
represented in their model as “an argument of the utility function,” as Davis notes. Given
that Akerlof and Kranton follow normal protocol in reducing economic agents to utility
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functions, the result is that there is no person outside of the utility function that can
determine whether the vector representing various identities determine preferences in
various situations.121 In short, Akerlof and Kranton’s model eliminates true individuation,
and thus fails to represent true personhood.
Several major problems arise from the fact that most economic models cannot
adequately treat personhood. The first is the aforementioned problem of
depersonalization. When models use abstraction to treat persons as part of “collective
individuals” like firms or “labor,” the very deployment of models in constructing markets
serves to contribute to the depersonalizing nature of certain economic social imaginaries
discussed in the previous chapter. The second main problem is that models without an
adequate conception of personhood cannot even begin to adequately treat the question of
the formation of individual persons so that markets can be designed so as to allow for the
actualization of particular identities that will allow for virtuous trajectories of action and
the development of morally acceptable Background capacities. In fact, the mere question
of basic moral commitments is often largely neglected, given the fact that identity is not
even a pressing concern. Third and finally, when markets are not constructed with
questions of identity in mind, individual economic agents are inadvertently discouraged
from considering questions of identity in the marketplace. To be sure, there are times
where identity resists such tendencies, as in the case of Japanese labor markets. However,
there are certainly also other situations in which such a loss of identity or fragmentation
of identity undermines the coherent development of an individual, resulting in the
problematic formations of modernity treated by Rommen, Bruni, Taylor, and others.
Finally, the depersonalization of particular economic agents and these agents’
121
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corresponding loss of identity undermines communion with God, insofar as communion
places a person in relation with Father, Son, and Spirit such that each person’s unique
identity is affirmed and ingrafted into the body of Christ (1 Cor. 12:12-26). Without a
coherent concept of identity, economic models cannot be adequately addressed from a
theological standpoint with the end of ensuring that economic actions are concurrent with
the divine work of grace in the economy and not sinful resistance to this plan. Any
economic model that fails to properly consider the question of personhood is
fundamentally heterodox in its denial of a major portion of the kerygma disclosed in
creation through the imago Dei and in redemption through the doctrine of justification in
Christ.
It would be quite easy in light of the failures of modern economic theory in terms
of identity to denounce capitalism in toto. This would be a mistake. Capitalism itself
should not be condemned for the problem of depersonalization uncovered here. There is
nothing intrinsic to capitalism (a system of private property and market exchange) that
would prohibit an emphasis on personal identity or the construction of markets oriented
toward re-personalizing the economy. In fact, a decentralized economy would arguably
provide a stronger basis for the economy on the level of interpersonal interaction. Many
alternatives to capitalism tend to dissolve the person into conflictually understood
economic classes that also disregard individual identity.122 And while advocates of
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In fact, an argument very much like the one Aristotle Papanikolaou makes for liberal
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capitalism like Michael Novak are certainly too optimistic in their praise of corporations
as a virtuous form of community,123 it is in principle possible to construct markets and
corporations that do avoid the problems of depersonalization. The problem is that current
models that have been used to construct the economy do not allow for any personal
distinction, but instead rely on abstract and instrumental logic. Alternative models (and
therefore alternative markets) can be constructed.
Let me conclude the chapter, then, by pointing to one concrete example of how
economic models can be oriented toward the re-personalization of the economy so that
economic identities can be directed toward the identity received in justification and
through union with Christ that is the culmination of human personhood. Luigino Bruni’s
notion of “relational goods” could help transform models so that they not only address
identity, but also provide a means of analyzing the quality of interpersonal relations.
(Economic justice is, after all, more properly about right relations than distribution of
wealth.124) A relational good is an economic concept used to address non-instrumental
relationships introduced by several authors “nearly simultaneously”: Martha Nussbaum,
Pierpaulo Donati, Benedetto Gui, and Carole Uhlaner. Bruni suggests that a relational
good has seven aspects: (a) identity: the identities of individuals providing relational
goods are not intersubstitutable; (b) reciprocity: “Inasmuch as goods are made of
relationships, they can only be enjoyed reciprocally;” (c) Simultaneity: production and
communion is possible but not absolute, a space of negative freedom that allows for a possible
rejection of God, but also of positive freedom, where those who are being drawn toward
communion with the Triune God can be conformed to Christ in part through common grace. See
Aristotle Papanikolaou, The Mystical as Political: Democracy and Non-Radical Orthodoxy
(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012), 144, 158.
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consumption of the relational good is simultaneous; (d) motivations: the relationship
must be the end, not the means; (e) emergent facts: “the relational good is a ‘third’ that
exceeds the contributions of those involved;” (f) Gratuitousness: the relational good is a
good in itself; and (g) good: the relational good is not a commodity, because while it
satisfies a need, it does not have a market price.125 Imagine constructing a market that
seeks to allow for economic exchanges while increasing relational goods. This is
precisely the sort of direction that the economy must take if it is to better serve as a
conduit for common grace, yielding to and cooperating with God’s redemptive work in
history toward the redemption of the Church. Until such a time as models and markets are
better able to foster the development of identity, the immanent term of redemptively
significant transformation in the dimension of orthodoxy will be lacking, and Christians
in the marketplace will be ill equipped to resist malformation from a social imaginary or
to overcome problematic norms that direct Christians toward inappropriate ends. Without
appeal to identity, believers will have much more difficulty continuing to follow Christ in
the economic sphere after their conversion, and this difficulty directly diminishes growth
in sanctification.
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CHAPTER 6 – ECONOMIC NORMS AND THE SANCTIFYING SPIRIT
Market-related activity, trade and other economic functionings have to be embedded in
institutions and social norms. If we refuse to embed our models consciously, we will still
be doing so, only unwittingly.
- Kaushik Basu1

In 1986 a team of psychologists performed a two-step experiment to evaluate
previous findings that groups are more prone to competitive behavior in games than are
individuals. The experiment first had individuals participate in the classic prisoner’s
dilemma, a game where two individuals or teams can pursue several strategies. Designed
to represent the interrogation where detectives lacking sufficient evidence to convict
interrogate two culprits of a crime individually, the game recreates the temptation facing
such prisoners in the face of a plea bargain. When offered a bargain, each prisoner can
remain silent, which will result in the best outcome provided that the other prisoner is
also silent. The prisoner can also take the plea bargain, receiving a reduced sentence
while the other prisoner would get a full sentence. If, however, the prisoner remains silent
but his partner confesses, then he will receive a full sentence. Frequently, the prisoner’s
dilemma results in self-interested behavior where both parties confess in order to receive
a plea bargain, and this is especially the case when two groups play the game.
Following the prisoner’s dilemma, participants took part in a second game
designed to test self-interest. As Insko and Schopler note in their thorough evaluation of
the study, “the idea was to expose subjects to a situation in which competitiveness did or
did not occur prior to their participation” in the second game.2 The second game is known
as mere-categorization, and like the prisoner’s dilemma it had already been studied by
1
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various psychologists. The game divided participants into two groups based on purported
preferences for the art of Klee or Kandinsky as determined by participants viewing
several pieces of art and responding. Groups were then asked to allocate money to
unidentified members of their own groups and of other groups. Insko and Schopler
explain, “If the group-on-group play of the [prisoner’s dilemma] created a belief in the
appropriateness of competitiveness, that belief should carry over to the merecategorization situation where competiveness less obviously occurs [as was known from
previous iterations of the game].”3 The second experiment revealed that participants who
worked in groups during the prisoner’s dilemma game and who therefore saw more selfinterested outcomes were significantly more self-interested in the mere-categorization
game, allocating much more money to those who shared their preferences for art. This
outcome is now discussed under the label of the “discontinuity effect.”
There are two possible explanations for the discontinuity effect. The first is
known as the “schema-based distrust hypothesis,” which posits that groups are more
likely to expect an outgroup to act selfishly and therefore are more likely to respond to
this expectation by acting selfishly themselves. While plausible, this explanation does not
adequately explain why groups in a mere-categorization game that are primed through
group participation in the prisoner’s dilemma to see self-interest as acceptable act more
selfishly than groups who are not primed in this way.4 Therefore, a second explanation is
needed: the “social support for shared self-interest hypothesis.” This hypothesis suggests
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that group members support one another in acting selfishly.5 Specifically, we might speak
of social norms as the basis for such outcomes. If self-interest is a social norm, it will
become more readily manifest in social situations, especially in the context where that
norm has been strengthened or highlighted as in the two stage experiment just discussed.
The implications of these findings for the present work are considerable, for here
again the strong fact/value distinction often manifest in standard economic theory’s
positive/normative distinction is untenable. Standard economic theory often treats selfinterest as positively demonstrable through empirical confirmation of predictions made
by models of self-interested agents, but the matter is not one of pure positive analysis.
Dale Miller puts the matter nicely:
That the explanatory power of the self-interest assumption has been the major
focus of the self-interest debate is understandable, but it has also proven limiting.
In particular it has forestalled consideration of the theory’s causal power – a
serious omission, as the assumption of self-interest is not simply an abstract
theoretical concept but a collectively shared cultural ideology.6

Quantitative analysis of economic actions that confirm predications made by the standard
homo economicus view of human nature may still not demonstrate that the actual motives
of economic agents can accurately be interpreted in light of utility maximization. Miller
insists that it may instead merely reveal that social norms oriented toward self-interest are
particularly strong.7 Here Miller does not go far enough, insofar as he defines a social
norm as something with the “power to induce people to act publicly in ways that deviate
from their private inclinations.”8 As I argued in chapter 5, our understanding of the world
5
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and our repeated response to it in particular ways can actually develop a set of capacities
that may indeed shift our “private inclinations.” Therefore, while it must be granted that
social norms can cause actions that deviate from our internal dispositions, the more
important question that this chapter will address is how such norms as influenced by
models can in fact shape the very internal dispositions and capabilities that make the
discontinuity effect evident. I will show that, over time, social norms can indeed shift
individual behavior in two ways. First, the direct influence of norms circulated through
intersubjective interactions can create patterns of behavior driven by internal capacities
and capabilities. Second, indirect influence of norms can be applied externally through
practices embedded in social institutions. In this instance, I will particularly highlight
incentives.9
This chapter will explore how God can work concurrently toward a redemptively
significant end through the intersubjective human actions that perpetuate social norms
and through the external structural forces that reinforce or undermine such norms by
appropriating such divine action to the Holy Spirit. Here the Spirit’s sanctifying work
through special grace finds a created basis in the order of creation in the Spirit’s work
through common grace whereby all of creation is oriented toward the redemption of the
Church for the purpose of its communion with the triune God. For this reason, a key
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component of the chapter is the connection between the identity received in Christ
through justification and the work of the Holy Spirit in sanctification that brings the
performative speech act of justification to fruition in the ever-increasing union of Christ
with the Church. It is only through this union that common grace finds its fulfillment in
special grace, that creation is perfected in redemption, and that the Father’s selfrevelation through the Son who justifies the believer results in Spirit-empowered divinehuman communion.
The External Regulation of Economic Actions: Technology and Incentives
As discussed in chapter 3 in terms of Kevin Hector’s pneumatology, and as will
again be discussed later in this chapter, norms are perhaps the created reality through
which we can best understand the sanctifying work of the Holy Spirit. In the economy,
however, the significance of norms is often downplayed. Instead, external, noninterpersonal means of regulating human actions are fundamental to the enduring
institutions constitutive of all constructed markets. As I have already briefly suggested in
chapter 4, economic models themselves can serve as an external means of regulating
human behavior. Michel Callon in particular highlights this fact when he argues that
“mathematical economics” can become “realistic under certain conditions,” namely,
when “calculative agencies are there to introduce interrelated calculations in decisions
and in the formation of actions.”10 While I am less certain than I read Callon to be that all
realism in mathematical economic models can be traced to the performative influence of
models, his point is still well taken.
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The place of models in networks as external calculative agencies that result in
predicted human actions is best understood through several illustrations. In chapter 4 I
illustrated the fact that models can be performative and thus can influence human actions
by discussing the Black-Scholes-Merton model for options pricing. Recall that when
options trading began in Chicago the model was a poor fit, but over time human actions
and option prices both converged on predictions made by the models. This must be
primarily seen as a sort of external regulation of human actions, made possible by a
certain social imaginary sustained within models and influential on individuals who have
a particular identity. The regulation is external because predicted outcomes were brought
to pass by external means. Initially, statistical sheets were circulated to traders, creating
the obligation to conform to scientific rigor to maintain the identity of a professional
trader, who would follow the sheets’ scientific recommendations.11 While internal norms
no doubt contributed to the widespread adoption of the sheets, the sheets themselves
externally determined the actual actions of buying and selling. In due time, statistical
sheets were replaced by computer programs, and today to an increasing degree financial
transactions depend upon the automated buying and selling facilitated by such programs
following certain models.
The Black-Scholes-Merton model is certainly not the only example of an
economic model incorporated into concrete economic processes. Consider, for example,
Critical Path Management (CPM), a form of linear programming that solves what
economists call an optimization problem, in this case the problem of determining the
quickest and most efficient path to completing a project. CPM is deployed in many
industries, ranging from weapons contractors to software firms to architectural and
11
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construction companies. Both charts and software platforms are available to complete the
calculations for companies.12 Like the Black-Scholes-Merton, CPM serves as part of a
calculative network that allows economic agents to act according to the normative
economic notions concerning ideal economic behavior that are implicit in many
economic models. Against approaches like economic personalism that challenge the
accuracy of economic models built upon the homo economicus, we must remember the
way that model-inspired technologies can cause human beings to act as if they actually fit
the homo economicus anthropology.
Changes in economic behavior can also be accompanied by changes in the
underlying set of Background capacities possible within a social imaginary and typically
activated within a given identity. This is particularly evident in the second external means
of regulating human behavior in the market that this chapter will study: incentives. Ruth
Grant helpfully explains the three basic components of an incentive:
Incentives ‘strictly speaking’ are a particular kind of offer: 1. an extrinsic benefit
or bonus that is neither the natural or automatic consequence of an action nor a
deserved reward or compensation; 2. a discrete prompt expected to elicit a
particular response; and 3. an offer intentionally designed to alter the status quo
by motivating a person to choose differently than he or she would be likely to
choose in its absence.13

In most economic control processes designed to prompt a particular response, whether
centralized or iterative/market driven, incentives play a major role. G. C. Archibald
explains that such control processes begin with a “qualitative rule” used to determine
“what is optimal.” In most cases, this rule will be derived at least in part from an
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economic model. These processes will also require some kind of implementation system
that leads economic agents to act in the optimal fashion as defined by the model, and this
system usually consists of an incentive structure.14 Archibald provides many examples,
the most easily accessible of which is the example of television. Suppose at a given time
80% of the population favors a show of type A and 20% of type B and that there are three
private television stations whose earnings come from advertizing sales. All three will
present shows of variety A to maximize viewership and ad revenue. This situation is not
Pareto optimal (a standard economic model for welfare economics) because changes
could be made to the market where some viewers would be better off without harming
other viewers. A solution can be found in establishing a public channel whose goal is to
maximize total viewership for the market, and which will therefore put on a type B show.
Of course, the public channel’s managers would need to be incentivized to ensure this
outcome. The basic pattern illustrated here is the need to recognize a sub-optimal
outcome through an economic model, to design a market where it is possible to overcome
the sub-optimal outcome, and then to incentivize the proper individuals so that they meet
the objectives of the model.15 Incentives are thus an important external means of norming
human behavior toward model-determined ends.
The use of incentives sounds innocent enough until you begin to survey the
literature of the impact of incentives on economic agents. Studies have time and again
shown that when a particular action is incentivized, linking that action to an extrinsic
benefit, two common problems occur. The first is known as “crowding out.” When
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external motivation is supplied for an action, internal motivation tends to wither.16 For
example, when blood donation was augmented by a system offering incentives for giving
blood in the United States, donations significantly declined. More than this, “our
internalized benevolence towards those unknown to us, who need blood, began to atrophy
from nonuse.” Over a similar time span, donations in the United Kingdom, where
incentives for donations were not offered, remained strong, as did the general
benevolence needed to motivate individuals to donate blood.17 Several outstanding
surveys of the literature come to similar conclusions: in whatever area incentives are
offered, be it to encourage children to draw during recess or to persuade students to
obtain high grades, internal motivation is reduced and often practically eliminated.18 The
second major problem with incentivizing is known as the “spillover effect.” When
incentives eliminate internal motivation through crowding out, they tend to also eliminate
internal motivation in other areas of human action. Incentivizing blood donations also
harms the internal motivation to be honest; more donors will lie about their health status.
Incentivizing teachers by test scores will cause a higher number of teachers to modify
students’ answers on exams. When students are incentivized, cheating goes up but results
on academic performance as a whole may be mixed.19
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Both the crowding out and spillover effect may be linked to a fundamental shift in
social imaginary. After all, the day care example provided at the beginning of chapter 4 is
simply an example of what happens when you offer disincentives. It is reasonable to
imagine that a similar shift in imaginary accompanies the loss of intrinsic motivators
through the crowding out and spillover effect. Likewise, though most studies do not
consider this question, I hypothesize that these shifts are accompanied by subtle changes
in self-unterstanding and identity. As one’s imaginary changes, the place one occupies in
the imaginary can also change, and this place is regulated by identity. Even if these prior
two shifts do not occur, there can be little debate that habitual actions and norms
themselves are changed when incentives are used. Therefore, in considering incentives
we begin to piece together how constructed markets may shape us through the immanent
terms of social imaginaries, identities, and norms in the dimensions of orthopathy,
orthodoxy, and orthopraxis, which I have argued must be interpreted either as the work of
particular divine Persons in common grace, or the work of human beings who refuse this
grace, depending on whether the transformation is redemptively significant or sinful and
maladaptive. Perhaps discussing two examples in more depth may be helpful in
illustrating the point.
The most common use of incentives in the economy concerns employee and
executive compensation. Interestingly, when surveyed, employees tend to state that
financial incentives are not the best way to encourage employee productivity. Most
employees claim to prefer a sense of significant, challenging work, and opportunity for
growth and advancement over financial incentives.20 Despite this, use of incentives has
20
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become increasingly common, especially as a part of executive compensation packages.21
If we consider the spillover effect and crowding out effect so commonly observed in
terms of compensation packages, we would expect a resulting decrease in internal
motivation and a decline in various related intrinsic motivators rooted in the intrinsic
good of an action. This should make incentives the subject of intense scrutiny, but this is
rarely the case. For example, John Reynolds considers problems surrounding investment
banking after the 2008 global financial crisis. He clearly explains how investment
bankers’ salaries are a mix of shares and salary “based on a review of an individual’s
contribution to the bank’s profit or loss.”22 These incentives are designed to encourage
bankers to be cautious and prudent, avoiding unnecessary risk and promoting the security
of the bank because stability is in their own self-interest because they are stakeholders.
Despite equity in the banks (sometimes worth hundreds of millions), many bank
executives still prioritized high-risk, short-term gain to long-term gains and security
leading up to the 2008 financial crisis. Reynolds attributes this to high turnover rates,
particularly among junior bankers, that undermine any orientation toward long-term
stability that incentives might provide.23 He concludes by cautioning against any major
change in the banking system, merely suggesting that incentives for ethical behavior may
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not “outweigh” those for unethical behavior.24 In other words, the collapse was a mistake
in judgment, not evidence of a decline in ethics. While I have no doubt that many
virtuous bankers still work in firms across the globe, a response encouraging banks to
double-down on incentives by increasing them so that they outweigh unethical behavior
misses the basic point: external motivations kill the very intrinsic ethical factors that are
necessary for financial stability. Reynolds offers neither an othopathic understanding of
the economy, nor a reasonable basis for orthopraxis.
Consider a second example: incentives as a basis for ecological care. Incentives in
ecological care typically take two forms. Occasionally, effluent fees are implemented,
where pollution is directly disincentivized through monetary fines. Such an approach
faces numerous legislative problems given the challenges of predicting the level of fine
that will reduce pollution to a desired level. A second and much more popular approach
involves constructing a market for tradable pollution permits, where firms purchase
pollution permits on an open market such that the total pollution allocation is below a
certain critical threshold.25 Such a permit system still functions as an incentive insofar as
it offers the extrinsic benefit of lower costs to those who institute environmentally
friendly technologies and who therefore do not need to purchase permits. Thus, permits
are a prompt designed to elicit a response that alters the status quo of polluting toward
more ecologically sustainable approaches. As an incentive, we can therefore expect to
find both the crowding out and spillover effects. There is some evidence that this may
occur, and that permits do not successfully target the underlying problems leading to
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pollution in the first place. For example, permit systems may cause some firms to simply
“substitute from controlled emissions to uncontrolled pollutants.”26 In other words, the
system does not create any internal motive to reduce pollution because it substitutes an
extrinsic benefit for the intrinsic benefit of a healthy created world.
Theologians and ethicists frequently disagree with economists over permit
systems for pollution regulation. André Fourçans helpfully notes that economists tend to
emphasize ethical outcomes, while moral philosophers emphasize ethical intentions, a
divergence in what I have called an imaginary. He adds that moral philosophers also have
a different understanding of the identity of economic agents, emphasizing social
embeddedness where economists see individual evaluators who change most easily by
use of incentives.27 Having granted these differences, Fourçans then attempts to
adjudicate between these two possibilities by recourse to cost-benefit analysis, arguing
that other forms of ethical analysis cannot decide “whether the health of asthmatics or the
elderly has more ‘moral importance’ than for example the jobs and the livelihood of
workers” in questions of environmental policy. Instead, all ethical concerns should be
incorporated into analysis by assigning costs to them and performing a cost-benefit
analysis.28 He then argues that market-based incentive approaches have a lower social
cost and higher expected benefits.29
The approach Fourçans puts forward is flawed in several respects. It should be
obvious that he fails to pass his own critique: if it is impossible to determine which
26

R. Quentin Grafton et al., The Economics of the Environment and Natural Resources
(Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004), 81.
27
André Fourçans, “Firms and the Environment: Ethics or Incentives?” in Ethical
Boundaries of Capitalism, eds. Daniel Daianu and Radu Vranceanu (Burlington, VT: Ashgate,
2005), 201-202.
28
Ibid., 204-5.
29
Ibid., 209.

273	
  
concern has greater moral importance, then it should be equally impossible to assign
differing monetary values to these concerns based on relative moral importance. Having
pointed out this inconsistency, I am not ready to concede that theologians and ethicists
cannot establish relative weight to various moral concerns, though I admit that this may
not be possible in all situations.30 Nevertheless, a more important problem with
Fourçans’s approach is that he depersonalizes the economy by substituting monetary
evaluations for moral concerns related to concrete persons and that he offers external
motivations for a problem that must ultimately be overcome through recognition of the
intrinsic good of creation and resulting internal motivation to reduce pollution. As a result
of this heteropathic and depersonalizing imaginary, Fourçans advocates policies that will
ultimately only reduce orthopraxis as the crowding out effect eliminates virtuous internal
motivations, resulting in the malformation of economic agents. A far better
methodological approach is found among advocates of the re-imagining approach like
Sallie McFague and John Cobb who have addressed ecological concerns. Despite my
ultimate reservations with the metaphysical assumptions of both theologians, I find their
arguments for the need to shift imaginaries from “economism” to “earthism,”31 or from
30
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an “economic worldview” to “a planetary theology” and “ecological worldview,”32 a
proper theological approach. Right action is only possible within the horizon of a proper
imaginary, and is only fully realized within a trajectory of action internalized because it
conforms to a particular identity. Therefore, as I have attempted to show through the case
studies of corporate incentives and environmental policy, a study of orthopraxis in the
economy must move beyond the external regulation offered by technology and incentives
to consider internal regulation through norms. The first step toward a theology of norms
in the economy is a theology of the Spirit that is properly attentive to the social nature of
sanctification. I turn now to the development of this pneumatology.
The Sanctifying Spirit and the Created Order
Noting the Pauline benediction, “The fellowship of the Holy Spirit be with you
all” (2 Cor. 13:13, cf. Phil. 2:1), Jürgen Moltmann writes, “the creation of community” –
here koinōnia, which I have been treating with the label communion – “is evidently the
goal of God’s life-giving Spirit in the world of nature and human beings.”33 While we
ought not to draw too sharp a distinction between the divine persons in the work of
creating the community of the Church (after all, Paul also speaks of the believer being
called into fellowship of the Son in 1 Cor. 1:9), Moltmann does rightly note the social
nature of sanctification through the Holy Spirit: “God is experienced not merely
individually, in the encounter of the individual, solitary soul with itself. He is experienced
socially too, in the encounter with others.”34 Though the sociality of sanctification and the
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distinctive mission of the Holy Spirit could be defended by appeal to many significant
modern Reformed theologians ranging from Barth35 to Gunton,36 this emphasis can be
found much earlier in scripture and in the Reformed tradition.
Though the Holy Spirit is not as prominent in the Old Testament, the social nature
of the Holy Spirit’s work is still evident. Responding to the common claim that the Spirit
is given to individuals in the Old Testament and to the Church in the New, Thiselton
rightly notes, “the gift of the Spirit is given to individuals only to promote the welfare of
the community of Israel.”37 He points to the example of the book of Judges, where “at
least seven of the judges receive the enabling of the divine Spirit” but
each of these manifestations of the Spirit of God ultimately preserved Israel from
broadly the era of Joshua to that of Saul or of the kings, while ‘in those days
there was no king in Israel’ (Judg. 18:1). Even if the Spirit anointed chosen
individuals, this served the people of God as a whole.38

We also see the breath or Spirit of the Lord playing a significant role in the Exodus
event, an event which, along with the promise to Abraham, constitutes Israel as a distinct
nation. After passing through the red sea, Moses and the Israelites attribute the parting of
the waters and the subsequent drowning of the Egyptian army to the rûah (Ex. 15:8, 10),
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a trope found elsewhere in the OT canon (Isa. 63:11b-12).39 The Spirit is therefore central
in the creation of the Israelite community. Though more muted than in the New
Testament, there is a clear social dynamic to the Spirit’s work in the Old Testament.
Particularly in Paul’s writings, the New Testament makes the sociality of the
Spirit’s work even clearer by highlighting a “corporate dimension to sanctification,” to
use Peterson’s terminology.40 This is manifest when Paul describes sanctification as a
formation into a single body or collectively into a temple of the Lord (1 Cor. 3:16-17,
12:13, 2 Cor. 6:16-18, Eph. 2:21-22).41 It is also evident in Paul’s common usage of suncompounds. Paul regularly crafts such compounds to speak of believers in the plural
being “buried with Christ” (sunetaphēmen, Rom. 6:4), “joined with him” (sumphutoi,
Rom. 6:5), “crucified with him” (sunestaurōthē, Rom. 6:6), “living with him” (suzesomēn
autō, Rom. 6:8), “being glorified with him” (sundoxasthōmen, Rom. 8:17), and so forth.
Christians are, as a community, “being made alive together with Christ” (sunezōopoiēsen
tō christō, Eph. 2:5).42 Because the Spirit is the one who unites us with Christ, this means
the work of the Holy Spirit is inescapably social in nature. The very idea of spiritual
growth is directed to both individuals and groups and is not something expected to occur
in isolation from other believers.43 Thiselton notes that for Paul the Holy Spirit is both
“given to a chosen individual” and also “poured out either over the community of all
God’s people, or within the framework of God’s purposes for the whole community.”
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This is particularly evident in 1 Corinthians 12, where gifts are “to each one individually,
just as the Spirit chooses” (12:11 NRSV), but are means “for the common good” (12:7).44
The point made for Paul could equally be made in regard to Luke-Acts, as I will soon
show.
Drawing on this Scriptural tradition, Reformed theology has also historically
emphasized the social nature of sanctification. At times this is manifest in certain patterns
of speech that implicitly drive a social theology of the Spirit, even if the connection is not
always explicitly made. For example, Calvin speaks of the Spirit being poured out “not
for any other purpose except that… we might all be converted together to be the people
of God [emphasis added].”45 The Church is “bound together by the one doctrine and the
one Spirit of Christ,”46 and believers are “participants in his spirit… For the spirit of the
Lord has reposed on Christ… in order that we all may draw from his fullness and receive
grace.”47 For Calvin, sanctification flows from our corporate union with Christ made
possible through the Holy Spirit, though he does not often pause to highlight the social
nature of this reality. Despite this shortcoming, his insights, along with those of other
early reformers, are preserved in the confessions. Thus the Heidelberg Catechism invites
congregations to affirm in question 53 that the Holy Spirit “has been given to me
personally,” while equally affirming in question 53 that “the Son of God through his
Spirit and Word… gathers, protects, and preserves for himself a community chosen for
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eternal life.”48 In Reformed theology the work of the Spirit on individuals toward
sanctification and union with Christ is balanced with the fact that the Church as a
community is properly the object of this pneumatological work of union.
I highlight the sociality of the Spirit’s work as a first step toward establishing the
link between norms and the work of the Holy Spirit. Even granting that the identity
received in justification has social consequences, particularly in terms of the distinction
between Jews and Gentiles, justification remains a decidedly individual phenomenon
where individual persons receive the new identity in Christ. Sanctification, on the other
hand, certainly pertains to individual persons, insofar as individual Christians are the ones
sanctified, but the social nature of this sanctification is central. This suggests that a proper
immanent term for considering the supervenient work of the Spirit must be primarily
social in nature, just as identity, the immanent term for justification, had to be primarily
personal in nature and only secondarily social insofar as identity is established in relation.
To further establish the link between norms and the work of the Spirit, we must
attend to the pneumatology of Luke-Acts, paying particular attention first to the curious
Lucan link between the laying of hands and reception of the Holy Spirit, and second to
the two modes of action for the Holy Spirit. Three times in Acts, Luke links the laying of
hands with reception of the Holy Spirit, when Peter and John visit the fledgling church in
Samaria (Acts 8:4-19), when Ananias laid hands on Paul to cure his blindness and
welcome him to the Church (Acts 9:17), and when Paul visited the Corinthian church
(Acts 19:1-7). While the laying of hands in these pericopes is certainly not intended to
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suggest that baptism in the Spirit depends on certain fixed rights,49 it is nevertheless
associated with a legitimate “transfer” of the Spirit, though this is an exceptional
occurrence.50 Because reception of the Spirit occurs in various ways in Acts, these
passages should not be interpreted as indicating that baptism in the Holy Spirit is
consequent upon particular apostolic contact or that it is always subsequent to conversion
rather than simultaneous with faith. Rather, given that these examples all occurred at
decisive moments to converts from missionary expansion into Samaria, to the apostle
Paul who would lead the gentile church, and to the gentiles at Corinth, it is reasonable to
agree with Lampe when he sees in the laying of hands an expression of “fellowship and
solidarity,”51 “association” and “personal contact,”52 and a sort of commissioning that
“takes the particular form of the association with the missionary, apostolic, ministry of
new members to join the work.”53 The occasion for this solidarity is the need for mutual
recognition of the apostolic validity of the Samarian church, the Gentile church, and the
Jewish church at Jerusalem. Thus, in Acts the laying of hands is only “secondarily an
effective symbol of the gift of the Spirit.”54 These unique instances demonstrate both that
“manifestations linked with the reception of the Holy Spirit… constituted corporate
rather than individual experiences,”55 to quote Eckhard Schnabel, and that reciprocalrecognition by Jew and Samarian of joint participation in the fellowship of believers was
49
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so significant that the Spirit operated in such an unusual fashion to facilitate such
recognition between parts of the one Church.
There are two modes of action for the Spirit in Luke-Acts, which can be labeled
“invasive irruptions,” and “complementary influence.” Accounts of invasive irruptions
depict the Spirit dramatically acting on the historical stage in an unmediated manner.
Accounts of complementary influence show the Spirit working concurrently with a
human person such that this person becomes the mediator of the Spirit’s work.56
Language is important for both of these categories. The first example of an invasive
irruption is found at Pentecost, with a major emphasis of the first appearance of the Spirit
being speaking in tongues (Acts 2:1-13). Throughout the books of Luke and Acts and
building upon Old Testament depictions of Spirit-empowered prophetic speech,
complementary influence particularly emphasizes the Spirit’s role in guiding what
Christians will say (Luke 12:12, Acts 4:8, 6:10, 13:9, 21:4).57 Accounts of
complementary influence are also associated with the key Lucan phrases “full of the Holy
Spirit” and “filled with the Holy Spirit.” As James Shelton notes, “the contexts for both
expressions reveal Luke’s interest in inspired speaking,” even though “filled with the
Holy Spirit” more often explicitly denotes “the empowering of an individual on a specific
occasion to speak authoritatively.” Those who are full of the Holy Spirit are still those
56
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divinely commissioned to proclaim the gospel.58 Taken together, these two varieties of
the Holy Spirit’s work suggest a powerful connection in Luke-Acts between the Holy
Spirit and language.59
With these exegetical points in place, I can now connect the scriptural account of
the Spirit’s work with Hector’s pneumatology that was presented in chapter 3. Hector
links theological language to the work of the Holy Spirit, which circulates through the
normative assessment that determines whether concept use carries on a precedent
trajectory.60 By this account, the work of the Spirit is fundamentally social, which fits the
Old Testament and Pauline depictions of the Spirit’s work. Hector also treats language
use and therefore the Spirit’s work as linked to the mutual recognition by which a speaker
recognizes someone as an authority in speaking, and then from that authority seeks
recognition of the legitimacy of the new speaker’s speech act.61 In Luke-Acts, the
unusual phenomenon of the laying of hands resulting in reception of the Spirit was in
order to ensure the Jerusalem church’s recognition of God’s work among the Samarians
and Gentiles, as well as to facilitate the recognition by the Samarians and Gentiles of
their unity with Jewish Christians. Finally, Hector compellingly argues that language is
norm-laden (and this stands regardless of where one lands on his claims about the nonmetaphysical nature of his account). If language is norm-laden, and if the Spirit’s work
both in its irruptive and complementary forms can so closely be linked to language, then
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whom one recognizes as users of the concept, and one intends this by trying to use it in the same
way as certain precedents.” Ibid., 63.
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the Spirit’s work must also be linked with norms more broadly considered, especially
given the widespread New Testament emphasis on the Holy Spirit as a basis for normed
ethical actions, or what I will call virtuous actions.
For both Hector and Luke, Spirit-empowered language cannot be divorced from
the broad use of language throughout society. In the account of Pentecost in Acts, the
languages spoken by the power of the Spirit were not distinct from common tongues, as
is evident from the fact that the crowd recognized the words spoken by the Apostles as in
their native tongues (Acts 2:8). The Spirit-empowered speech of the early Christians at
Pentecost was thus a grace-enabled transformation of human language that elevated such
language above its natural capacity. As such, Pentecost must be seen not only as a
restoration of the intended state of creation through the undoing of the dispersion of
languages at Babel that was a consequence of sin (Gen. 11:1-9), but also as a
transfiguration of this original state by elevating such language through the
eschatological impact of grace during the “last days” (Acts 2:17). To turn to Hector’s
more philosophical account, it must be made clear that the Christ-initiated and Spiritenabled trajectories of precedent language use draw upon broader vocabulary, patterns of
speech, and conceptual frameworks from society at large, albeit in a sense that
transfigures such concepts and speech. Simply put, there can be no complete divide
between the order of creation and the order of redemption in terms of theological
language, which is but another way of pointing out that God’s common grace must be
operative in some fashion throughout all human society for such a connection to be
possible.
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The same structural relation between norms in society and Spirit-enabled action
exists in all areas of Christian life, be it in the realm of language, virtuous action, or
liturgical worship. Virtuous action can be oriented by norms within the created order
toward a good end, though the theological virtues will always exceed the capabilities
latent within the created order. Worship follows certain liturgical patterns that are learned
as part of the community, but even worship draws upon the created order both in its
constitutive materials such as the bread and wine of Eucharist,62 and in its patterns of
speech drawn from vernacular languages.63 Any normed activity within the Church,
therefore, draws in part upon an always-prior set of norms within the created order. So
while it must be stressed with great force that it is not a social impulse but Christ who
unites the Church through his Spirit,64 we must be careful to equally stress that the
Spirit’s work to unite the Church is always also a work to re-unite creation, to restore it to
its Edenic state, and at last to transfigure it beyond even the glory of Eden. We never
move from created language and knowledge to the order of redemption by powers latent
within creation itself. However, having been illuminated by the Father’s self-revelation in
the Son as received through our Spirit-enabled understanding, we can stand within the
order of redemption and see the created order as it truly is: an order oriented toward
redemption and designed for communion with Father, Son, and Spirit.
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Helpful here is Schmemann’s suggestion that the Edenic Eucharistic priesthood was
designed such that Adam and Eve would be “offering of the world to God, and in this offering…
receiv[ing] the gift of life.” Creation from its start was oriented toward communion with God, as
is evident in the fact that basic material elements are central to the Eucharistic meal. Alexander
Schmemann, Sacraments and Orthodoxy (New York: Herder & Herder, 1965), 17.
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This remains the case even for a Latin or Greek liturgy, given that certain historical
patterns of speech drawn from the created world are retained within liturgy.
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Barth, Dogmatics, IV.3.2, 682.
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To use the proper technical term, the work of the Holy Spirit in the believer’s life
is sanctification, a work that follows necessarily from justification and that is rooted in
faith.65 All who are justified by grace through faith stand equally approved before God,
recipients of a new identity in Christ. Sanctification must be distinguished from
justification because, in contradistinction to justification, in sanctification there is no
change in status. While there is no progress in justification because the justified stand
equally before God, not all are equally sanctified. Despite this distinction, justification
cannot be dissociated from sanctification as if these two aspects of redemption were two
unrelated or divisible acts. Sanctification must be rooted in justification, and justification
must result in sanctification.66 The necessary unity between the Son’s foundational work
in justification and the Spirit’s work in sanctification was initially rooted in a desire to
resist enthusiast claims to have visions that contradicted the Biblical text.67 In later
Reformed theology we see the unity amid distinction mandated by a theology of
appropriations, where the Father’s work in creation, the Son’s work in redemption, and
the Spirit’s work in creation are neither divided from one another, nor exclusively the
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The Reformation principle of sola fide demands that sanctification also be rooted in
and developed through faith. This connection between faith and sanctification gestures toward the
relationship between the social imaginary and norms. For a thorough treatment of the connection
between faith and sanctification, see G. C. Berkouwer, Studies in Dogmatics: Faith and
Sanctification, trans. John Vriend (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1952).
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The distinction and relation between justification and sanctification here described is
widely attested throughout Reformed theology. Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology Volume 3
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1982), 108, 213; Calvin, Institutes, III.11.6; Ursinus,
Commentary, 227; Wollebius, Compendium, XXXI.13; Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics vol. 3,
570-572; Kuyper, Holy Spirit, 440-447; Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 530.
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I. John Hesselink, “Pneumatology,” in The Calvin Handbook. ed. Herman J.
Selderhuis, trans. Henry J. Baron, Judith J. Guder, Randi H. Lundell, and Gerrit W. Sheeres
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 2009), 300; Thomas F. Torrance, Kingdom and
Church: A Study in the Theology of the Reformation (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1956), 97-99.
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work of one divine person.68 Thus, the work of the Spirit must be properly related to both
the created order and to the work of the Son.
Though this has been underemphasized in the Reformed tradition, the work of the
Spirit in redemption proper is in harmony with the divine work of common grace
operative in creation. I have argued that this means that there is a created analogue69 to
the Spirit’s work in sanctification. This created analogue can either be the location of
God’s concurrent work of common grace that finds its telos in the redemption of the
faithful, or it can be a site of malformation where human beings refuse that same telos
and divide the order of creation and redemption. It should be clear by now that I consider
norms to be the created analogue a theology of the economy must seek. This follows
from the relation between norms, identity, and the social imaginary. A social imaginary
establishes the symbolic framework within which any trajectory of human action is
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So Bavinck insists that when we appropriate creation to the Father, redemption to the
Son, and sanctification to the Spirit, we must acknowledge, first, that each person is active in all
three parts, but also, second, that the appropriation is fitting insofar as creation is ordered toward
redemption and subsequent sanctification in much the same way that the Father begets the Son,
and with the Son spirates the Spirit. Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics vol. 3, 571; cf. Wollebius,
Compendium, XXXI.3. This is not an entirely novel development. Bullinger, for example, used
appropriations to distinguish in a similar fashion the Father’s work in creation, the Son’s
incarnation, suffering, death, and resurrection, and our “sins… forgiven in the Holy Ghost.” The
same basic point is there, though there is not yet a completely developed distinction between
justification as grounded in the redemption found in Christ and sanctification through the work of
the Spirit. Heinrich Bullinger, The Decades of Henry Bullinger. The Fourth Decade, ed. Thomas
Harding (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1851), 326.
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It must be clear that the Spirit’s work is not here reduced to the preservation of certain
norms but rather that (a) it is analogous to these norms, and (b) these norms are in small part the
immanent term for the Spirit’s work in sanctification. The Holy Spirit’s work in sanctification is
ultimately mystery, meaning that the particular mechanism by which such a transformation is
made cannot be fully known. As Kuyper notes, the ineffability of sanctification is an important
restraint upon any “human effort to make oneself holy or holier.” As long as the mechanism for
sanctification lies beyond our comprehension, we can never attempt to work our way to
perfection on our own. Nevertheless, this emphasis on epistemological humility must be held in
balance with the equal principle that any redemptively significant transformation toward
sanctification brought about through norms operative in the economy must be spoken of as
concurrently the gracious work of God. Kuyper, Holy Spirit, 435.
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intelligible. One’s identity then establishes the set of commitments that determines which
trajectories of action one is able to take. Through norms, an individual is reinforced in the
pursuit of particular sets of action through the pre-reflective and intersubjective influence
of others. Thus, concurrent divine work through norms can be properly appropriated to
the Spirit not only for the scriptural reasons attested above, but because norms serve to
complete trajectories that issue from a social imaginary and are actualized within a
particular identity. If norms must be considered coincident with the work of the triune
God, then following the rule for speaking of appropriated divine works they are most
fittingly works of the perfecting Spirit.
To avoid the error of Pelagianism, I must again remind the reader that I do not
mean to imply that redemption emerges from norms in the created order. Redemption and
sanctification are decidedly transcendent of the world as grace is to nature. Once the
special grace of God is operative in sanctification, however, the human person is
gradually brought to share in the perfect humanity of the incarnate Christ through union
with him, and in this transformation the order of redemption perfects God’s act in the
order of creation, such that special grace is a fulfillment of the common grace within
which creation is sustained. This means that under certain circumstances life in the world
in general, and in the economy in particular, can contribute towards the redemptively
significant transformation of believers, though certainly not in any meritorious sense.
Common grace also works toward the sanctification of the elect insofar as all of creation
and all of human civilization falls under the same divine providence that leads the Church
to communion with the triune God, but God’s work toward sanctification through
common grace operative in creation depends upon the prior special grace of justification.
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The Spirit works in sanctification to restore the image of God.70 In terms of the
created order, the development of capacities through the social imaginary discussed in
chapter 5 partially constitutes the created basis for this restoration. Recall that
Background capacities are the basis of seeing the world in a particular way and of
recognizing particular institutional facts. The set of possible capacities is largely
determined by the social imaginaries within which a subject interprets the world.
Particular identities then contribute to the actualization of a specific subset of
Background capacities, and these capacities are developed through their repeated use in
practices that require habituated action along a particular trajectory maintained by norms.
For these capacities to actually develop and transform a human being, normed action is
essential.
The development of Background capacities is only a partial created term for the
Spirit’s work of sanctification. A complete account must also consider the virtues that are
developed through interpersonal norms. To explain what I mean, I will draw on Alasdair
MacIntyre’s working definition for virtue:
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends
to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices and the lack of
which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.71

Note several significant aspects of this definition. First, virtues enable particular
practices. By practices, MacIntyre intends any “socially established cooperative human
activity” that strives toward intrinsic goods that are “partially definitive of that form of
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Berkhof, Systematic Theology, 532.
Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, third edition (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 191. MacIntyre treats this definition as a
working definition, but insists that further conceptual clarifications are required to sufficiently
grasp the notion of virtue.
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activity.”72 Virtues are developed within a social network demarcated and maintained by
specific norms73 that carry on precedent trajectories.74 These networks themselves are
determined in part by the goods toward which they are oriented. In the terminology I
have been using, they are intelligible only within a particular imaginary.75 Second, the
successful development of virtue facilitates our achievement of the goods intrinsic to
practices themselves. I will explain the significance of this fact momentarily. Third,
virtues are acquired qualities. With Background capacities, they form a nexus of norminfluenced human qualities whose acquisition and growth is the created analogue for the
Spirit’s work in sanctification to “infuse new qualities into the will,” to use the
terminology of the Canons of Dort.76 For this reason, MacIntyre’s definition of virtue
must be slightly altered, such that virtues allow us to “obtain” rather than “achieve”
internal goods. It is also preferable to speak of the reception of theological virtues, though
this reception also is manifest in a progressive growth that remains dependent upon
habituated action reinforced by norms. As agents operate according to these norms they
grow in virtue, a redemptively significant growth that must be partly attributed to
common grace and appropriated to the Holy Spirit.
72

Ibid., 187.
In MacIntyre’s words, “A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to
rules as well as the achievement of goods.” Ibid., 190.
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MacIntyre is in clear agreement with my Hector-influenced depiction of norms as
carrying on a chain of precedent uses when he claims that “To enter into a practice is to enter into
a relationship not only with its contemporary practitioners, but also with those who have preceded
us in the practice, particularly those whose achievements extended the reach of the practice to its
present point.” Ibid., 194.
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MacIntyre uses the related and yet conceptually distinct notions of narrative, story, and
tradition. The fundamental point of each of his terms is the same as the basic point of a social
imaginary: human actions are intelligible only within a larger framework. The details, of course,
diverge in many instances. Ibid., 204-225.
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Canons of Dort, III/IV.11. cf. Turretin, Institutes, Vol. 2, 17.1.4. Turretin claims that
sanctification “consists in a change and renovation of nature itself (corrupted by original sin) by
which depraved qualities and habits are cast out and good ones infused so that the man desists
from evil acts and strives for good.”
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The telos of all of God’s work in oikonomia is to bring about communion between
human beings and the Father, Son, and Spirit. The Spirit’s distinctive role in
sanctification is no different. Brunner puts the matter succinctly: The Holy Spirit’s “first
and decisive activity is this, that He makes Christ present to us.”77 Through our Spiritenabled union to the Son whose presence we are increasingly aware of, Christians share
in adoption and thereby also have communion with the Father in a manner analogous to
the Son’s communion with the Father (Eph. 1:5). The triune work of redemption must
therefore be seen as the means participating in God’s knowledge of God.78 Communion is
here orthodoxy in the sense of both right knowledge and right worship. The sanctifying
work of the Spirit insures such communion is never merely orthodox though, insofar as
sanctification results in virtuous actions, a life walking in the light of the Lord (Is. 2:5).79
Our acquisition of the theological virtues of faith, hope, and love in a partial degree
through sanctification and then fully through glorification enables us to achieve the
intrinsic good that is communion with God, a communion itself constitutive of the
ecclesiological and redemptive-historical practices80 within which virtue is obtained.
This treatment of the Spirit rounds out the expansion of Kevin Hector’s
pneumatology begun in chapter 3, so it would be prudent to pause to summarize the
contours of the constructive development I have pursued. I am convinced that one of the
significant contributions that Hector’s Theology without Metaphysics makes is found in
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78
Thomas F. Torrance, The Mediation of Christ (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992), 116-117.
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I use MacIntyre’s sense of the term, here, meaning that sanctification is social in its
reliance on cooperative human and, I would add, concurrent divine action delimited by standards
of excellence, here conformity to Christ.
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its attempt to correlate theological discussion of Spirit-enabled language use with
technical and concrete accounts of how language is actually learned and used. Tabling the
question of metaphysics, I have attempted to affirm the basic method while developing it
in four dimensions. First, I develop Hector’s claim that “a concept just is a norm, in that a
particular use is both normed by precedent uses and, in turn, norms subsequent uses.”81 If
this is the case, then the simplest way that to expand Hector’s proposal is to connect the
Holy Spirit’s work to norms in a more general sense, as I have done in this chapter.
Though helpful in this context, I grant that this contribution is not a significant departure
from Hector’s own work. It relies almost entirely on his insights.
The second manner in which I have developed Hector’s theology is to offer a
more properly trinitarian correlation between accounts of human action in general and the
work of God. This element begins to represent more of a departure from Hector’s project,
though I pointed out in chapter 3 where there were aspects of Hector’s work that pointed
in this direction, especially his correlation of justification and sanctification with
identification and transformation.82 If the Spirit works through norms, then the Father
works through social imaginaries and the Son through identity. Besides offering a more
clearly trinitarian account of language use, this development allows for a more
comprehensive analysis of all norms in relation to other created realities through which
God is acting. As a result, this creative development of Hector’s insights allows for a
more comprehensive deployment of his basic insight into the market, where three created
realities can now become the focus of analysis instead of merely one.
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Hector, Metaphysics, 105.
Ibid., 235-6.
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The trinitarian development of Hector’s work that I pursued required me to
develop his work in a third way by situating his discussion of norms within a broader
theology of divine action deriving from a non-contrastive account of transcendence and
drawing on classical accounts of concurrence and appropriations and on more
contemporary discussions of supervenience. On my account, norms, identity, and social
imaginaries are not only identified with the Spirit, the Son, and the Father, but they
become the immanent terms of divine action. Though this connection begins to head in a
direction that in the end may be incongruent with Hector’s own (anti-)metaphysical
commitments,83 I believe it is indispensible to speak in these terms. Once we recognize
that norms, identity, and social imaginaries are the immanent terms of God’s coincident
and supervenient action within the created order, it is possible to connect these immanent
terms with God’s work in the order of redemption. In short, these terms become the
means by which God can bring about three dimensions of redemptively significant
transformation by facilitating our return to God of right experience through orthopathy,
right practices through orthopraxis, and right knowledge through orthodoxy, though again
I remind the reader of the fundamentally interconnected and ultimately indivisible nature
of these dimensions. In other words, speaking of concurrent divine action allows me to
develop a theology of communion, where personal relationships with Father, Son, and
Spirit emerge from grace-enabled mutual awareness and mutual interactions in
knowledge and will, initiated by God through revelation, justification, and sanctification
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It would take more analysis than space permits to determine whether or not this is the
case. In short, I would note my suspicion that even if language does not correspond to the essence
of a thing, the sorts of metaphysical moves I am making require me to make claims about the
divine essence that would seemingly undermine Hector’s therapy and still fall subject to the
concerns raised by Marion, Caputo, and others.
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and returned by humans to God through a life of orthodoxy, orthopathy, and
orthopraxis.84
This connection between the immanent terms of divine action and communion
results in one final creative expansion of Hector’s project, one that as far as I can tell
lacks a parallel in Hector’s own work. If God works through norms, identity, and social
imaginaries, it becomes possible to speak of transformation made possible through these
immanent terms, or of human refusal of this transformation. While Hector quite helpfully
gives an account of how human talk about God must be a participation in God’s talk
about God, I fail to see where he connects this claim with a theology of grace, so that any
human participation in God’s talk about God also results in transformation of the speaker
by grace. In terms of the current project and its theology of common and special grace,
and having made the generalizing move from language to human actions in general, we
can now more clearly say what it means to participate in both the life of God and in a
market economy. When a market is constructed so as to allow for human norms, social
imaginaries, and identity to become more open to being the objects of concurrent divine
action, redemptively significant transformation can bring about communion such that
participation in the market can also in an analogous and anticipatory85 sense be
participation in the life of God. I see this development as my most substantive move
beyond the groundwork laid by Hector and as the full conclusion of my theology of the
economy.
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Here I believe I have finally fully connected the account of communion developed in
chapter 2 in dialogue with Owen, Chirico, and Hodgson to the technical apparatus developed in
chapter 3.
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I say antitipatory because a full union between participation in life in the created order
and participation in the life of God will only occur at the eschaton.
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Now that my full theological account is complete, and now that the connection
between norms and the work of the Holy Spirit has been clearly elaborated, one final task
remains. I must now consider whether the model-influenced norms operative within the
economy, a particular subset of creation, are such that they facilitate practices that make
the realization of the intrinsic good of communion obtainable, or whether they tend to
resist the divine work of common grace that unites the divine acts of creation and
redemption toward this final beatific end.
Norms, Virtue, and Economic Models
Some economists are aware that norms can affect the economy, and some even
consider the question of the development of virtue through economic action. For
example, studies have found that when there is a social norm against receiving welfare
payments, people are more likely to take low quality jobs to avoid unemployment and the
social stigma of welfare payments. When welfare is socially accepted, people are less
likely to take low quality jobs and unemployment rises.86 Despite the fact that some
studies exist treating the issue of social norms, many of the mainstream economic models
taught in classrooms and textbooks neglect these fundamental aspects of human action.
Instead, these textbooks begin with microeconomic analysis that treats individual
consumer preference functions and budget constraints giving rise to demand as a
byproduct of an optimization problem. Texts then move on to consider equilibrium as a
result of the convergence of aggregate demand functions with production functions for
firms.87 Mainstream neoclassical models depicting rationality treat consumers, firms, and
86

Basu, Political Economy, 76.
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investors as utility-maximizing individuals whose preferences are exogenous to the
model – meaning that the model does not consider how preferences arise.88 The notion of
exogenous preferences is itself problematic in that models do not consider what can be
called preference-changing norms that ultimately shape consumer preferences.89 As
theologians like to point out, this means that economic models are often unable to
account for the role that marketing and advertizing can play in shaping preferences by
instilling new social norms in consumers. There is a deeper problem with this approach to
standard utility maximization problem within a budget constraint: N. Gregory Mankiw,
Principles of Microeconomics, seventh edition (Mason, OH: South-Western College Publishers,
2014), 435-460; Robert S. Pindyck and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, eighth edition
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2012), 67-109. McConnell, Brue and Flynn have added a
chapter on behavioral economics to the twentieth edition of their text in the consumer behavior
section, something previously missing. Despite this, there is still no viable account of norms.
Campbell McConnell, Stanley Brue and Sean Flynn, Microeconomics, twentieth edition (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 2014). Hubbard and O’Brien do consider fairness as interpreted through
behavioral economics, and preferences are treated as endogenous to the economy by appeal to
Becker’s analysis of social influences on utility. However, insofar as preferences are still
determinative of consumer choices, there is still no role for norms. R. Glenn Hubbard and
Anthony Patrick O’Brien, Microeconomics, fifth edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall,
2014), 304-349. Krugman and Wells qualify the standard optimization problem by noting that
bounded rationality, risk aversion, and questions about fairness my change results. However, even
in the discussion of fairness, nothing approaches a viable account of social norms. Paul Krugman
and Robin Wells, Microeconomics, third edition (London: Worth Publishers, 2012), 243-316.
There are, of course, exceptions to this trend in textbooks. Notable for its attention to the
connection between advertizing and preferences, the social embeddedness of consumer behavior,
and the ethical analysis that must be linked to consumer behavior is: Neva Goodwin, Julie A.
Nelson, Frank Ackerman, and Thomas Weisskopf, Microeconomics in Context, second edition
(Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2009), 251-283. Equally notable is a microeconomic
textbook that begins with institutional design and social interactions, and that considers social
preferences in the consumer behavior chapter: Samuel Bowles, Microeconomics: Behavior,
Institutions, and Evolution (New York: Russell Sage, 2004). Neither of these latter examples
were in Amazon’s top fifty best selling microeconomics books.
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Nancy Fox reminds us that this does not mean that economists have entirely neglected
the question of the origin of preferences, pointing to Veblen, Leibenstein, and Galbraith. Though
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I draw the term from Basu, who suggests that there are three economically-significant
varieties of norms: (a) rationality-limiting: “a norm that stops us from doing certain things or
choosing certain options, irrespective of how much utility that thing or option gives us”; (b)
preference-changing norms: norms that may influence preferences for consumption, investment,
or working; (c) “equilibrium-selection”: a norm that “helps people select an equilibrium when
more than one equilibrium is available.” Basu, Political Economy, 72-3.
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preferences: treating preferences as exogenous helps to prevent many economists (there
are certainly exceptions) from seriously engaging the development and social evolution
of economic systems.90
Substantial as the problems facing many economic models are in the area of
exogenous preferences, an even larger problem is found in the underlying assumption
that rationality can be equated with utility maximization. The problem has been well
known for decades, at least since Amartya Sen’s seminal paper “Rational Fools.” In the
paper Sen distinguishes between sympathy and commitment, where sympathy refers to
“concern for others [that] directly affects one’s own welfare,” and commitment to a
concern for others that does not improve one’s welfare but which is rooted in a moral
commitment.91 Sympathy may drive someone to give money to a beggar on the side of
the road to prevent the discomfort arising from the beggar’s pleading look, while
commitment may compel that same person to give anonymously to support natural
disaster relief. The difference here is one of motivation. In a case of sympathy at least
part of the motive is the desire to alleviate one’s own discomfort of suffering. In
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The contribution in terms of preferences is merely part of a larger problem treated by
Herman Daly and John Cobb, who argue that, while economics has never fully neglected the
social and historical evolution of markets – the authors point to Hegel, Marx, and Marshall here –
by and large economists only seek models that explain current behavior. Cobb and Daly suggest
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commitment, there is no such self-interested welfare motive. Utility maximization alone
cannot account for commitment, a major flaw in the standard account of rationality.
One can make a utilitarian objection to Sen’s distinction by arguing that there is
still some implicit satisfaction found in “doing the right thing” such that all decisions still
boil down to utility maximization. Perhaps with this in mind, Sen later strengthened his
objection to the standard account of rationality, distinguishing between welfare, goal, and
choice. He claims that self-interested behavior has three components: “Self-centered
welfare” indicates that a person’s utility depends only upon her own consumption, “selfwelfare goal” indicates that a self-interested agent has the goal of maximizing utility, and
“self-goal choice” indicates that a person’s choices are guided by her own goals.92 A selfinterested individual therefore acts in such a way that goals and choices are joined with
and subsumed to self-welfare maximization. Commitment, on the other hand, drives one
“wedge” between welfare and choice and another between goal and choice.93 The wedge
between welfare and choice is fairly easy to understand if commitment motivates actions
that provide no welfare benefit. This is the wedge that the standard utilitarian objection
challenges. Even if the standard objection holds, which I doubt,94 the second wedge
between goal and choice must be taken into account.
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1996), 80.
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Sen’s second wedge entails that commitment can cause someone to make a choice
contrary to his own goals, therefore driving a wedge between choice and goal. Social
norms (of which moral norms are a subset) would be one important determiner of goals
outside of individual choice. Hans Bernhard Schmid has critiqued this position, claiming
that such a thing is impossible according to John Searle’s notion of “conditions of
satisfaction.” A condition of satisfaction is the requirement that must be fulfilled for me
to have done what I intended to do. Schmid suggests that if a person intends something,
then he must have chosen his goal, his own conditions of satisfaction.95 I think Schmid
overstates the case, insofar as someone can, through commitment, find herself in a
situation where she intends to act according to the commitment setting conditions of
satisfaction upon that intention, namely, the willingness to do whatever that commitment
entails. What the commitment entails, however, may not be set by the agent, but by some
“other.” Thus, to intend to adhere to a particular commitment is to intend to act according
to some external standard that will have its own conditions of satisfaction, its own telos.
Despite objections, I consider Sen’s distinction between commitment and sympathy a
helpful challenge to standard economic theory, one that highlights fundamental flaws in
dominant economic theories of rationality.
Standard economic theory’s failure to incorporate a principle of commitment has
three theologically significant consequences. The first consequence is that models lacking
room for commitment reinforce self-interested behavior.96 This is so because such models
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Hans Bernhard Schmid, “Beyond Self-Goal Choice: Amartya Sen’s Analysis of the
Structure of Commitment and the Role of Shared Desires,” in Rationality and Commitment, eds.
Fabienne Peter and Hans Bernhard Schmid (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 214-215.
96
Some Christian ethicists do not see this as problematic. Thus Nankivell argues that a
“competitive, acquisitive instinct” has been fundamental to human life as far back as we can
historically explore, so it would be pointless to attempt to purge human nature of this instinct
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convey to those who are aware of them the fact that self-interest is not only a norm but
also the only rational basis for human action. As discussed in the example of the
discontinuity effect at the beginning of the chapter, when self-interested behavior is
understood as acceptable and even normative, economic agents are more likely to act in
self-interested ways. (This may partially explain the phenomenon discussed in chapter 4
where economics students tend to manifest more self-interested behavior than their
counterparts in other disciplines.) Given that proper formation in sanctification requires
the development of Background capacities that allow us to act in an other-regarding
manner, loving our neighbor as ourselves (Matt. 22:39 and pars., Gal. 5:14), this
shortcoming is prone to putting out the Spirit’s fire and resisting the work of
sanctification in the economy.
The second consequence of economic models’ lack of treating commitment is
even more substantial. Because any internal motivation other than utility preferences is
eliminated from most economic models of behavior, markets constructed with these
models in mind typically resort to external motivation through incentives that attempt to
restructure preferences. This use of incentives tends to eliminate internal motivations
oriented toward intrinsic goods through the crowding out effect and the spillover effect,
something hugely problematic from the standpoint of orthopraxis because the
now. Instead, we should seek to build institutions that make the most of it. Owen Nankivell, All
Good Gifts: A Christian View of the Affluent Society (London: Epworth, 1978), 63. Even if this
were the case, and there were no Edenic state of other-regarding love prior to a historical fall,
theological ethics should not be oriented toward the past, but rather the eschatological future. The
theological task is to call the believer to a life beyond the natural capabilities latent within
creation, that is, to call the believer to life as a new creation. Here one could appeal to the
invisible hand as something bringing a morally positive outcome from self-interested individual
motives. John Stapleford points out that even Adam Smith in his advocacy of the invisible hand
assumed that responsible people would “‘constrain’ themselves in ‘the pursuit of self-interest.’”
Increasing self-interest through norms would eventually result in a magnitude of self-interest to
which even Smith would object. John E. Stapleford, Bulls, Bears, and Golden Calves: Applying
Christian Ethics in Economics, second edition (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity, 2009), 42.
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development of virtue depends upon the pursuit of goods intrinsic to a practice itself,
whether this practice is economic like working, or theological like living in communion
with the triune God.97 In short, not only do incentives make the development of virtues in
the economy problematic through the crowding out effect, they may also make the
development of the theological virtues problematic through the spillover effect. As the
sociology of religion approach is prone to notice, a major problem with the contemporary
economy is that it tends to eliminate economic agents’ recognition of the intrinsic good of
a religious practice or belief, instead substituting an extrinsic good as the basis of
religious belief and practice.98 This is why critiques of utility-maximizing homo
economicus by a theological approach such as personalist economics can never be quite
adequate: the problem is not merely one of orthodoxy, that such models do not truly
represent the human being created in the image of God. The problem is fundamentally
one of orthopraxis, that when such models are used as the basis for constructing a market
and economic interactions therein, the market will undermine the development of virtue,
no longer conforming to the divine work of common grace that could be operative within
it. The very problem with the spillover effect is that it eliminates any internal drive
toward intrinsic goods other than money, but God is the highest intrinsic good, so
97

D. Stephen Long, perhaps underemphasizing the point, writes: “Because the success
and advancement of capitalist societies have little if any bearing on the relation of the internal
goods of participants in those societies to their achievement of external goods, such societies
make the exercise of virtue difficult.” Long, Divine Economy, 230.
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Vincent Miller suggests that the sociological claim that religion is becoming
therapeutic is partly a result of advertizing attempting to convince the consumer that she is
missing something. Here a false religion seeking to facilitate human ability to cope in the face of
an ever-receding loss of intrinsic goods is presented as a substitute for well-grounded theological
community that is itself an intrinsic good. Vincent Miller, Consuming, 85-87. Bruce Rittenhouse
argues that consumption is an effort at “self-valuation,” a pursuit of material goods as a religious
response to the threat of death and loss of meaning. Here, the religious impulse remains, but
material goods that are extrinsic to true religion become the perceived source of satisfying the
religious ground motive. Rittenhouse, Shopping, 147-152.
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Christian life suffers. One truly cannot love both God and mammon (Luke 16:13 and
pars.). Here the economics as religion approach is invaluable in its insistence that the
modern economy can fundamentally change the way that religious subjects understand
and practice their religions.
The third and final shortcoming is the fact that a shortage of models that can
analyze commitment results in the lack of an adequate economic framework for
considering whether market structures enhance or impede economic agents’ abilities to
develop and receive virtue. The question of virtue is not entirely unknown in economic
research, though it has certainly been peripheral to mainstream discussions. There are two
influential theses regarding the relationship between virtues and the market. The “doux
commerce” thesis claims that virtues are encouraged to flourish through commerce, while
the “self-destruction thesis” disagrees, claiming that the market undermines the very
virtues that are needed for its proper functioning.99 Graafland argues compellingly that
both theses are too simplistic. He surveys seventy-three economic studies that consider
whether the market enables or hinders the development of virtue and finds three
conclusions that are pertinent for our study: (a) we have not reached conclusive empirical
answers; (b) though theoretical studies are divided evenly between the doux commerce
and self-destruction thesis, empirical studies are far more pessimistic, with two-thirds of
them reaching negative conclusions about the relationship between virtue and the free
market; (c) individual virtues may respond differently to markets (i.e. diligence seems to

99

See Johan J. Graafland, The Market, Happiness, and Solidarity: A Christian
Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2010), 108. Among the authors considered in chapter 1 in the
legitimizing approach, Deirdre McCloskey most explicitly relies on the doux commerce thesis.
McCloskey, Virtues, 30-31.

301	
  
improve, but the vice of envy also increases).100 Graafland’s analysis leads me to believe
that it may be possible to construct markets that are at least more amenable to the
development of virtues, but this task will only be possible when fundamental economic
models of human behavior move beyond depictions of self-interested pursuit of
preferences or utility, instead considering norms, evaluating the endogenous origin of
preferences, and treating the development of virtues. While economic actions within a
market oriented toward the development of virtue obviously would not be coterminous
with sanctification, they would allow us to construct a market in the created order that has
a transcendent telos only fulfilled in the order of redemption.
Gary Becker, himself an advocate of utility maximizing theories of human
behavior that fail to attend to the idea of commitment,101 may have developed a partial
foundation for the economic analysis of virtues in his notion of personal capital and
social capital. Both ideas treat preferences as endogenous to models (i.e. determined
internal to the models themselves),102 with personal capital referring to the manner in
which past personal decisions may influence present preferences, and social capital
referring to how past and present actions by peers in a social network may influence
present personal preferences.103 Essentially, personal and social capital function as a sort
of feedback loop. An economic agent acts at a particular time based on a particular utility
function that is, in part, derived from the personal and social capital stocks. The action
taken can affect these capital stocks, which in turn modifies the utility function, resulting
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in new actions being taken in the next time interval, leading to yet another set of
modifications to the capital stock, and so forth ad infinitum. Thus, unlike many other
dominant economic models, Becker is able to speak of something akin to a social norm
that results in the development of particular qualities within an economic agent. If his
theory of rationality was modified to allow for a notion like commitment, then social
capital stocks perhaps could even treat the development or reception of virtues. However,
without any notion of commitment, the reduction of rationality to preference
maximization – even preference maximization influenced by the preferences of others in
society – makes it impossible to treat the development of virtue through commitment to
an intrinsic good, a goal chosen by God and not the self, that eventually transforms the
will and bends it toward a higher end.104
In point of fact and despite its potential to be transformed and put to better use,
Becker’s model of human agency illustrates the full set of problems considered in the
second half of this project. Becker’s economic work is perhaps the most invasive
example of economists deploying a marginalist-influenced economic imaginary in all
domains of human life to answer a wide range of problems.105 Therefore, Becker’s work
104

For a parallel analysis that contrasts Augustine with Milton Friedman, see Cavanaugh,
Being Consumed, 7-15.
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Consider, for example, Becker’s treatment of the family. He interprets altruism as a
preference where altruists receive a “psychic income in place of money income.” In other words,
altruists do not act out of commitment, but out of preference and utility maximization. Becker
analyzes the family and the market, concluding that the marketplace is an inefficient place for
altruism, while a family is an efficient place for altruism. In the marketplace, rational agents can
calculate that making direct cash transfers to those in need is more efficient than providing goods
at below cost to those in need, so direct philanthropic giving will predominate and altruism will
apparently be absent. In families, however, “marriage markets” match partners whose preferences
are to be benefactors or beneficiaries. Investment in children’s human capital through altruism
actually promotes the prestige of the family as the child becomes more successful. For these
reasons, Becker claims that there is a market basis grounded in utility maximization and
efficiency for altruism in the family, but not in the marketplace. Gary S. Becker, A Treatise on the
Family, enlarged edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 299-302. The

303	
  
contributes in a significant way to the heteropathic depersonalizing found in many social
imaginaries influenced by instrumentalist marginalist logic, a depersonalizing trend that
undermines the general revelation of God in creation. Becker’s work also lacks space for
a rigorous conception of identity. As John Davis notes, Becker still has no adequate basis
for individuation insofar as the agent in Becker’s model who invests in various forms of
social and personal capital is still merely a collection of preferences, preferences that
Becker must arbitrarily assume are immutable in order to allow for reidentitification.
More than this, there is no reason why we cannot imagine multiple sets of preferences
manifest in different contexts, which from the standpoint of Becker’s model would
signify the same thing as the existence of multiple selves.106 This multiple-selves problem
leads to fragmentation of identity and the inability to develop a coherent set of
Background capacities needed for proper development in self-understanding and
understanding of God, i.e. for orthodoxy. Without space for identity in the economy, one
cannot live in accordance with the identity received through justification, and therefore
one cannot easily grow in sanctification. Finally, as previously noted, Becker’s lack of a
notion of commitment undermines social norming toward an intrinsic good as an

example clearly attempts to extend a particular imaginary and a particular understanding of
reasoning into the family. Becker has made similar efforts in many areas of life not traditionally
interpreted in terms of economic theories of utility maximization. See: Gary S. Becker and Guity
Nashat Becker, The Economics of Life: From Baseball to Affirmative Action to Immigration, How
Real-World Issues Affect our Everyday Life (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1997). John Mueller
rightly notes that Becker’s theories cannot explain the real economic decisions facing a family.
For example, men on average consume more food than do women. Assuming that costs of
education and shelter are the same, this would mean that parents must derive higher utility from
boys than from girls to explain their decision to continue to raise male children, at least if we are
following Becker’s approach. Mueller argues compellingly that such a conclusion is “circular and
nonverifiable” – the explanation of parents as utility maximizers only explains such basic
phenomena concerning the family if you also posit preferences for men. Neither preferences nor
utility maximization is verifiable on its own, and each assumption relies on the other. Mueller,
Redeeming, 166-7.
106
Davis, Theory of the Individual, 55-62.
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orthopraxic means of developing virtue as part of the Spirit’s work of sanctification. As
long as social norms are reduced to preferences understood in the context of utility
maximization, the proposed policy response to problems will draw on incentives with the
resulting crowding out and spillover effects.107 Becker’s economic theories, therefore,
serve to illustrate the broad problems facing much of modern economic theory, where
failure to attend to social imaginaries, identity, and norms undermines transformation in
the dimensions of orthodoxy, orthopathy, and orthopraxis.
Despite the pessimism with which I treat Becker’s work, I am not yet ready to
give up on the market or on economics as a viable Christian discipline. To be sure,
theological obstacles are formidable, but sometimes orthpraxis can be a viable starting
point for returning to orthodoxy and orthopathy, just as orthopathy can be a basis for
orthodoxy and orthopraxis.108 In game theory, norms have resolved a number of
intractable problems in games where purely self-interested individuals are unable to
obtain an optimal outcome. For example, consider what is known as an agency game. In
the game a principle invests $1. An agent can choose to take the principle’s $1, at which
time the game ends, or to also invest $1. If the agent invests, both players receive their
initial investment back plus an additional $0.50. Operating under a rationality of pure
profit maximization, the agent normatively should refuse to invest and make an
additional $1. However, game theorists have found that committing the principle and the
agent to a longstanding relationship that discourages failure to participate through strong

107

So, for example, Becker proposes to use incentives or fines to tackle crime,
immigration, and drug addiction. See Becker and Becker, Economics of Life, 142, 60-61, 150.
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Just as the work of God proceeds from the Father, to the Son, terminating in the Spirit,
so our return to communion with the Father can reverse the standard pattern, beginning in the
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in terms of the theology of James K. A. Smith in chapter 4.
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professional norms can result in both principle and agent consistently investing such that
each player can make a steady profit. Over time, the norms are internalized and action is
changed. Rationality also changes, because the agents think in more collective terms than
in terms of mere individual utility-maximization. Finally, we can deduce that the agent’s
experience of the game is re-personalized through a longstanding relationship.109 In short,
the agency game reveals that norms resulting in orthopraxic behavior have the potential
to derail a heteropathic imaginary just as a heteropathic imaginary may have the potential
to derail orthopraxis. Norms themselves may be a basis for transforming the economy so
that it conforms to the work of God through common grace toward redemption.
For this reason, I choose to end my substantive analysis by pointing to the
positive developments that have been made in business practice around the globe through
movements I have classified as part of the redistributionist approach. The Focolare
movement or the distributist-influenced Mondragon Corporation have already
incorporated more orthopraxic business practices into their management, production,
labor, and investment policies. Having granted this, however, I must immediately
concede that the successes within these corporations are paltry in comparison with the
larger changes that need to occur. Economic models defending the economic feasibility
of such endeavors must be developed and deployed in the construction of markets that
make the success of such businesses possible. The complex and time consuming process
that would be needed to bring this change about could bring with it positive
developments in orthopathy and orthodoxy, resulting in a market that does not impede the
ability of Christians to live in communion with Father, Son, and Spirit, but which instead
109

Robert D. Cooter, “Law from Order: Economic Development and the Jurisprudence of
Social Norms,” in A Not-So-Dismal Science: A Broader View of Economies and Societies, eds.
Mancur Olson and Satu Kähkönen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 230-34.

306	
  
serves as a conduit for the common grace by which Father, Son, and Spirit are drawing
the world to themselves for the redemption of humankind. I view defending the necessity
of such a project as a vital need for contemporary theology and hope that the preceding
arguments have begun to make the case for a theologically informed economics.
However, the actual construction of markets capable of being conformed to the work of
common grace is something a theologian should never hope to be able to accomplish
alone. So while theology may yet return to its post as queen of the sciences, a queen
without subjects is nothing but a vestigial reminder of what might have been. Therefore
only when Christian economists, politicians, and business executives make their own
irreducible contributions to the development of an economy of common grace can
regicide be prevented, and can there be any hope of a grace-filled market through which
human beings may more fully know the God who eternally is Father, Son, and Spirit.
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CONCLUSION
That God is always working in and through the Church to redeem a people is
theologically indisputable. The Church exists as the body of Christ, those who are being
transformed into the likeness of the one who purchased them with his blood. The extent
of the work of God in the world toward redemption, however, remains far more fragile.
Though creation will find its end, its renewal, and its transfiguration in the eschatological
completion of the transformation God is currently working within the Church, the extent
to which creation is currently transfigured is by no means guaranteed.
I have endeavored to show that creation and redemption are not two disparate acts
of God, but that creation itself is oriented toward a telos that is only obtainable through
grace. In fact, human action within the created order is so radically dependent upon grace
that we must understand God’s transcendence in a non-contrastive way. Though God is
transcendent to human actions, he is no less immanent to them so that all human actions
must be understood as in some sense also the concurrent act of God. “In some sense” here
plays a decisive role. Some human actions in the created order tend toward the
supernatural telos of that order, in which case they must be understood as that form of
grace whereby God uses all of creation to draw together a people for Himself. Reformed
theologians speak of this as common grace. Other human actions are sinful and attempt to
negate this grace. These actions are still permitted by God, but must be understood as
primarily human, a discordant and irrational undoing of the divine work of creation.
Because God is triune, all divine actions must be seen as the undivided work of
the Father, Son, and Spirit. Each action, however, can be properly appropriated to Father,
Son, or Spirit as each work more clearly reveals one particular person. As fons divinatis
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the Father eternally generates a Son who is the perfect instantiation of the Father, a Son
on whom the Spirit eternally rests to complete the love of the immanent Trinity. In the
order of redemption we properly see the work of the economic Trinity ad extra taking a
similar form. The Father’s self-revelation in the Son is the source of faith in a believer
who is then justified through the Son’s redemptive death. Justification performatively
conforms the believer to the image of Christ through the inseparable gift of the Spirit
whose work in sanctification and glorification completes and perfects the transformative
work of redemption. These acts must be seen as acts of special grace, devoid of any
human meritorious contribution, arising solely from faith, and leading to communion
with Father, Son, and Spirit who are each known distinctively in their respective
redemptive acts.
We must remember that redemption is not severed from creation. Instead it
perfects creation. So we also see within the order of creation a number of concurrent
divine-human actions that are oriented through common grace toward redemption, and
which can be appropriated to Father, Son, and Spirit insofar as they conform to the
distinctive eternal relationship of each. Human beings experience the world within a
particular social imaginary, a particular symbolic framework illuminating the social
significance of any human action that makes a particular set of actions possible. Within
an imaginary, a particular human identity determines for an individual the specific
actions that can possibly be instantiated within a social world, and those actions are
manifest as patterns of behavior brought to completion under the influence of social
norms. Particularly when the human acts of experiencing, knowing, and doing underlying
a social imaginary, identity, and norms are redemptively significant, contributing to the
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sanctification of the Church in the order of Redemption, we must speak of God the
Father, Son, and Spirit at work in the economy through an imaginary, identity, and norms
respectively. When these created terms undermine redemptively significant
transformation in the dimensions of orthodoxy, orthopathy, and orthopraxis made
possible through special grace, they must be seen as sinful efforts to quench the Spirit’s
fire.
I have argued that both common grace and sin are possible within a market
economy in the areas of social imaginary, identity, and norms. Though a market can be
constructed in many ways, many contemporary economic models contribute to an
imaginary that depersonalizes and objectifies human persons in the economy. As a result
of this depersonalization, Background capacities for relating to others as persons wither,
thereby diminishing our ability to have communion through personal relationships with
the three divine persons. This failure in orthopathy can undermine an orthodox
understanding of human identity through an instrumentalist logic deployed throughout
the economy that undermines the unique and valuable nature of all humans who bear the
image of God. Even worse, modern economic models’ failure to adequately treat the
notion of identity results in market constructions that contribute to identity fragmentation
or to loss of identity. In such circumstances it becomes difficult for Christians in the
economy to live into the adopted identity of Christ’s sonship received in justification, a
fact that undermines the sanctification that flows from justification. When instrumental
logic emphasizing self-interested utility maximization is understood as a norm, it can
derail patterns of action in the world that pursue the trajectory of other-regarding action
initiated by Christ and sustained by the Holy Spirit. Markets constructed under the
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assumption that human beings are motivated only by extrinsic incentives undermine
intrinsic motivations fundamental to the development of virtue, resisting the work of the
Spirit in sanctification.
Though problems abound, this need not mean that the market cannot be a conduit
of God’s common grace contributing to the sanctification of the Church. I have argued
that many of the strongest critics of capitalism have failed to attend to the diverse ways in
which a market can be constructed. In fact, Christians within the redistributionist
approach have already engaged in markets in a manner more likely to foster
sanctification than is normally the case in the modern economy. Furthermore, though the
market is often depersonalizing and objectifying, market structures themselves can foster
interpersonal interaction that results in genuine community. Efforts to develop relational
goods within market exchanges, reduction in the use of incentives, and attention to which
market structures contribute to the formation of virtue could all result in a market system
that is in greater conformity with the work of God in redemption. There has been far too
little intentional research regarding these questions to yet determine the extent to which a
market can be constructed within which an economic agent can be more easily aware of
the workings of the Father, Son, and Spirit within the created order, and within which
these divine workings are less frequently resisted, so it is not wise to pursue the course of
the legitimizing approach, even if it was possible to clearly endorse an economy as the
best Christian alternative, which is unlikely.
At this point I must acknowledge what may be a glaring omission in the eyes of
some of my readers. I have responded to critics of capitalism who fail to attend to the
potentials latent within the market and who view the market as necessarily leading to the
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malformation of human persons, but I have barely mentioned objections to capitalism
that treat the market as fundamentally oppressive, unjust, or idolatrous, the sorts of
objections often made in liberation theology. This omission is by design and for two
reasons. First, I sought to attend to a prior question to that of injustice, namely, what
factors of a market economy contribute to our formation as human subjects such that
gross economic oppression or injustice could be possible in the first place?1 When the
structure of the market is depersonalizing, emphasizes instrumental logic, or diminishes
intrinsic motivation, any effort to pursue justice will be undermined. When the market
resists the formation of the Background capacities necessary to avoid what is commonly
called the idolatry of the market, or when the development of the virtues needed to pursue
justice are undermined through a refusal of the goods internal to a practice, justice will
not be found. Second, while I have outlined the salient features of a theology addressing
the work of God in the economy, I have for the most part avoided analyzing particular
policies, market structures, or institutions. Eventually analysis will need to turn to these
questions, but there was enough to tend to in this volume to prohibit my considering
particular questions of justice at present.
Another glaring omission may have bothered some of my readers: Where is the
Church? In the theology here presented, I have emphasized how creation is oriented
toward redemption, and therefore how common grace is oriented toward the benefit of
the Church. What has been conspicuously absent is any account of how the Church is
also for the world. This has rightly been a far more important theme in much systematic
theology. Because the community that is the Church is the community that is united with
1

Here I have no particular injustices in mind. The question as to how just or unjust the
current market economy is must be tabled for a later project.
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a God who is a God for the world, the Church is fundamentally for the world.2 I have
merely intended to highlight the corresponding truth that because the fact that God is for
the world is most clearly evident in the Church in which God is drawing persons within
the world to himself, and because this Church within the world is fundamentally for God
by the power of the Holy Spirit, we can know that the world is also by grace designed to
be fundamentally for the Church and through the Church for God. This is the return to
God by which personal relationships are mutual, and communion is complete. My
theology has therefore emphasized common grace and the need to orient creation in
general and the economy in particular toward the sanctification of the Church and toward
the glory of God. A complete theology of the economy – and I make no claim to have
here presented a complete theology – would also attend to the manner in which the
Church is for the world as the body that bears witness to world that it is created by and
for God.
Though I cannot sufficiently develop the connection between ecclesiology and
economy, special grace and the world here, I can at least offer some preliminary remarks
that may help illuminate the direction such a theology might take. The Church has the
responsibility to bear witness through the power of the Spirit to the salvation available in
Christ according to the Father’s eternal plan. Whereas a theology of common grace
explores the subtle ways in which society as a whole can contribute toward the believer’s
sanctification, a theology of special grace must explore how the Church proclaims the
word to society as the means by which the world can be transformed through special
grace so as to partake in the salvation that makes sanctification possible in the first place.
A theology of common grace highlights the way that salvation is corporate, pointing out
2
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how a human person is shaped by society and economy in ways that are redemptively
significant. Personal salvation is never so personal as to unfold in isolation from one’s
community and social context. A theology of special grace highlighting the Church’s role
in society recognizes that the Church is also a fundamentally and irreducibly communal
reality, but special grace highlights the personal nature of salvation. Each human being
when confronted with the Word stands before a broad and a narrow gate (Matt. 7:13-14)
given a personal choice to be for or against God.
When the Church places the decision to be for or against God before the world,
the Church provides the occasion for God’s grace to lead to faith, conversion, and
transformation. Such conversion and transformation is the primary means by which the
world can change, and so proclamation by the Church and intentional effort within the
economic sphere offers the best hope of bringing about the changes needed to properly
orient the created order toward the order of redemption. This must be made clear lest a
certain Gnosticism creep into a theology of the economy that would present salvation as
an escape from captivity in sinful structures – in this case in a sinful economy that lacks
orthopathy in its social imaginary, orthodoxy in its notion of identity, and orthopraxis in
the actions perpetuated by norms. Yes, the economy can resist the transformation
happening through sanctification, and yes, the economy can be a site of God’s common
grace, but no, the transformation found through salvation is not primarily about rightly
constructing imagined spaces like the market. For this reason, a theology of common
grace must always be balanced by ecclesiology.
What, then, is the role of the Church in the economy? If my arguments are
persuasive, how should the Church respond to what I have argued? Have I provided a
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recipe for a Constantinian drive to seize state power as a basis for constructing a market?
While there is no doubt that some work must be done through political channels, it is not
clear at all that the primary means of bringing about change must lie through the use of
statecraft. The Church’s main objective must always remain the task of simply being the
Church, a city on a hill, a lamp not hidden under a bushel (Matt. 5:14-16). When
Christians make a move to change the economy so that it yields to the work of God in the
created order, this task will always be secondary to the task of faithful witness to the
gospel. And when such transformation is pursued, it can easily be pursued in a
microeconomic context, as businesses pursue new ends, individual markets are
constructed along different lines, and consumers, workers, and investors strive toward
new practices rooted in their identity in Christ, practices that will contribute to the
transformation of prevailing social imaginaries that disenchant the world and undermine
communion with the triune God.
Communion with the triune God is the end goal of all of creation. Within the
Church, this means that God is working to bring a redeemed people into ever-closer
fellowship with Father, Son, and Spirit. God’s work within the world is no less oriented
toward such communion, such that the work of the economic Trinity in redemption will
eschatologically converge with the economic work of human beings. This convergence is
a horizon toward which we must continually strive, though as horizon we cannot hope for
a full realization of such unity until the final consummation of creation is completed in
the advent of Christ’s return and reign. Until that final day, may we have the courage to
proclaim to the world that it is oriented toward a transcendent goal, toward redemption,
toward communion with God, and through this proclamation may the economic work of
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Father, Son, and Spirit by grace include the economic work of human beings. May there
be communion with the economic Trinity in the economy of humankind.
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